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ABSTRACT
Essays on Learning Outcomes and Education in Mexico
Vicente Antonio Garcı́a Moreno
The objective of this dissertation is to present empirical evidence and analysis of three key issues
in the Mexican education system: 1) school accountability, as reflected in a particular state innova-
tion pursued by the state of Colima in 2009 to identify and address the problems of low-performing
schools, 2) age delay and the effects of a national reform introduced in 2006-2007 that modified the
first grade entry-age across all Mexican states, and 3) the educational disadvantages of indigenous
peoples in México and their consequences, as determined from recent data which allows identifi-
cation of this population.
First, the dissertation evaluates the impact of a targeted state-sponsored intervention program
known as Programa de Atención Especı́fica para la Mejora del Logro Educativo (PAE) designed
to provide low-performing schools with remedial resources in Colima, México. The research an-
alyzes the effect of this compensatory program in terms of standardized test scores among 108
participating schools having the lowest learning outcomes in 2009. The results of this “natural
experiment” confirm that intervention in the form of the PAE program had a positive impact on
average test scores in poorly performing Colima schools. By exploiting PAE’s eligibility rules, a
regression discontinuity method is used to estimate the impact on subsequent learning outcomes.
Schools that participated in the program and a valid comparison group were followed for three
years in order to compare their performance. The fact that the program was halted after only one
year meant that the only realized interventions were those related to the program’s preparation,
which revolved around notifying schools as low-performing, identifying a school’s main academic
problems and devising a development plan to address those challenges. Yet, after only one year,
test scores in PAE schools increased by 0.13 standard deviations vis-à-vis non-PAE schools and in
fact, after three years, differences between the two groups of schools were no longer significant.
Second, the dissertation explores the impact of exogenous variation in the age at which students
enter school on education outcomes. Prior to the 2006-2007 school year, the cut-off day for school
entry in Mexico had been September 1st. Since then, however, pupils aged 6 by as late as Decem-
ber 31 could start public school. Data related to this cut-off transition are reviewed and analyzed
using a regression discontinuity method so as to estimate the causal effect of delayed school enroll-
ment on math test scores. A two-stage least square (TSLS) estimator is used wherein the source of
identification is the variation in 1st grade entry ages which resulted solely from differences in dates
of birth. The results indicate that older students scored higher than younger students. The reform
impacted the discrepancy between those regulated by the new cut-off dates and those regulated by
the old cut-off date(s) by 0.30 s.d. (comparing the 1998-1999 cohort which entered school before
the reform with the 2002-2003 cohort, which entered afterwards). The results also suggest age
effects on education outcomes that are stronger for recent generations than for generations enter-
ing first grade prior to the reform. Because math scores have increased by 0.95 s.d. since the first
administration of ENLACE in 2006, this result suggests that, at a minimum, moving the cut-off
date by four months to December 31 did not have an adverse effect on mean math test scores.
Finally, a sobering analysis of the educational outcomes of indigenous populations is conducted
using data from Encuesta Nacional Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, ENIGH) which, for the first
time in 2008 and then 2010 identified indigenous populations. The research finds that although the
percentage of families in extreme poverty residing in municipalities where indigenous populations
are concentrated dropped between 1992 and 2010, the gap in poverty rates between the municipal-
ities where indigenous people concentrate and others remains huge, with extreme poverty in the
former equal to 51.9% in 2010 and in the latter 16.9%. Because rates of return to education are
estimated in this dissertation to be high in Mexico (around 10%, including those for indigenous
populations), education is found to be essential in reducing the gulf in poverty levels by ethnicity.
But the study shows that gaps in educational outcomes between indigenous and non-indigenous
populations remain wide, whether in terms of average educational attainment, participation in
Kindergarten, the percentage of students who are overage, and the average student achievement as
measured by a variety of tests.
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ucativo in México (Program of Intensive School Focus for Educational Progress in
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4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3 Simple Theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Background and the context delayed school entry in México . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
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México faces many challenges in its efforts to improve the wellbeing of its people, in particular,
those who are socially and economically disadvantaged. This is México’s “Perennial Challenge.”
According to the World Bank, México is a middle-income country, and the world’s 11th largest
economy, yet México’s economic performance is poor in terms of economic growth, with an av-
erage growth rate of only 0.6% from 1993 to 2013 (INEGI, 2014a). In 1992, 53% of México’s
population experienced moderate poverty, and after the 1994 economic crisis, poverty rose until
late 1990s, decreased until 2006 but then rose again. By 2012, 53% of México’s population was
again classified as living in moderated poverty (CONEVAL, 2014). Despite twenty years of public
policy efforts in social and educational programs, México has failed to reduce its poverty rate.
México faces great—seemingly insurmountable—challenges of economic development 1.
To be sure, the Mexican people have achieved some great advancements in education. Figure 2.3
in Annex depicts gross enrollment in México, where enrollment increased after the Mexican rev-
olution, and greatly expanded in the last 60 years. But these successes have not been matched
by substantial increases in education achievement as measured by international achievement tests.
1see Figure 2.8 in the annex for more details on the evolution of poverty in México from 1992 to 2012
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México’s participation in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) sponsored by
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reflects comparatively poor
academic achievement. PISA provides a measure of reading, mathematics and science achieve-
ment designed for international comparisons. PISA’s international assessment focuses on young
people’s ability to apply their knowledge and skills to real-life problems and situations, rather than
on how much curriculum-based knowledge they may possess. Students from México are among
the worst performers. In PISA 2003, México scored 385 points in math and by 2012 had scored 413
points, an increase of only 28 points over almost a decade. In 2000, México achieved a greater total
of 422 points in reading, but by 2012 had increased its average reading by a mere two points. With
respect to science, México actually lost ground, decreasing from 422 to 415—a loss of 7 points
in this period. By comparison, México’s most important economic partner, the USA, achieved 68
points higher in math than México in PISA 2012. México is far from close the gap with developed
countries in this achievement test.
So while educational enrollments have increased, student achievement has not kept pace. This
relationship between enrollment and achievement, however, may not be merely coincidental: It
is possible, as some researchers have claimed, that poor achievement results are associated with
increasing enrollment. With more and more children entering and completing basic education than
ever before, new entrants are more likely to come from marginalized households where malnutri-
tion and poverty are more prominent, and illiteracy is more widespread (World-Bank, 2006).The
process of learning for these economically disadvantaged children is more challenging and this
may be reflected in comparatively lower student achievement in schools, as measured say by test
scores. In addition, the educational system may not have been adequately prepared –in terms of re-
sources, quality of public sector management, etc.—to handle the increased enrollments. Because
of this, México may have been subject to a painfully ironic educational dynamic: the more who
are taught, the less is learned.
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Given this state of affairs, a number of educational reform movements have been undertaken or
proposed. Some have emphasized the inequalities across regions, states and ethnicity (Sáenz,
1939; Prawda, 1989; World-Bank, 2006; Mexicanos-Primero, 2013). Some education authorities
want to address the low quality of education through the implementation of educational policies
and structural reform policies targeting the cognitive achievement of Mexican students. To this
end, a number of policymakers, education authorities, and researchers have suggested that decen-
tralization as a key factor to improve México’s education system. According to Merino-Juárez
(1999) , “proponents of decentralization point to the potential for experimentation and innovation
in educational programs.” Others support centralization of the education system while still others
support some sort of school “autonomy”: adjusting and contextualizing educational programs to
deliver better services. And still others stress the importance of transparency and accountability
of school actors and educational authorities, pointing, for example, at accountability policies de-
signed to increase school quality like teacher incentive programs.
Reforms come from other directions too. Teachers unions push for increases in salaries as well
as resources while families and the private sector pursue their own interests and agendas. At the
end, there is a national recognition of the problem, but there is no consensus on how to improve
the quality of education nor a consistent educational agenda in the Mexican society. Worse, dif-
ferent and competing perspectives can wear down even the best good faith efforts among reformers.
The objective of this doctoral dissertation is an analysis of three different issues relating to learn-
ing outcomes in México: 1) the impact of a specific educational policy targeting low-performing
schools in Colima, México, called Programa de Atención Especı́fica para la Mejora del Logro Ed-
ucativo (PAE), or Program of Focused Attention fro the Improvement of Educational Outcomes
and 2) the effects of entry-age as a structural factor impacting learning, and 3) the various dimen-
sions of the educational disadvantages of indigenous people in México. Each issue is addressed
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separately in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. An introductory Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Mex-
ican education system, detailing the structure of the education system, access, demand, principal
reforms, expenditure, evaluation system and learning outcomes.
Chapter 3 evaluates the impact of the educational intervention called Programa de Atención Es-
pecı́fica para la Mejora del Logro Educativo (PAE), which identifies and targets low-performing
schools and provides resources to improve them. The research analyzes the effects of this com-
pensatory program on improving the education quality of schools in Colima, México. The PAE
program targets 108 schools that in 2009 obtained the lowest learning outcomes measured by the
country’s student assessment.
Chapter 4 explores the exogenous variation in education related to dates of birth. That is, some
individuals inevitably start school one year later than their cohorts merely due to an entry-age
cut-off. For instance, in the school year spanning 2006-2007, the entry-age cut-off day had been
September 1. Since then, however, pupils aged 6 by December 31 could start public school. Data
related to this cut-off transition are reviewed and analyzed, and a regression discontinuity method
is used to estimate the causal effect of delayed school enrollment on student outcomes in México.
A two-stage least square (TSLS) estimator is used in which the source of identification is the vari-
ation in the 1st-grade entry age that results solely from differences in date of birth. Nevertheless,
sensitive statistical checks are performed to understand if other possible mechanisms may explain
any learning improvements. This section includes sub-sections which review the current literature
on age effects, describe a theoretical model analyzing age effects, provide the data and context of
entry-age reform and discuss methodology and results.
Chapter 5 identifies and describes the dimensions of educational inequality facing the indigenous
populations of México. In particular, the analysis explores unequal learning environments, poor
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schooling outcomes, lack of transitions to higher education and low returns on educational invest-




This chapter provides a targeted survey of educational indicators and the education system in
México. First, it analyzes the demand side and the demographics behind it. In addition, it describes
the basics of the Mexican education system and its principal reforms. It discusses expenditures in
education as well as the information and evaluation systems adopted. Finally, it describes the state
of learning in México.
2.1 The rising demand for education in México
México is a country with an estimated population of about 120 million, with 55% of the population
below the age of 30 years. The median age of the Mexican population is 26 years old. México
is therefore a young country (INEGI, 2014b). This is reflected in rising enrollment of children
in schools. In the school year 2012-2013, the demand for compulsory education amounted to 35
million young Mexican students in ages from 3 to 18 years (preschool to 12th grade). This is a
historic high in terms of enrollment.
Nevertheless, in 2013, the fertility rate was only 2.2 children per woman and has decreased over
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the last 20 years by 1.4 children per woman (CONAPO, 2013). So while México is currently
experiencing the highest demand for compulsory education in its history decreasing fertility rates
suggest that 35 million may well be a demand peak. Extrapolating from the fertility rates and
number of births from 1992 to 2012 issued by the National Heath Information System (Sistema
Nacional de Información en Salud- SINAIS), by 2020 the Mexican education system will need to
accommodate only 31 million students aged 3 to 18. Given that demand pressures are relaxing, the
current decade is a moment of historic action to improve education in México. But the demand for
education in México is not just related to the demographics. Despite slow growth, the country has
achieved higher per-capita income over time and, as will be detailed later, rising enrollment rates
have led to significant increases in educational attainment over time. But as parents become more
educated, the demand for their children’s education also rises.
Figure 2.1 shows the average years of schooling of both mother and father by year of birth of their
children. A mother’s education for those born in 1985 was, on average, about 5.5 years of school-
ing and a father’s education was about 6.4 years. Though males are more educated than females,
this gap has been reduced by about 0.15 years of schooling for those born since 2008. For the most
recent generation (those born in 2008), the average years of schooling for either parent is over 8.5
years. With better educated adults and parents, the demand for better educated children increases.
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Figure 2.1: Average parental education by year of birth. Source: SINAIS
How has the increased demand for schooling translated into supply? The next section examines
the transformation of the Mexican school system over time.
2.2 Mexican education system and its principal reforms in the
last 20 years
From a normative point of view, an education system is a group of rules, laws and norms defined
by the social contract of a society. In México, the social contract governing education has been
principally codified in the form of the Mexican Constitution; in particular Articles 3 and 31. The
second most important law is the Education Law which defines the organization, administration
and role of government, society, parents and private sector with respect to Mexican education.
The Mexican education system (hereafter MES) is organized into five levels: preschool (P1-P3),
primary school (grades 1-6), lower secondary education (grades 7-9), upper secondary education
(10-12) and higher education. By right of law, schooling in México is compulsory from preschool
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to grade 12 (see Annex, Table 2.6 for details on the organization of the MES). The government
dominates the supply of schooling.
In the school year 2011-2012, only 13% of the total provision of education (in terms of student
population) was offered for by the private sector (SEP, 2013). However, the amount of private
expenditure increases with respect to the level of education being funded (with the exception of
preschool): for basic education, 9%, 8% for grades 1 to 9, and 14% for preschool. In grades 10 to
12, the private sector covered 17.4% and a full 32% of higher education.
The MES is a complex nation-wide system responsible for many levels of education across widely
disparate populations. For that reason, the following description of the MES is focused on preschool
and grades 1 through 6. The Ministry of Education (Secretaria de Educación, SEP) is responsible
of the organization, regulations and the governance of the MES. Along with SEP, state education
authorities and the teachers union (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educacion -SNTE),
are the three main actors within the MES.
The starting point of the modern Mexican education system is the Mexican Revolution (1910-
1920)—a social movement which, among other notable developments, recognized the unequal
conditions and opportunities of Mexicans. In particular, the revolution highlighted the plight of
some of México’s most disadvantaged: its indigenous people. According to Sáenz (1939), the
Mexican Revolution was not from the indigenous population. Rather, it was for the indigenous.
At the same time, “Mexicanization” part of the revolution offered both land and books. In the
ten years after the revolution, public school enrollment increased from 12,000 to 22,000, mostly
through advances in rural schools—one of the promises of the revolution. After this initial period,
the history of the MES can be demarcated into four periods: 1) institutional consolidation, 2) bu-
reaucratic and corporative autocracy followed by economic crisis, 3) decentralization and 4) the
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present system.
The consolidation of the MES was possible through investment in education by post-revolutionary
governments, specifically through a long term plan called the “Eleven Years Plan” from 1958 to
1970. During this plan, educational inequalities due to greater urbanization and rising state dis-
parities in income per-capita increased but advances in basic access were nevertheless widespread
(Prawda, 1989).
During the late 1970s, México focused on developing its oil resources and it benefited from ele-
vated oil prices, but economic mismanagement and increasing international debt let to a debt crisis
in 1982 that affected public finances throughout the 1980s. For example, the salary of a primary
teacher with a university degree decreased by 36.1% between 1983 and 1988 (Prawda, 1989). Even
while advances were made in access to preschool and grades 1 to 9, public and private spending fell
in throughout the 1980s. According to Prawda (1989) inequality among states in terms of access,
spending, organization and quality persisted. Merino-Juárez (1999) states “as the centralization
process was not equally strong everywhere, the large differences between the states regarding the
amount of resources spent per student or per capita became determined by the relative size of the
state system”(p. 69). At that time, Prawda (1989) claimed that inequalities could be resolved by
structural changes in the education system realized through decentralization, reorganized priorities
and more funding.
Prior to 1994, México had a centralized education system, with all relevant decision-making taking
place at the national level. In 1992, the Mexican federal government, the states and the teachers
union agreed to a process of decentralizing the education system. This reform gave the states
the responsibility for providing basic education (grades 1 through 9), professional development
for teachers and infrastructure for schools (Merino-Juárez, 1999). However, the federal education
10
authority remained responsible for pedagogical content, education policies, information and evalu-
ation systems and disadvantaged populations in isolated rural areas. (Compensatory programs for
disadvantage populations have been in operation since the early 1990s.). In addition, the reforms
associated with decentralization made 7th to 9th grade compulsory and included a pay scheme
program for teachers known as the Teacher Carrier Program (Carrera Magisterial).
Many researchers argue that the education system remained highly centralized even under this
“administrative decentralization” (Alvarez et al., 2007). The Ministry of Education retained some
centralized power arguing that education must have nation-wide minimum standards, similar cur-
ricula and qualification requirements. Furthermore, Merino-Juárez (1999) claims that “the decen-
tralization did not change key aspects of education policy or the incentives beyond education that
affect funding decisions across all public services provided by the state” (p. 123).
2.2.1 The current Mexican education system and Recent reforms
In 2000, México transitioned from a party which had ruled for 70 years (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional, PRI) to an opposition party with right-leaning ideology, Partido Accion Nacional
(PAN). A number of significant educational reforms were implemented during the first six years of
the new government. Among these reforms was the creation of the National Institute for Evalua-
tion of Education (INEE), intended to ensure education accountability (Mexicanos-Primero, 2007).
Prior to the creation of INEE, educational authorities, principals and teachers were not account-
able. For example, in 1995, México participated in the Third International Mathematics and Sci-
ence Study (TIMSS-1995), and performed very poorly. In fact, the results never were published
and most of the Mexican TIMSS-1995 data were destroyed (Solano-Flores et al., 2005). INEE was
founded in August 2002 with the aim of providing adequate, rigorous and more transparent eval-
uations of the basic and secondary education system. A main objective of INEE is to consolidate
the national evaluation system with the objective of increasing the quality of Mexican education.
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Other objectives include: (1) coordinating international evaluations, (such as PISA); (2) develop-
ing an indicator system based on the information collected by SEP; and (3) developing models for
the evaluation of schools as an organizational unit (Mexicanos-Primero, 2007). In September of
2013, an educational reform was approved by the Mexican congress which gave it the power to
control the evaluation system in México.
In 2002, the Mexican congress approved preschool reforms which included a modification of the
curriculum, credentials for educators (at the preschool level) and three years of compulsory kinder-
garten (from age 3 to 5). The main objective of these reforms were to reduce disparities across
gender, race and economic status so that pupils would enter primary school on a more equal ba-
sis. The implementation of three compulsory years of kindergarten was phased in: The third year
of kindergarten became obligatory in the school year 2004-2005, the second year in 2005-2006
and the first year in 2006-2007. Intended to guarantee universal preschool education, data from
UNICEF indicated that 98% of five year olds were enrolled in preschool by 2005. Moreover,
enrollment in first and second year preschool also increased, but with less intensity (UNICEF,
2007). Figure 2.2 shows the enrollment in the 2nd and 3rd grade of preschool since the reform
was approved. Enrollment for both grades increased in the school year 2003-2004, then reached
its highest in enrollment in the school year 2006-2007 for 2nd grade and in the following school
year for 3rd grade. After that peak, enrollment remained stable for both grades.
Moreover, the law stipulated that only third year of kindergarten is a requirement to enter to 1st
grade but it was not enforced until the school year 2006-2007 due to the school entry age reform
that was also undertaken. That is, it was enforced in 2006 as a requisite to enter to 1st grade due to
the school age cut-off reform (more details on these two reforms in chapter 4).
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Figure 2.2: Preschool Enrollment in México. Source: SEP
In 2002, the Vicente Fox administration created the Quality Schools Program (Programa de Es-
cuelas de Calidad -PEC) to improve the administration of schools as well as the dialogue between
principals, teachers and parents in the most marginalized schools in México. PEC provides mone-
tary resources to schools to implement school plans designed by parents, teachers and principals.
In addition, the government launched a reform of secondary education, completed in 2009. This
reform had a significant component based on teacher professionalism.
As a part of an accountability program in 2010, the Ministry of Education launched a teachers
incentive program using the National Evaluation of Academic Achievement in School Centers
(ENLACE) to increase school quality. The Programa de Estı́mulo a la Calidad Docente (PECD), a
monetary incentive program, was designed to reward teachers in high-performing schools. These
programs are defined as bonus or “merit pay” schemes that provide a financial reward to teachers
for their performance (Bruns et al., 2011). The reasoning is that, since student learning depends
on teacher performance, teachers will increase their effectiveness and productivity through direct
monetary incentives. However, an quasi-experimental evaluation by Franco (2013) shows that the
program did not have any impact on learning measured by ENLACE test.
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In 2013, México continued reform efforts, including tackling corruption in the sector. For instance,
early 2013, Elba Esther Gordillo, head of México’s Teachers’ Union, was jailed on accusations of
corruption. President Enrique Peña Nieto also signed a constitutional amendment introducing a
number of key education reforms. Most of the reforms addressed professional career issues and
teacher termination. In addition, the INEE was given more power to administer the system of
teacher and student evaluations. Also, the reform introduces a new information system incorporat-
ing a national school census with rosters of student, teachers and principals.
2.2.2 Expenditure in Education in México
In 2010, the spending per student in México was below the mean level for OECD countries. For
example, the average spending of preschool per student was $6,762 in OECD countries while in
México it was only $2,288. On the other hand, part of the reason for the lower spending per student
in México relative to the OECD average is its comparatively lower income per-capita. Indeed, if
one calculates the overall total expenditure in education as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), it was about 6.2%, which is about the average for the OECD. In addition, the figure for
2010 represents a 1% increase over the 5 rate in 2000 (OECD, 2013).
Most of this expenditure is public. In 2010, 82% of total expenditures on education in México were
a result of government expenditures. But these expenditures are not equally distributed across the
country. Spending per student in México is subject to great variation due to unequal distributions
among levels, states and populations. For example, the average spending per student in basic ed-
ucation is $1,670 per school year, but across Mexican states this figure changes and is lower in
states with disadvantaged populations (e.g., Chiapas’s unit cost is $1,117). According to Mexi-
canos Primero (2013), the uneven distribution of education resources in México reinforces social
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inequalities especially among disadvantaged populations.
This is not a recent phenomenon. Expenditures on education at the state level have differed sig-
nificantly from year to year and from place to place. According to Merino-Juárez (1999), between
1985 to 1991, Baja California spent 32 times more than Oaxaca, and “the highest spenders are
the northern states which also tend to be wealthier and more industrialized (Baja California, Chi-
huahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa, Sonora and Tamaulipas)” (p. 52). Federal spending on
education does not necessarily help in reducing spending inequities across states. In 2013, the
actual administrative financing for education in México relied heavily on federal transfers or di-
rect transfers of monetary resources to education institutions (in the case of higher education) at a
rate of 62% of total expenditures (both public and private). According to Merino-Juárez (1999),
“Federal transfers for education to the states are not allocated according to the equalizing criteria
stated by the decentralization agreement and the new education legislation” (p. 122). Just after
decentralization, states increased their expenditure in education as well as the transfers from the
government (Merino-Juárez, 1999).
In México, private household expenditures on education also vary by income distribution, region
and ethnicity. According to INEGI (2013), the percent of household expenditure on education has
actually decreased by -1.7% from 2006 to 2012. In 2006, the percent expenditure on education
as a percentage of total household expenditure was 15.5%, while in 2013 this percent was 13.8%.
By contrast, in the richest percentile of the income distribution, the percent of expenditure reached
almost 20%. Predictably, the bottom 10% of the income distribution spent only 5.2% of their total
income on education (INEGI, 2013). Moreover, the expenditure gap in education between rural
and urban areas was 6.1% in 2012.
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2.2.3 Information and Evaluation System
Since the decentralization of education in 1993, there have been a variety of educational interven-
tions by SEP, the states as well as the private. How has student achievement changed over time?
In order to measure comparative student achievement, México participated in an international as-
sessment (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, TIMSS) for the first time in the
middle of the 1990s. However, due to very low performance, the results never were published.
The starting point of an evaluation system began in 1998 with the application of the first standard-
ized test-sample format designed by the Department of General Evaluation in Education as part
of the SEP. This process was institutionalized with México’s participation in PISA 2000 and the
creation of the INEE. Since decentralization, several states have developed their own information
and evaluation systems, like Colima which, since 1997, has applied a local test and published its
own results. However, since 2006, the Ministry of Public Education has administered the National
Evaluation of Academic Achievement in School Centers (ENLACE) nationwide. The ENLACE
evaluates students at the primary, secondary and upper secondary school levels.
ENLACE deploys and coordinates the activities of 133,000 persons to supervise the application
of assessments: teachers are not allowed to administer exams to their own students and parents
are not allowed to supervise their own children. The SEP’s Department of Policy Evaluation (the
agency in charge of ENLACE before the reform created the National Evaluation Institute in 2013)
used the K-index and Scrutiny methods to detect cheating on suspicious answer strings. Student
scores are calculated on the basis of items answered correctly weighted by the difficulty of the
item on a scale ranging from 200 to 800, with a mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100. (For
comparisons over time, 2006 is used as the base year.) Because ENLACE is administered annu-
ally during the National Week for Evaluation (in April to early June), everyone—students, parents,
teachers, principals, etc.—know exactly when the exam will be applied through an initial school
year document distributed before the start of the school year.
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2.3 State of Learning in México
With more and more children entering and completing basic education than ever before, it is of-
ten claimed that expanding access inevitably leads to decreasing the quality of education. New
entrants are more likely to come from marginalized households where malnutrition, poverty and
illiteracy are more common.This makes the schooling of these children a great challenge for the
school system. In addition, in the absence of additional resources and support, expanding school
and classroom enrollments constitute a great challenge for schools and teachers, which can have a
negative impact on learning.
For this reason, national assessments can provide insights into which students are progressing and
meeting curriculum goals, which teachers are most effective and also signal which policies and
strategies are having the desired effect.
Figure 2.3 depicts gross student enrollment in México, where enrollment in the first six grades had
increased after the Mexican Revolution and has expanded in the last 60 years. Enrollment for other
levels of education, however, does not follow the same trajectory. According to Prawda (1989),
for every 100 students who started 1st grade in 1982, only 53 completed 6th grade. But these
figures are based upon aggregated averages across states. For example, in México City, 86 of 100
finished 6th grade. By contrast only 55 of 100 in Colima finished 6th grade. The worst 6th grade
completion rates, though, occurred in those states with greater indigenous populations: Tabasco
(48 students), Campeche (45 students), Veracruz (43 students), Michoacán (42 students), Yucatan
(41 students), Guerrero (40 students). Oaxaca (40 students) and Chiapas (29 students).
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Figure 2.3: Gross Enrollment in México by Level of Education. Source: SEP
So while 6th grade completion rates clearly vary from state to state, enrollment rates also vary
through time. Using the Mexican Expenditure and Income Household Survey, Table 2.1 shows the
percentage of children attending school by generational cohort. While 17% of the 1992 generation
was not attending school at age six, their attendance nevertheless increased to 98% by age 8. How-
ever, this generation started leaving school at a greater rate by the age of 14 and 16, with 16% and
then 38% attrition rates respectively. Generally, the greatest percentage of children was in school
at the age of 6. In 2012, for example, a full 98% of 6-year-olds were attending school, and by age
12, most of these students were still attending school, presumably in the 7th grade. Yet many of
these students drop out at the secondary school level. By the 10th grade, more than 30% were no
longer attending school.
Figure 2.4 shows the population not in school at the ages of 5 and 6. During the 1990s, the MES
was very efficient in increasing enrollment as reforms in preschool education were implemented.
In 1992, 5-year-olds were not obligated to attend school (though they were encouraged). In fact,
in 1992, 37% of 5 year olds was not attending any type of education. In 2000, this number was
13%. By 2002, however, preschool was compulsory (more details in the reform subsection) and
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Table 2.1: Six Years Old Generation and their percentage not attending school
Generation 6 8 10 12 14 16
6-1992 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.38
6-1994 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.37
6-1996 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.38
6-1998 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.38
6-2000 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.34
6-2002 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.31
6-2004 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.14
6-2006 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 1992,1994,
1996,1998,2000, 2002, 2004,2006, 2008,2010, and 2012
only 6% of children aged 5 were not in school—an 8% reduction from the previous year. In 2012,
only 2% of children of this age were not attending any type of schooling.
Figure 2.4: Percent of Individuals Not Attending School by Age-Cohort. Source:Author’s calculation
using ENIGH
A similar story emerged with children aged six. In 1992, 17% of this generation were not in school,
but this figure decreased throughout the 1990s. By 2012, this number was only 2%.
Table 2.5 in the annex shows the percent of population not attending school by age. In 1992,
11% of the population aged 12—those transitioning between grade 6 and 7 (between primary and
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secondary schooling)—had dropped out. Moreover, ages older than 12 attend at even lower rates
(though these attrition rates have reduced since 1992). For example, 47% of 16-year-olds were
not in school in 1992. This number was 10% less in 2000 and 16% less in 2012—significant
progress—but over 30% still remain out of school.
The Mexican school system also suffers from overage, with many students enrolled in grades
which are over the normative age that such grades serve. For example, the normative age of 9th
graders (the last year of lower secondary school) is 14 or 15 for the generations not affected by the
school entry-age reform in 2006. (For post-2006 generations, the age is 14 years old.). Figure 2.5
shows the percentage of those attending school at the age of 15 years by grade. At this age, the
rule is two-thirds of these cohort should be attending 10th grade and the rest should be attending
9th grade. However, there are students who accelerated schooling which are less than 10%, and
there are about 10% who are older than it is expected in grades below 9th.
Figure 2.5: Population of 15 years old attending school by grade. Source:Author’s calculation using
ENIGH
Enrollment and graduation rates have increased overtime, especially for the most disadvantaged
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populations. In 1997, the Mexican government created a program that affords cash payments to
low-income families in order for this segment of the population to enroll their children in basic
education. The government created Progresa (now Oportunidades) to increase the education of
the most disadvantaged families in México and has been successful in increasing enrollment in
basic education for these populations. Oportunidades has had a significant impact on increasing
schooling enrollment and attainment (Skoufias and Parker, 2001; Behrman et al., 2011; Todd and
Wolpin, 2008). However, a lack of school quality has undermined the success of Oportunidades
over the long run (Lunde et al., 2007).
How has this increase in enrollment affected achievement? How heterogeneous is achievement
across subgroups of the population? To answer this question, Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 show the per-
cent of students able to perform at the basic elementary level of math in 2006, 2010 and 2012 from
the total population of that birth cohort eligible to attend 9th grade. The calculation uses the per-
centage of net enrollment (column 1-% enrolled) from the Mexican Household Survey (ENIGH)
and the percent of 9th grade students who perform at least the at elementary level of math and
Spanish comes from ENLACE (column 2 and 3 - Level 1- Math and Level 2 Spanish). Level 1 is
the minimum learning level. Columns 4 (Math) and 5 (Spanish) are the percent of individuals of
total population eligible to attend 9th grade who perform at least at the minimum learning standard.
In general, there has been an increase in average math learning over time, as measured by the
results of tests scores at the 9th grade: a higher proportion of these students could perform basic,
elementary (level 1) over time. The figures from 2006, 2010 and 2012 in Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4
reflect this increasing math performance: 38% in 2006, 40% in 2010 and 43% in 2012 despite that
net enrollment has maintained about 87 %.
In fact, those students attending a school in a very high marginality area show significant advances
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Table 2.2: Measuring inequities in learning for the population in 2006
% enrolled Level 1-Math Level 1-Spanish Math Spanish
Total 87.17 0.56 0.35 0.38 0.57
Girls 88.01 0.57 0.29 0.38 0.62
Boys 86.37 0.56 0.41 0.38 0.51
Very Low Marginality 90 0.52 0.27 0.43 0.65
Low Marginality 88.31 0.57 0.36 0.38 0.56
Medium Marginality 85.79 0.61 0.44 0.33 0.48
High Marginality 83.66 0.65 0.51 0.29 0.41
Very High Marginality 71.07 0.71 0.66 0.21 0.24
Indigenous 77.74 0.65 0.53 0.27 0.37
Non-indigenous 88.42 0.56 0.35 0.39 0.58
urban 89.6 0.57 0.36 0.39 0.58
rural 83.8 0.63 0.50 0.31 0.42
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2006
Math and Spanish refer to at least elemental level
Table 2.3: Measuring inequities in learning for the population in 2010
% enrolled Level 1-Math Level 1-Spanish Math Spanish
Total 87.11 0.54 0.38 0.40 0.54
Girls 88.86 0.54 0.32 0.41 0.60
Boys 85.41 0.55 0.44 0.39 0.48
Very Low Marginality 88.41 0.56 0.36 0.39 0.56
Low Marginality 88.55 0.56 0.40 0.39 0.53
Medium Marginality 87.89 0.54 0.41 0.40 0.52
High Marginality 83.60 0.50 0.39 0.42 0.51
Very High Marginality 75.30 0.53 0.47 0.35 0.40
Indigenous 85.31 0.52 0.41 0.41 0.51
Non-indigenous 87.30 0.55 0.38 0.39 0.54
urban 90.24 0.55 0.38 0.41 0.56
rural 83.08 0.53 0.41 0.39 0.49
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2010
Math and Spanish refer to at least elemental level
at the basic, elementary level. In 2006, 71% of the population attended 9th grade and 21% of
them performed at least at the basic level of math and 24% of them in Spanish. In 2012, these
performance figures increased to 35% and 40%, respectively while enrollment for this popula-
tion increased to 75 %. In fact, in 2012, the percentage of individuals attending school in a very
high marginality municipality who performed at least at the elemental level close the gap to other
marginality levels1. It is worth pointing out that the two states with municipalities with very high
1The National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Población, CONAPO) ranks all localities according to
a marginality index, a weighted average of literacy, access to basic public utilities, household infrastructure and av-
erage wages. Rankings range from very high marginalization, high marginalization, medium marginalization, low
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marginality are Oaxaca and Michoacán and their ENLACE coverage is not representative. That is,
there is an overestimation of these tables due to the absence of the of the worst schools from the
database.
Table 2.4: Measuring inequities in learning for the population in 2012
% enrolled Level 1-Math Level 1-Spanish Math Spanish
Total 86.35 0.51 0.41 0.43 0.51
Girls 87.98 0.48 0.34 0.45 0.58
Boys 84.80 0.51 0.50 0.42 0.42
Very Low Marginality 87.52 0.52 0.39 0.42 0.54
Low Marginality 83.70 0.51 0.43 0.41 0.48
Medium Marginality 82.87 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.45
High Marginality 88.70 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.49
Very High Marginality 85.99 0.45 0.52 0.47 0.42
Indigenous 85.99 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.48
Non-indigenous 88.72 0.51 0.41 0.42 0.51
urban 86.52 0.51 0.41 0.43 0.51
rural 86.13 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.46
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2012
Math and Spanish refer to at least elemental level
Although the data presented here on learning outcomes shows significant changes over time, they
also show that the percentage of students performing at very low levels in math and science remain
at troublingly high levels.
México’s participation in the OECD’s first Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)
confirms the challenges facing México in terms of school quality. PISA provides a measure of
reading, mathematics and science achievement from a nationally representative sample, compara-
ble across countries. PISA’s assessment focuses on knowledge and skills to solve real-life problems
and situations rather than on curriculum-based knowledge. Students from México are among the
worst performers. Figure 2.6 depicts a linear association between average math scores in PISA
2012 and GDP per capita. This positive correlation is significant and suggests that those countries
with greater GDP per capita tend to have higher PISA scores. However, even in comparison with
marginalization, and very low marginalization. For methodological details regarding México’s marginality index, see
http://www.conapo.gob.mx/
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others with similar GDP per capita, México still performs at a relatively poor level, and also is
among the worst performers in this test.
Figure 2.6: Average Math performance and Per-capita Income. Source:Author’s calculation using PISA
Furthermore, analyzing the performance in PISA among Mexican states between 2003 and 2012,
Figure 2.7 illustrates unequal performance across states and over time. The red lines indicate the
average performance in both PISA rounds. There are four groups of states: The first group is
Michoacán, Oaxaca and Sonora which did not participate in PISA 2012. Michoacán and Oaxaca
were among the worst performers in achievement tests as well as other educational indicators.
The second group consists of those below average in 2003 and below the average in 2012. Guer-
rero, Chiapas and Tabasco were the worst performers in both years at the left bottom corner of
the graph. The third group is states with average performances in both years. Most states are
in this category. Finally, the fourth group is composed of higher performers in both rounds of
PISA—Aguascalientes, México City, Colima, Nuevo León and Querétaro. And though there is no
data on any achievement test before decentralization, there are clear divergences in math achieve-
ment which exemplify long-standing inequalities across states.
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Figure 2.7: Math Performance across Mexican states in 2003 and 2012. Source:Author’s calculation
using PISA
2.4 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, despite the fact that México has achieved significant advances in terms of access
and enrollment at all levels, the country faces serious challenges in moving the school system to
high-quality standards, specially for indigenous and rural populations. The progress has been het-
erogeneous across states, and there remains persistent inequality among various Mexican regions.
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2.4.1 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.8: Poverty Evolution. Source:CONEVAL (2014)
Figure 2.9: Percent of Individuals not Attending School by Age-Cohort.Source:Author’s calculation
using ENIGH
26
Figure 2.10: Percent of Individuals not Attending School by Age-Cohort.Source:Author’s calculation
using ENIGH
Table 2.5: Percent of children not enroll in education by age and school year
Age 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
5 0.37 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02
6 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
7 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
8 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
9 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
10 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
11 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
12 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04
13 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07
14 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
15 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.21
16 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.31
Source: SEP
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Table 2.6: General Organization of the Mexican Education System
Type of Education Level Type of service























Impact of the Programa de Atención
Especı́fica (PAE) para la Mejora del Logro
Educativo in México (Program of Intensive
School Focus for Educational Progress in
México)
3.1 Introduction
There is an increasing tendency among policy makers to use information as a tool to improve the
quality of education systems. Data used for accountability purposes is becoming an essential com-
ponent of school system functioning (Bruns et al., 2011). School actors respond to accountability
interventions in the form of rewards, sanctions and consequences—all intended to improve school
quality. However, the evidence of the positive impact of such interventions on student performance
is mixed (Rouse et al., 2013).
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Often, accountability takes the form of interventions oriented to low-performing schools, as mea-
sured say by test scores. These education interventions that target poorly performing schools are
themselves controversial. Some researchers argue that “bad” schools should not be “rewarded”
with more resources and have challenged such program’s “positive discrimination.” On the other
hand, it seems counterintuitive to withhold resources from a troubled school. And while there is
some evidence that targeted interventions for ill performing schools help, there are few rigorous
empirical studies on the effects of such programs.
Within México, the state of Colima has been a champion of accountability. Since 1997, Colima
has had an evaluation system which publicly rewards the schools with the highest achievement
rankings. In 2009, Colima’s education authorities revised their accountability strategy and iden-
tified 108 schools that had obtained the lowest learning outcomes as measured by ENLACE. In
early February 2010, the state governor announced the “performance status” of selected schools:
Schools which performed below an arbitrary cut-off were automatically enrolled in a mandatory
Programa de Atención Especı́fica para la Mejora del Logro Educativo (PAE). Once identified as
a PAE school, the school was required to implement a series of pedagogical interventions set by
local authorities and consult with external advisors to assist in the preparation, collaboration and
organization of a school improvement plan for a period of at least three years.
Exploiting PAE’s rigid eligibility rule (an exogenously determined cut-off point dividing schools
into treatment and control groups), this dissertation uses a regression discontinuity design to esti-
mate the impact of the program. Participating PAE and non-participating schools were followed
for three years to compare their performance.
In this way, the current study is part of the growing literature on the impact of accountability on
30
school quality. This literature, however, has failed to separate the effect of the pedagogical or other
interventions triggered by accountability on low-performing schools with the effect of being la-
beled or catalogued as a “failing” school. For while a failing status typically precipitates a series of
explicit interventions in a school (more resources, pedagogical interventions, etc.), the impact of
being labeled as “failing” could work through implicit mechanisms, such as stigmatization or rep-
utation damage but also through the stimulus it may provide for coordinated collaboration among
school actors to respond to the “failing” label.
The research in this chapter will seek to examine the overall effect of the PAE while at the same
time identifying the impact of being labeled a “failing” school. The reason the present study can
identify this labeling effect is because, despite the good initial intentions of policymakers, the PAE
program was halted early, even before the government assigned any additional resources to the
schools so that reforms could be implemented. Any short-run impact in the schools would have
been connected to the mere classification and announcement of the schools as “failing,” and any
longer-term effects would have been because of pedagogical changes made by the school staff at
that time, without any support from the government, which had terminated the program.
The following section, Section 3.2, summarizes the current literature relevant to interventions tar-
geting low-performing schools, identifying some weaknesses that the current study will seek to
address. Section 3.3 provides background information on the Mexican state of Colima, describes
the PAE and charts some trends in learning outcomes. Section 3.4 details the methodology and
identification strategy while Section 3.5 discusses the main results. Finally, a concluding Section
3.6 enumerates some policy recommendations.
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3.2 Related Literature
In a world of scarce resources, policymakers often confront limited options to improve student
learning. One strategy is to rely on socioeconomic background and allocate additional resources to
schools serving underprivileged students. These targeted programs are motivated by the fact that
schools where children of families with low socioeconomic background enroll are also the schools
most likely to have the poorest student outcomes. Research on programs that target schools based
on student socioeconomic background is limited, and has produced mixed results.
From the Netherlands, the effects of two subsidies targeting schools with large proportions of
disadvantaged pupils have been evaluated (Leuven et al., 2004). The first subsidy scheme gave pri-
mary schools with at least 70% disadvantaged minority pupils extra funding for school personnel.
The second subsidy scheme gave primary schools with at least 70% pupils—from any disadvan-
taged group—extra funding for computers and software. A regression discontinuity design was
used to estimate these effects within a local difference-in-differences framework. The evaluation
indicated negative results for both subsidies—with some outcomes significantly different from
zero.
In the United States, Title I aims to overcome educational disparities associated with poverty so
as to ensure that all children meet state academic achievement standards. The Title I program
provides additional resources to schools with high poverty rates through funding for school-wide
programs or for targeted programs for disadvantaged students (if they compose less than 40% of the
school population). While most of the funds from the program are utilized for instruction-related
expenses almost half of the funds were spent on salaries and benefits (Stullich et al., 2009). And
results have been mixed. Various evaluations have revealed some positive effects, but in most cases
these benefits are short-term gains, and in some cases, even negative results were found (Slavin,
1989; van der Klaauw, 2008)
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A different strategy does not use socioeconomic disparities as a proxy to focalize educational pro-
grams. Instead, standardized test scores are used to help identify which schools need additional
resources so as to create a more equitable education system (McKinsey & Company 2007). That
is, improving the performance of lagging schools in terms of test scores improves the system as
a whole and reduces differences between low- and high-performing schools. There are an ar-
ray of such programs, but their effectiveness is yet to be fully vetted. Generally speaking, there
are two types of programs which fall under this strategy: educational interventions which target
low-performing schools and accountability schemes which provide performance-based incentives
and/or penalties.
With respect to the first type of intervention, several remedial programs attempt to address achieve-
ment disparities through a combination of interventions which include, for instance, greater re-
sources and technical assistance. The P-900 program in Chile is such a program. Introduced in
1990, P-900 is a program of four interventions targeted at low-performing, publicly funded schools.
Schools received improvements in their infrastructure and were given a variety of instructional ma-
terials. Teachers attended weekly training workshops, and after school-tutoring workshops were
created. Chay et al. (2003) concluded that the P-900 program in Chile had positive and significant
effects on test score gains (albeit much smaller than those found by Tokman (2002)’s double dif-
ference estimates).
By contrast, the second type of intervention imposes a regime of accountability that pressures
low-performing schools to improve test scores, under the threat of penalties which may include
the closing of the school. One of the most prominent examples of accountability is the state-level
accountability and ranking system of No Child Left Behind in the United States. There is some
evidence that schools respond to accountability pressures with improved test scores (Carnoy and
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Loeb, 2003; Hanushek and Raymond, 2004). Indeed, the research shows that students in high-
accountability states averaged significantly greater gains on 8th grade math test than students in
states with little or no state measures to formally track student performance. In addition, other
interventions focusing on accountability in other contexts have resulted in increased average test
scores (Rouse et al., 2013; Rockoff and Turner, 2008; Carnoy and Loeb, 2003). In fact, the overall
effects of accountability systems range from test score increases of 20% to 40% in standard devi-
ation (Hanushek and Raymond, 2004) (though estimates are generally smaller when focusing on
the specific impact of sanctions on failing schools (Figlio and Rouse, 2006). In a meta-analysis by
Lee’s (2008) the average effect size of this kind of intervention is 0.08 S.D.
Beyond education, accountability schemes have also proven to increase quality of service in other
fields. Bevan and Wilson (2013) show that prior to devolution in 1999, the governance of schools
and hospitals in England and Wales was similar. After devolution, their funding and organization
continued to be similar, but the two governments adopted different policies in the pursuit of com-
mon objectives. This resulted in two natural experiments of policy change. A governance model of
so-called “trust and altruism” in Wales actually resulted in poorer performance relative to England.
Bevan and Wilson (2013) argue that the English policy of public “naming and shaming” resulted
in improved examination performance and helped to mitigate an endemic problem of long wait-
ing times. Analogous results have been obtained in the restaurant business: The public display of
hygiene quality report cards in restaurant windows obtained from health inspections have forced
restaurants to improve their health scores (Jin and Leslie, 2003). Such accountability pressures
work not only for schools, governments and businesses, but individuals too. By providing peer
comparisons feedback to customers on their home electricity and natural gas usage individuals re-
duce their consumption (Ayres et al., 2012).
There is, then, good reason to believe that schools are also sensitive to transparency accountabil-
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ity. In the Netherlands, both average grades and the number of diplomas awarded increased after
schools received their own negative report cards. For schools that received the lowest ranking, the
one-year short-term effects on final exam grades amounted to 10% to 30% of a standard deviation
(Koning and van der Wiel, 2013).
Moreover, identifying schools as low (or high) performing has a direct impact on school choice,
and this too has been investigated. In the Netherlands, Koning and van der Wiel (2013) found that
school-quality scores impact the number of first-year students who choose a school. In the United
States, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) analyzed an experiment in which parents of students at low-
performing schools were provided information about the quality of alternative schools. They found
that the provision of explicit quality information led more parents to choose higher-scoring schools
at rates 5% to 7% higher. In this way, we know that not only do schools respond to school-quality
information, we know that parents do too.
Despite the positive association of accountability with improved student outcomes, such feedback-
based interventions do complicate estimations of causality. According to the education production
function, student performance is a function of family resources and family choices which partially
determine school inputs (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). For this reason, using student achievement (in
the form of test scores) to rank school performance will cause school rankings to correlate with
family resources (as well as school inputs). Mizala et al. (2006) show that the distribution of test
scores in Chile is largely an expression of socioeconomic status. In this way, the impact of ac-
countability is itself a function of socioeconomic conditions.
And there are other issues to consider. Transitory noise in average scores and mean reversion lead
conventional estimation approaches (such as a difference-in-difference), to overstate the impacts
of such accountability programs. In particular, Chay et al. (2003) identify mean reversion as a
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serious limitation to Tokman (2002)’s evaluation of P-900. Schools can respond to accountability
pressures by misreporting performance measures or engaging in tactics that increase scores at the
expense of real learning (e.g., teaching to the test, shaping the testing pool, cheating) (Reback and
Cullen, 2006; Figlio and Getzler, 2002; Jacob and Levitt, 2003).
How, then, have Mexican schools actually responded to the PAE program? One factor to consider
is the fact that the PAE program was discontinued only after one year of implementation. This
means that only interventions related to the program’s preparation were enacted and partially im-
plemented. Activities during the preparation period included notifying the school of its poor qual-
ity, identifying the school’s main challenges, and developing a plan to address those challenges.
The PAE information, then, amounted to a detailed diagnosis of a school’s problems coupled with
an invitation to network with other school directors, teachers and advisers to develop improve-
ments—no additional inputs to the schools were actually funded or provided. In this way, the
current study examines how using standardized tests scores to identify poor performing schools,
diagnosing the school problems and developing school reforms may –by itself– lead to higher stu-
dent performance. The impact will be examined in two time contexts: the immediate effects of the
PAE, through its labeling and informational aspects, and its longer-run effects, which may have
occurred through pedagogical and internal changes made by the school staff itself (without help
from the government, which had officially terminated the program). If it turns out that the PAE, as
implemented –purely as an informational program—does improve student achievement, it would
suggest that schools can capitalize on just the purely informational aspects of accountability –and
the changes this generates at the school level–to improve quality, without necessarily requiring
extensive government support in the form of additional resources.
But how does the mere availability of information about school quality affect school performance?
One way that the informational aspect of accountability results in improvement is that it creates a
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fact-based dialogue among educational authorities, directors, school principals and teachers. As
plans are developed based on the information low-performing schools receive about their failures,
interventions can then be designed that impact directly on student achievement. In this way, iden-
tification is not only the first step toward improvement, it is arguably the most impactful step. In
fact, identification of the problems a school has may not only be necessary, but could be surpris-
ingly sufficient; improvements can take hold in a school even before additional school inputs have
been applied.
Given the fact that the PAE was terminated after the preparatory, informational part of the project
was completed, this allows a careful study of the impact that the informational aspects of an ac-
countability regime can have on student outcomes, even if the regime does not involve increased
resources or any specific, targeted interventions. Research on the PAE is also significant because
there is very little rigorous impact evaluation analysis of programs that target low-performing
schools in México and so there is very little evidence about the impact of such programs on learn-
ing outcomes. Hence the present paper will close an important gap in the literature.
3.3 Background, PAE Description and Recent Trends
Colima is a small state in the center-west region of México with a population of 650,555 inhabi-
tants, 34.3% of whom live in households with incomes below the official 2012 poverty line. (The
poverty headcount ratio in México is 45.4%.) Since the decentralization of May 1992, Colima
has built an efficient school administration and adjusted its educational programs to the specific
characteristics and needs of its region. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, Colima experimented and
innovated with its educational system. In 1998, for instance, Colima created a mandatory program
of school-based management named Programa de Gestion Escolar for all schools (except private)
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in the state. In 2002, this Colima-inspired program was launched at the national level with grants
for the poorest Mexican schools. This national program required not only that schools participate
but also submit a plan in order to win additional grant funding. Also, the selection mechanism
failed due to the lack of data to select the poorest schools.
By 2003, Colima was outperforming all Mexican states in math, reading and science—and actu-
ally approaching OECD averages. For example, Colima’s math scores were on par with those for
Greece and Serbia, higher than those from Thailand, Brazil, Uruguay and Turkey. In PISA 2006,
Colima decreased its performance but ranked among the top five states with the same results in
PISA 2009 and 2012.
Colima soon became a pioneer in México for disseminating school performance data (e.g., rank-
ings and rewards). This comprehensive and efficient data system included student-level records
which could be disseminated within the school as well as externally to parents, the community
and the media. In the late 1990s, Colima also launched Concurso de Escuelas de Calidad (CEC,
Contest of Quality Schools)—a public event organized by the state governor to recognize the best
performing schools. Using a series of achievement tests administered to grades 3 to 9 in all types of
schools (e.g., private, public, and rural), the governor awarded approximately $3,000 to the winner
among each of six subgroups: 1) private schools, 2) public urban, 3) poor public urban, 4) public
semi-urban, 5) rural complete school and 6) rural incomplete school (multigrade school).
Colima’s state-run assessment program (using local assessment instruments) was eventually eclipsed
by the national ENLACE exam. In the school year 2005-2006, for the first time, the Ministry of
Education applied a census achievement test named ENLACE. An exam designed to gather infor-
mation on students’ performance, ENLACE involves tests in Math, Spanish and a rotative subject
for third, fourth, fifth, sixth and nine grade. ENLACE was not a high stakes exam until the school
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year 2010/2011. But it won popularity due to the increased flow of information between schools,
parents and the community. In early October of 2009, the results from ENLACE were released,
and Colima performed under the National average. All the schools in Colima had access to the
ENLACE information but there is no evidence of rankings or public dissemination of the results
at this stage. That year, the Colima’s Ministry of Education (CMOE) started the design of PAE;
at the same time, a national program with the same characteristics started to be designed as well.
Colima has adapted several Federal-run programs to be more relevant to the local context. PAE is
one of such programs. PAE shares the objectives and some elements of its design with the Federal
Program “PEMLE”. Although targeting criteria between the two programs differs only marginally,
PAE adds a more detailed diagnosis and close follow-up of the school improvement plan vis-à-vis
PEMLE (for a more precise comparison of PAE and PEMLE see Annex 1). There is no docu-
mentation if PAE was part of a Federal Program or it was created parallel to a Federal program,
however, the focus and the content of both programs differ. The National program, “PEMLE”
, also used ENLACE 2009 to select the schools but had a more elaborated selection of schools
which included trends overtime with no rankings (for more details see the annex ). Also, PEMLE
did not enforce participation and allowed states to include schools on a discretionary basis, it was
a program with no stakes, no rewards and no consequences.
3.3.1 PAE Description
PAE was a program designed to improve learning outcomes among the lowest performing pub-
lic primary schools in Colima. While there still remains some debate regarding the reliability of
standardized test scores as measures of school performance (Kane and Staiger, 2002), the Colima
Ministry of Education used 2008-2009 ENLACE score data to construct its ranking of schools.The
program’s operation guidelines excluded multi-grade schools with one or two teachers and com-
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munity schools regulated by the “Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo”, CONAFE.1.
Of the 477 primary schools in Colima in academic year 2008-2009, 40 were private, 39 belong
to CONAFE, 38 and 40 were one- and two-teacher schools, respectively and 10 for a variety of
reason, did not have an ENLACE score. The group of PAE-eligible schools consisted, then, of 310
public primary schools (see Figure 3.1) with a total student population of 62,366 (95.17% of the
total number of students in public primary schools in Colima during the 2008-2009 school year).
Between October and November 2009 the CMOE used the 2008-2009 ENLACE score data to con-
struct its ranking of schools. School scores were a simple average of the three subject areas tested:
math, Spanish and science–across grades 3, 4, 5 and 6—and schools in the 35th percentile or less
of the distribution of school performance were selected as PAE schools. As shown in Figure 3.1,
PAE included 108 of the 310 schools that belong to the potentially eligible population.2 The PAE
schools were distributed across all ten municipalities of Colima and encompassed 1,535 teachers
and a total of 26,943 students.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the timeline followed by the design and implementation of Colima’s PAE.
Between October and November 2009 the CMOE selected the schools that were going to partic-
ipate in PAE following the criteria described above. In January 2010 the selected schools were
officially notified. In February 2010 at a teachers’ congress in Colima, the Governor launched
the program and publicly disseminated the list of selected schools. Although the selected schools
were presented as those with lowest learning outcomes in the state, the Governor emphasized the
co-responsibility behind low performance of schools and state education authorities and the im-
portance of working together to achieve improvements. Between the public announcement of PAE
1For details on CONAFE see www.conafe.gob.mx
2Two schools were dropped from the sample due to a mistake in their original classification as non-multigrade
schools which later on was changed to multigrade.
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Figure 3.1: PAE and Non-PAE Population and Sample
and the first follow up ENLACE test in May of 2010, PAE schools were assigned a technical ad-
viser who had to visit the school three times a month to work with school directors and teachers in
the diagnosis of the ENLACE test and the design of improvement strategies. In addition, the PAE
technical adviser coached teachers on analyzing the ENLACE information to have a clear under-
standing of how schools were selected into PAE and the causes of poor performance within their
schools. This first four months of PAE, which the CMOE called the “awareness” period, was too
short to change any of the fundamental inputs of the learning production function and it is hence
capturing the “accountability” effect of the program.
Speaking generally, PAE public announcements did explicitly emphasize the shared responsibil-
ities between state authorities and the schools and also probably implicit mechanisms (as verbal
complaints, stigmatization, reputation damage); that is, there was a policy dialogue with treated
schools which implied collective action and made school actors’ efforts more accountable. In ad-
dition, state education authorities coached teachers on analyzing the information used to selected
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schools and diagnosing the causes of poor performance within their schools. 3
Figure 3.2: The timeline of the PAE
Between May and June 2010, authorities at Colima’s Ministry of Education, together with school
directors and selected teachers, developed a simple methodology to construct a detailed diagnosis
identifying the learning weaknesses of their students based on the ENLACE results.4 The diag-
noses were tailored to each school: the ENLACE test questions which more students answered
wrong were collected by subject area, grade and classroom. Using personal identification num-
bers and a password, all teachers in México had online access to a rich data base organizing the
proportion of students in their class who answered an ENLACE question incorrectly. The website
3In addition, a consultant firm visited all PAE schools to document the students’, teachers’, parents’ and principals’
opinions about their schools. The main objective of these qualitative reports was to identify the causes of the poor
ENLACE performance among these PAE schools in 2009. The main findings were that the low socioeconomic status
of the students coupled with dispirited attitudes among teachers had a detrimental affect learning. In fact, one key
observation in the report was that teachers in PAE schools had the same level of credentials than non-PAE teachers.
The teachers did not differ in formal education and training; the teachers differed in personal passion and conviction.
Delivered in early May 2010 to the Colima Ministry of Education, the pedagogical recommendations of the PAE were
implemented starting in the 2010-2011school year
4The methodology relied on public information constructed by the Federal Ministry of Education (SEP).
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also indicated what area of knowledge and the relevant curriculum for each ENLACE questions
thereby providing teachers a concrete pedagogical direction to guide their efforts.
The second phase of PAE started in September 2010 and consisted of pedagogical interventions
and the monitoring of progress and implementation. With diagnoses in hand, state authorities,
school directors and teachers collaboratively designed school-specific improvement strategies,
which, broadly speaking, included one or more of the following four interventions:
1. Strengthening school-based management. This intervention draws on the experiences gained
from the previously implemented PEC (Programa Escuelas de Calidad) and AGES (Apoyo
a la Gestión Escolar).
2. Redefining the role of school supervisors and training them. School supervisors in México
are not appointed through a competitive process and do not have to undertake any training
before taking on their duty. Hence, there is a high degree of variation in the quality of school
supervision.
3. Redefining the role of school directors and training them. Similar to school supervisors,
many of the school directors lack the skills necessary on how to manage a school. Direc-
tors have trouble identifying the strengths and weaknesses of their school and based on this
design a school plan for the medium- and long-term. Directors seldom set measurable and
reachable goals in crucial indicators to monitor progress, among others.
4. Reinforcing teachers’ knowledge in the identified academic areas posing challenges. The
program provided teachers with training and special courses to strengthen their knowledge
in subject areas identified as challenging during the diagnosis step of the program.
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Table 3.1: Evolution of Average Math Score in Colima based on ENLACE
year All Schools Non-PAE PAE
2006 485 500 459
2007 497 514 467
2008 490 506 461
2009 488 507 451
2010 503 517 475
2011 528 544 500
2012 514 529 487
2013 527 542 500
Source: Author’s elaboration using ENLACE, SEP
Due to reasons that have little, if anything to do with the program’s performance, PAE was can-
celled sometime between October and December 2011.
3.3.2 Dataset and Recent Trends
This study uses and merges student learning outcomes as measured by ENLACE with administra-
tive school census data collected by federal and state education authorities (known as the Formato
911). Since 1998, this school census is collected at the beginning and end of each school year,
and lists, among other entries, the number of teachers, students, classrooms, computers, average
years of education among teachers as well as the geographic location for each school. In virtue of
a unique school identifier (Clave de Centro de Trabajo, CCT), it is possible to merge this school
census data with the results from standardized ENLACE tests into a single data base. In addition to
learning outcomes, ENLACE includes socioeconomic information for each school based on their
geographical location.5
5The National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Población, CONAPO) ranks all localities (an ad-
ministrative and / or geographic entity often more disaggregated than a municipality) in México according to a
marginality index, a weighted average of literacy, access to basic public utilities, household infrastructure and av-
erage wages. Rankings range from very high marginalization, high marginalization, medium marginalization, low
marginalization, and very low marginalization. For methodological details regarding México’s marginality index, see
http://www.conapo.gob.mx/
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Table 3.1 depicts mean math scores in Colima from 2006 to 2013. In general, schools in Colima
have improved by about 42 points throughout this period. As expected, the 108 PAE schools
had lower learning outcomes relative to the non-PAE schools. In 2006, PAE schools were 41
points lower than non-PAE schools and in 2013, PAE schools were still 42 points behind non-
PAE schools, in other words, score gains among PAE schools were similar to non-PAE schools
throughout this period. In 2009, the baseline year, the difference between PAE and non-PAE
schools was 56 points and the gap was reduced to 42 point the year after, perhaps partly explained
by mean reversion effects (see Chay et al. (2003)).
3.4 Methodology
The literature in economics of education has used educational production functions to estimate the
relative impact of various factors affecting student outcomes. One can utilize, therefore, an educa-
tion production function (EPF) approach to estimate the impact of policy interventions on student
outcomes. Endogeneity and causality issues, however, require that the statistical analysis employ
methods that adjust for the potential biases obtained through OLS estimation. In this dissertation,
an EPF is estimated to examine Colima’s PAE adopting a quasi-experimental evaluation design,
which mimics a randomized experiment, and allows the parameter relevant for policy analysis to
be more accurately estimated. The total effect of the program (which includes both direct and
indirect effects) is defined as the local average treatment effect on achievement for students (Todd
and Wolpin, 2003).
A school’s eligibility for PAE was first determined by ENLACE scores. This exogenous classi-
fication created two groups: schools just below and schools just above the exogenous threshold.
Under these conditions, a discontinuity in the relationship (or regression) between pre-PAE scores
and post-PAE scores will reflect the impact of the PAE program (Imbens and Lemieux, 2007; Im-
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bens and Wooldridge, 2008).
A simple comparison of mean test score differences between PAE schools and non-PAE schools
over time (see Table 3.5) or a difference-in-difference estimation may be too na ive. First, factors
unrelated to the program can impact both groups, and might cause the impact of the PAE to be
over- or underestimated. For example, the discussion in Mizala et al. (2006) suggests that school
rankings issuing from repeated cross-sections of Chile’s achievement data are not necessarily in-
dicative of school effectiveness but are simply reflective of the socioeconomic composition of its
students. Second, the selection of schools on the basis of a one-year school performance ranking
may misclassify schools due to a one-time performance aberration (caused by one time shocks to
non persistent causes or mean reverting noise). As discussed by Chay et al. (2003), this could
bias estimators of the program’s impact since PAE’s (low-performing) schools would tend to au-
tomatically revert to the overall mean. A double difference approach could, therefore, mistakenly
attribute score improvements to the program.
Following Chay et al. (2003), a regression discontinuity design can defuse this mean reverting
problem. The logic behind their approach is quite simple: The objective is to identify a group of
schools that are part of PAE that are similar enough to a group of schools that is not part of the
program. A good place to identify such comparison groups is right around the cut-off point dis-
tinguishing PAE from non-PAE schools as the threshold mimics a randomized selection to receive
or not to receive treatment. An important limitation to this sort of regression discontinuity design,
however, is that the results are valid only for observations around the cut-off point; the estimated
impact is limited to a local average treatment effect (LATE) which cannot be generalized to cover
the entire population, thereby undermining the external validity of the estimation. This shortcom-
ing, however, is not debilitating. Since PAE is a targeted program, the fact that its results are not
valid for all populations is not especially relevant. The regression results are intended to inform
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the evaluation of this PAE program and related public policy issues.
The regression discontinuity approach is used to answer the following research questions:
(i) Does PAE increase learning outcomes among participating schools?
(ii) If there is an impact, how long does the effect persist over time?
(iii) What role does mere identification, disclosure and discussion of a school’s problems, which
was the main impact of PAE, when it was stopped, play in effectuating improvements?
(iv) Does PAE have a differential impact on student achievement distributions?
(v) Does PAE improve the management of school directors?
More formally, the following equation specifies the educational production function utilized to
examine the effects of PAE on student achievement. Let us define Yi,s,t as the average ENLACE
performance of student ith in school s and year t as a function of a dummy variable PAE, taking the
value of one if the school is part of PAE, zero otherwise; ENLACE average results at the baseline
Ys,2009; the interaction between the former and the later; and a series of school-level controls Xs,t :




βkXks,t +ηs +νs,t (3.1)
Notice that the dummy variable identifying schools belonging to PAE is based on eligibility to
the program, determined by ENLACE average results for 2009. By assumption εi,s,t should be
independently and identically distributed (iid) with a mean of zero and known variance. How-
ever since the unit of intervention is the school but the unit of analysis is the student (i.e. schools
and not students are assigned or not to PAE), the unobservables are defined as composed of two
terms εi,s,t = ηs + νi,s,t . In other words, the unobservables are captured by two components, a
school-specific one (ηs) and an individual-, school- and time-specific term (νi,s,t). This structure
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of the error term implies clustering of students within schools allowing for intra-school correla-
tion across students. Equation 3.1 can be modified to include higher order terms of the “forcing
variable” Ys,2009 to control for non-linearities in the relationship between the eligibility criteria and
subsequent learning outcomes.
For a group of schools sufficiently close to the PAE-eligibility cut-off, such that samples are bal-
anced both in observables and unobservables, the effects of PAE will be captured by β̂3,t in Equa-
tion 3.1. Since PAE was announced in February of 2010 and the first follow up ENLACE test was
a few months after in May of that same year, the parameter estimating the discontinuity β̂3,2010
captures immediate the accountability effect of the program while that for 2011 and 2012 captures
also the effects of an additional pedagogical and other interventions adopted by school afterwards.
A variation of Equation 3.1 can be used to test for heterogeneity across subject areas. Additionally,
a more disaggregated version of Equation 3.1 can be used to test whether the effects of the pro-
gram are heterogenous across the distribution of ex-ante test scores. In other words, by estimating
Equation 3.1 separately for groups of students located at different levels of learning outcomes, it
can be shown if, say, increases in test scores are occurring among students with relatively high
initial learning outcomes in poor performing schools.
3.4.1 Determining the bandwidth
The optimal number of schools around the cut-off by which to evaluate the impact of the PAE
program is determined by a trade-off between precision and internal validity. That is, a narrow
bandwidth would select schools very close to the cut-off hence more similar in observables and
unobservables, but the statistical power might be compromised given a small number of observa-
tions. On the other hand, a wider bandwidth would increase the number of observations in the
treatment and control groups but might not yield balanced samples in observables (and unobserv-
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Table 3.2: Bandwidths around the cutoff
Enlace Points Schools Students PAE NonPAE
4.74 38 4,069 22 16
9.48 66 7,422 35 31
18.97 122 13,353 59 63
Source: Author’s elaboration using RD command
ables). Following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), the optimal bandwidth is determined to be
9.48 ENLACE points below and above the cut-off or 0.0948 standard deviations around the thresh-
old dividing PAE from non-PAE schools. This optimal bandwidth will be complemented with two
alternative rather arbitrary ones: half of the optimal bandwidth (±4.74) and double the optimal
bandwidth (±18.97).6 Table 3.2 shows the number of schools above (non-PAE) and below (PAE)
the cut-off as well as the number of students using the three different bandwidths.
Figure 3.3 shows the intra-class correlation for those schools around the cut-off. This coefficient is
zero until 15 points after the cutoff, and less than 0.02 at 25 points around the cutoff. This confirms
that a comparison between schools can be conducted for the suggested bandwidths.
6The optimal bandwidth was computed using the regression discontinuity Stata program RD.
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Figure 3.3: Intraclass Correlation coefficient around the cutoff
To create a comparison between the PAE and non-PAE schools, 80 schools were chosen before the
program started. In a ranking where 1st place indicates the lowest scoring school, schools ranging
from 70 to 108 would be chosen as the PAE treatment group while the non-PAE control group
would consist of schools 109 to 148. This procedure allows the use of a regression discontinuity to
estimate the impact of the program. Figure 3.10 shows the density of the assignment variable and
the densities for both groups (PAE and non-PAE schools). The straight line is the cut-off which
divides the two groups, and the density function appears continuous around the bandwidth. In this
way, there is no pattern which would invalidate the identification strategy.
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Figure 3.4: Density of the assignment variable
3.4.2 Sample Balance
If as the PAE treatment and control groups are equal in expectation in terms of observed and unob-
served dimensions, then the evaluation framework will mimic a randomized experiment. Table 3.3
summarizes the descriptive statistics for a sample of 4th graders in the PAE and non-PAE schools.
While there are no significant difference in age, sex and access to the Oportunidades program,
there are some slight differences in parental education, family size, and Internet access at home do
arise. Although relatively minor, the discrepancies suggest that students in the (control) non-PAE
schools are slightly richer than the (treatment) PAE schools.
Having first verified that there are no major differences in socioeconomic background between the
treatment and control groups, an analysis of school inputs was also done. The school inputs for the
2008-2009 school year, before treatment, are shown in Table 3.4: as can be seen, the school inputs
–such as school size and students pre teacher–are not significantly different across treatment and
control.
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Table 3.3: Descriptives statistics of fourth graders in the evaluation sample (78 schools)
Variable Non-PAE control S.E. PAE-Treatment S.E Difference S.E.
Age 10.0 0.020 10.1 0.020 0.0 (0.028)
Female 0.5 0.015 0.5 0.015 0.0 (0.021)
Oportunidades 0.4 0.014 0.4 0.015 0.0 (0.021)
Years in preschool 2.74 0.029 2.60 0.029 0.14 (0.041)**
Live with parents 0.74 0.013 0.75 0.013 0.00 (0.018)
Mother’s education 9.48 0.165 8.98 0.148 0.50 (0.222)**
Father’s education 9.94 0.185 9.12 0.174 0.82 (0.253)***
Number of siblings 2.31 0.048 2.48 0.050 -0.17 (0.069)***
Cars at home 0.92 0.027 0.91 0.027 0.01 (0.038)
Internet at home 0.38 0.014 0.33 0.014 0.05 (0.020)***
Computers at home 0.62 0.024 0.62 0.025 0.00 (0.035)
Observations 1,104 1,148
Source: Student-PAE Survey
Table 3.4: School Inputs 2009, evaluation sample
Non-PAE control PAE-Treatment Difference S.E.
Number of students 197 191 5.97 (21.30)
Number of teachers 7.87 7.77 .099 (.728)
% of teachers with Incentive Program 0.49 0.40 .08 (.070)
% of teachers with B.A. or more 0.68 0.78 -0.10 (.06)
Student/teacher ratio 24.65 24.44 .21 (1.12)
Intra school year dropout 0.2% 0.2% 0.00 (.009)
Students who fail the grade 0.03 0.03 0.00 (.006)
Source: School Census, 2009
To show diagrammatically and in more detail the comparison between PAE and non-PAE schools,
Figure 3.5 shows the continuity of the drop-out rate along the 2009 average achievement, the forc-
ing variable. The continuity of the covariate indicates that the treatment and control were equal in
expectation in terms of the student composition of the two groups.
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Figure 3.5: Dropout and average performance in 2009. Source:Author’s calculation using 911
Figure 3.6 illustrates that student-to-teacher ratios are equal between PAE and non-PAE schools.
The lack of discontinuity close to the cut-off indicates that these schools were equivalent with re-
spect to this school input.
Figure 3.6: Student Teacher Ration. Source:Author’s calculation using 911
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Identification
As noted above, a simple approach to evaluating the PAE program would involve just a straight-
forward comparison of the differences in mean value of the outcome variable (e.g., test scores)
between the PAE schools and non-PAE schools over time. Figure 3.7 illustrates this simple ap-
proach—without controls—using the full sample of the PAE and non-PAE schools, with a red line
representing the 2009 baseline year (before the program). That is, Figure 3.7 depicts the overall
mean test performance between PAE and non-PAE schools over seven years. In 2006, non-PAE
schools out-performed PAE schools by about 0.40 s.d., and this gap increased in 2007. Between
2007 and 2009, both mean test scores decreased, but PAE schools decreased more. After 2009,
both groups experienced an increase in their average test scores while still maintaining a difference
in means similar to that of 2006. In short, it would appear the PAE program had no effect on test
scores.
Figure 3.7: School Performance over time. Source:Author’s calculation using ENLACE
As we shall see, Figure 3.7 depicts how a simple comparison might misrepresent the impact of the
PAE program: PAE schools—before and after the program—underperform in comparison with the
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non-PAE schools and there does not appear to be any change after the program was implemented.
The next step is to adopt the regression discontinuity design.
First, Figure 3.8 examines whether the assignment rule used in the selection of the poorest per-
forming schools had actually been followed. That is, the graph shows the relationship between the
average school achievement scores that were used to determine which schools were eligible for
PAE and the percentage of those schools that actually received PAE information. Graph 3.8 shows
that this rule was indeed followed: Every school that was eligible for PAE joined the program.
So, the fact that the average school achievement score in 2009 was a deterministic forcing variable
classifying PAE-treatment and non-PAE-control schools means that a sharp regression discontinu-
ity methodology can be used to analyze the impact of the program.
Figure 3.8: First Stage. Source:Author’s calculation using ENLACE
Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental design resulting from a sorting of schools due to a spe-
cific test score cut-off, the analysis uses schools close to the cut-off point so that a valid comparison
among similar groups can be constructed. Schools were arrayed on a forcing variable defined by
their average test scores on the ENLACE achievement test and classified at an exogenous perfor-
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Table 3.5: Evolution of Average Math Score in Colima based on ENLACE , Sample Evaluation
Year NonPAE PAE Diff S.E.
2006 476 464 11 (5.76)**
2007 492 473 19 ( 5.32)***
2008 481 468 12 (4.76)***
2009 475 464 11 (1.08)***
2010 489 490 -1 (6.15)
2011 502 501 1 (5.86)
2012 514 510 4 (5.88)
2013 508 499 9 (6.62)
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE
mance cut-off point defined of 469.2. Schools with scores below the cut-off point were classified
as PAE schools and schools with scores greater than the cut-off point did not receive the program.
Table 3.5 shows the distribution of average math scores in Colima for the evaluation sample.
Using the sample of schools close to the cut-off, Figure 3.9 shows the distribution of average test
scores by PAE-treatment and non-PAE treatment, including the overall sample of schools as well
as the samples used for the regression discontinuity analysis, including the 50% bandwidth as well
as the optimal bandwidth and double this bandwidth, as discussed earlier. The results for the over-
all sample of schools was just discussed, but comparing those results with those in the evaluation
samples (close to the cut-off point) show significant differences. For all bandwidths used in the
regression discontinuity design, the PAE schools tend to catch-up with the non-PAE schools after
the implementation of the program. The suggestion is that the PAE program was indeed successful
in raising student achievement, when similar schools are compared with each other.
Figure 3.9 focuses on the comparison of test scores between PAE and non-PAE schools before
and after the PAE implementation threshold, using the optimal bandwidth. As it was discussed
earlier, because of mean reversion between control and treatment schools or other factors, the use
of rankings may lead to misclassification of schools across the treatment and control groups, but
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figure 3.9 shows the average school performance three years before the baseline and there is no
significant difference in results, suggesting the absence of this type of problem.
Figure 3.9: PAE sample. Source:Author’s calculation using ENLACE
The descriptive picture provided by the diagrams in this section suggests that using a regression
discontinuity method the PAE program may indeed have worked in raising student achievement.
However, determining the exact impact requires estimating the production function equation spec-
ified above. This is discussed in the next section. For most of the statistical analysis reported
below, the focus will be on the data that includes 66 schools on (±9.48) point around the cut-off,
to ensure the statistical power and precision of the estimates, but the analysis was carried out with
other bandwidths as well.
3.5 Results
Overall, the empirical results in this section suggest that the OLS “naive” estimates do not accu-
rately reveal the causal relationship between the PAE intervention and average school performance.
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Using the OLS approach, there appears to be a negative relationship: Schools subject to PAE did
not improve on the basis of this intervention. But because this statistical approach may be sub-
ject to the presence of omitted variables, there may be a downward bias on the OLS estimate for
the PAE impact on scores. This is investigated next, by using the regression discontinuity approach.
3.5.1 Differences in Differences at the school level results
Table 3.6 presents the effect of the PAE program on the average school test scores across band-
widths and time. In general, the estimates show that the relationship between the PAE program
and school achievement is positive by 13.82 points of ENLACE (0.14 s.d.) with the preferred
bandwidth (±9.48).
Different specifications, with various controls and different bandwidths, were used. The coeffi-
cients were all positive, and significant at the 95 level. That is, the PAE program increased EN-
LACE test scores by around 0.13 s.d. for a bandwidth of 38 schools on each side of the cut-off, and
the estimate was significant at a 95% (p< .05) level of confidence. In particular, from the 2008-
2009 school year to the 2009-2010 school year, average scores increased in all of Colima’s schools.
But they increased more in the PAE schools so that the 2010 the difference in differences estimates
show a significant gain favoring the PAE over the non-PAE schools by around 0.16 s.d. for the
optimal bandwidth. This suggests that the program had a positive impact on student achievement
and that program helped reduce the gap that existed before the PAE was implemented between the
PAE and non-PAE schools. 7.
7Two models where performed to estimate these effects: Ys,t = α + βPAEs,t + γDuringPAEs + τPostPAEs +
δYearεs,t and Ys,t = α +βPAEs,t ∗Year+ εs,t
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Table 3.6: Effects of PAE on average learning achievement, Colima 2006-2013
All ±18.97 ±9.48 ±4.74
PAE 9.92 13.02 13.82 12.60
(3.628)*** (3.545)*** (4.89)*** (6.507)**
Observations 2452 964 528 304
PAE 2010 4.13 9.44 15.46 23.46
(6.113) (6.39) (8.82)* (11.74)**
Observations 2452 964 528 304
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE (2006-213)
*** 99% ** 95% *90% . Full results in the annex.
3.5.2 Second stage, graphical analysis
Figure 3.10 illustrates the reduced form relationship between average school performance in 2010
(vertical axis) and the performance in 2009 relative to the cutoff test score (horizontal axis). The
PAE schools are to the left of the cut-off, which was of course used for their eligibility into the
program, and the non-PAE schools are to the right. A clear discontinuity appears at the normalized
cut-off (zero): there is a general pattern showing that schools on the left of the cut-off (the PAE
schools) display greater gains in tests scores in 2010 than those schools on the right of the cut-off
(the non-PAE schools). This graphic illustration suggests that the PAE program did, after all, have
an effect on school outcomes. This short-run impact of the program may be attributable to the
information and analysis that the accountability component of the PAE program provided to the
PAE schools about their educational status and the problems their students encountered.
School Average Performance 2010, PAE vs Non-PAE, Impact Evaluation Sample
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Figure 3.10: Second Stage, 2010.
Analyzing the impact of the program after one year, when the schools may have implemented some
pedagogical interventions (because the program ended, they were not provided with any additional
resources as part of the program itself) provides additional information on the impact of the PAE.
This second stage of the analysis, examining test scores for 2011, reveals a small discontinuity
at the cut-off. Schools on the left of the threshold have an average achievement in 2011 slightly
higher than those schools on the right of the cut-off.
School Average Performance 2011, PAE vs Non-PAE, Impact Evaluation Sample
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Figure 3.11: Second Stage, 2011.
By 2012, two years after the implementation of the program, the relationship between average
school performance and the forcing variable has dissipated. No achievement differences arise at
the cut-off.
School Average Performance 2012, PAE vs Non-PAE, Impact Evaluation Sample
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Figure 3.12: Second Stage, 2012.
3.5.3 Second Stage, Econometric results
This section extends the graphical analysis in the last section by discussing the results of the PAE
program over time using the coefficients of the estimated equations. Recall that the PAE program
consisted of two components: accountability intervention then followed by pedagogical interven-
tion. If the first component impacted test scores, the effect would presumably (though not neces-
sarily) be observed before the implementation of the second component. As evidenced in Table
3.7, the relationship between schools subject to PAE accountability intervention and average test
scores suggests that the PAE program had an effect on school outcomes.
Figure 3.13 illustrates the impact of the program comparing schools around the cutoff. The signif-
icant of these coefficients relies on the clustered S.E. at the school level.
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Table 3.7: Effects of PAE on average learning achievement, Colima 2010
Model Sample Coefficient S.E.
±18.97 13516 19.41 (13.35)
±9.4 7424 44.32** (20.90)
±4.74 13494 99.92** (47.66)
Each model includes controls.
All regressions are clustered by schools
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
Figure 3.13: Second Stage, 2010, Impact Evaluation Sample. Source:Author’s calculation using ENLACE
While the results show a positive 0.42 s.d. impact on the average school scores for the preferred
bandwidth, it is possible that the PAE program impacted scores on a subject-by-subject basis. Ta-
ble 3.8 shows the estimates for math, Spanish (reading) and other (subjects tested changed very
year and they were, therefore, rotative). Indeed, the effect of the program was consistent across
subjects. The program had a positive effect of 0.41 in Spanish (for the optimal bandwidth). In
Math, PAE schools were impacted by an average of 46 points (with a statistical significance of 95
% (p < .05). The PAE intervention also had an impact on rotative subject performance for schools.
After only one year and half (school year 2011-2012), the PAE program was discontinued. Using
data from 2011, the results indicate that the PAE program had no longer a significant impact in in-
creasing average test scores. For 2012, an analysis does not detect either a significant effect on test
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Table 3.8: Effects of PAE on average learning achievement, Colima 2010
Model Sample Coefficient S.E.
±9.4 Math 7333 46.51** (21.42)
±9.4 Spanish 7304 41.20** (20.10)
±9.4 Rotative 7356 44.46* (24.17)
Each model includes controls.
All regressions are clustered by schools
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
score gains, and the results are consistent across specifications. So, although there was a short-run
gain in test scores, the test scores stopped rising after two years.
3.5.4 Threats to Internal Validity
As is the case with all regression discontinuity designs, threats to internal validity need to be inves-
tigated and, if possible, mitigated. Tests for discontinuities in covariates unrelated to the treatment
at the cut-off point, and tests for discrepancies at non-discontinuity points must be conducted. Ad-
ditionally, other weaknesses can be avoided by ensuring that sufficient observations around the
cut-off point exist and that the analysis is generalizable to the entire population. As previously
mentioned, the PAE cut-off point was entirely determined by the government (presumably by bud-
get considerations), making it exogenous. Second, as detailed above, the Colima education data
bases include rich data on students in all schools; this ensures that the number of observations
around the cut-off point is sufficient to support statistical inferences. Finally, since the PAE is a
special program intended to target a special population, the fact that its results may be valid only
for a specific population subgroup is not a point of concern; we are interested in the impact PAE
had on these lower-performing schools.
As for unrelated covariation, Table 3.9 shows the regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of
the intervention given average student-to-teacher ratios. The results are not significant, suggesting
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that schools were similar with respect to this covariate.
Table 3.9: Effects of PAE on average Student-Teacher Ratio, Colima 2010
Model Sample Coefficient S.E.
28 ES 6160 -3.92e-16 (1.19e-15)
25 ES 5566 7.34e-16 (1.27e-15)
20 ES 4482 -2.59e-16 (7.24e-16)
Each model includes controls.
All regressions are clustered by schools
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
By the same token, Table 3.10 shows the regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of the
intervention given average marginality rates. Again, the results are not significant.
Table 3.10: Effects of PAE on average marginality, Colima 2010
Model Sample Coefficient S.E.
28 ES 6160 .16 (.136)
25 ES 5566 .22 (.135)
20 ES 4482 .23 (.144)
Each model includes controls.
All regressions are clustered by schools
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
What about schools artificially manipulating their test scores, which is often done by the appalling
practice of excluding low-performing students from taking the exam? (Reback and Cullen, 2006;
Figlio and Getzler, 2002; Jacob and Levitt, 2003). Table 3.20 in the Annex lists the average number
of students who did not participate in ENLACE 2009, 2010 and 2011 in PAE-treated and non-PAE-
control schools. The average number of missing students was similar across all groups and times.
There is, then, at least no evidence of systematic exclusions.
Given that all these results have been reported in aggregate, they do not reflect the possible hetero-
geneous effects of treatment. Table 3.18 illustrates the impact of the program across the distribution
and cut-off. Using a quantile regression, the impact of the program for the preferred bandwidth
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are only significant at bottom 10% with a coefficient of 9.5 and the last three deciles by12.41,18.6,
19(70% and 80% and 90%). This result suggests that the program did not have an impact for the
average student. In addition, Table 3.19 details the various activities and practices of principals of
PAE and non-PAE schools in 2010. The Table shows the mean differences across Principal’s task,
where PAE principals had better indicators in terms of accountability and management capacity.
That is, a potential mechanism of PAE improvement was the change of school management of the
Principal in PAE schools.
3.6 Discussion
In 2010, the state of Colima established an accountability strategy and identified 108 schools that
had obtained the lowest learning outcomes as measured by ENLACE. In early February 2010, the
state governor announced the “performance status” of selected schools: Schools which performed
below an arbitrary cut-off were automatically enrolled in a mandatory Programa de Atención Es-
pecı́fica para la Mejora del Logro Educativo (PAE). The program, however, was ended in the
2011-2012 school year.
By exploiting PAE’s eligibility rules, a sharp regression discontinuity was used to estimate the
impact on subsequent learning outcomes. Schools that participated in the program and a valid
comparison group were followed for three years in order to compare their performance. The re-
sults of a statistical analysis of this natural experiment confirm the positive effect of the PAE pro-
gram on average test scores in poorly performing schools in the Mexican state of Colima. There
are many potential explanations of this impact. First, principals and teachers may have focused
on teaching to the test. Curriculum and ENLACE are linked by design and ENLACE was used
to show the weakness areas in the classrooms of the low-performing schools. It is possible that
66
teachers used this information to teach the subjects that were more closely connected to the test.
Second, the pressure put on teachers by being declared low-performing schools may have created
incentives to practice some type of cheating. ENLACE uses two algorithms to detect cheating
and results are invalidated when it happens. There is no evidence of test scores invalidation by
the Ministry of Education of Colima to any PAE schools (under the preferred bandwidth). In ad-
dition, the percentage of students who did not take ENLACE during the intervention was equal
than non-PAE schools, which suggests the PAE schools did not try to manipulate test scores by
choosing the students who took the test Third, student mobility across schools might have affected
the test scores after the PAE schools were identified. But such mobility is very difficult without
a reason other than geographic reallocation of student’s family. In addition, it would have been
more likely that the best students would have moved out of PAE schools, which –if anything—it
would suggest the impact of the program could have been stronger than suggested by this study..
Fourth, another plausible explanation is that the intervention may have changed the expectations
of the school actors. That is, teachers may have increased effort due to future expectations of
punishment. While expectations are a consistent story, it goes in the same direction than the ac-
countability story that this analysis supports. Therefore, the results of a statistical analysis of this
“natural experiment” confirm that the accountability intervention embodied by the PAE program
had a positive impact on average test scores in poorly performing schools in the Mexican state of
Colima. In the short-term, the PAE schools responded to feedback information by improving the
quality of the education they provided. The size of the three-year effects align with studies that
evaluate the impact of accountability measures on test scores, with values ranging from 12% to
15% s.d. on performance outcomes.
The fact that the PAE program was halted after only one year suggests that the main intervention
of the program was circumscribed to the detailed information provided to the schools about the
test scores of their students, the activities connected to the preparation of a program of change at
the school level, and any pedagogical reforms induced by these activities. Activities during the
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period of preparation revolved started by notifying schools they were low-performing, identifying
the school’s main academic problems and devising a development plan to address those challenges.
Thus, if the PAE program were to have an effect on test scores, the mechanism of influence would
be limited simply to school notification, problem identification and reform conceptualization. Yet
after only one year, test scores in PAE schools increased by 0.4 s.d. vis-à-vis non-PAE schools and
differences between these two groups were not significant for the three years of the experiment. As
Koning and van der Wiel (2013) observes (from a study in the Netherlands), “naming and sham-
ing” can itself effectuate change.
The results of this chapter indicate that full and wide dissemination of information detailing school
quality is critically important. When students, teachers and parents in a school know that their
scores are low, and this triggers a process of self-evaluation and analysis, the process itself may
lead to an improvement in learning outcomes. There may also be a motivational impact connected
to the ranking of a school relative to others, linked to the “naming and shaming” social pressure
that arises from being labeled a low-performing school.
According to this analysis, it is not so much the inputs made available by an intervention program,
but the signaling value of the program, the associated diagnosis and networking opportunities with
other school officials and advisers which result in school improvements. Moreover, unlike the
high-stakes consequences for schools in the United States, or the sacking of officials in England,
or the lead with your feet school choice in the Netherlands, the policy (or at least de facto events)
in Colima bore no punitive actions against school actors.
So while the PAE program in Colima was surprisingly and frustratingly short-lived, it’s prema-
ture termination serves to highlight a largely unrecognized phenomenon: acknowledgment is, in
some ways, virtually tantamount to improvement. After all, if you really understand the prob-
68
lem, effective solutions come much easier. If you don’t understand the problem, no amount of
“problem-solving” can be expected to work. This is why future research must focus on document-
ing how school administrators, teachers, parents and students interpret, internalize and react to
indications that their school is underperforming.
One may still legitimately wonder why schools did not improve before the PAE program given
that the same information was already disclosed publicly. Perhaps the information was not well
understood or disseminated, or beleaguered school leaders in poorly performing schools could
not—without the right logistical support and networking—begin to proactively respond to more,
and as it were, even louder, bad news. These are all areas of future research. Moreover, a fed-
eral Mexican program similar in nature to PAE—the Program to Improve Academic Achievement
(PEMLE)—could no doubt benefit from more research in this vein. It remains refreshing, how-
ever, that quality information, without punitive measures but within a supportive and collaborative
environment, appears to be sufficient for improved learning, as demonstrated in this chapter.
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3.6.1 Tables and Figures
School Average Performance 2010, PAE vs Non-PAE, Impact Evaluation Sample
Figure 3.14: Density of School Average Performance, PAE vs Non-PAE
Table 3.11: Differences and Differences -PAE results
(All) 76 33 28 25
Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E.
PAE School -56.53*** (1.880) -16.12*** (2.172) -15.36*** (2.111) -14.23*** (2.418) -14.10*** (2.557)
During PAE 9.92*** (3.628) 13.02** (3.545) 13.82** (4.89) 12.60** (6.507) 11.03** (5.049)
After PAE 0.166 (5.790) -2.8 (7.761) -3.31 (8.250) -2.874 (10.14) -5.845 (10.46)
2007 13.30*** (3.633) 11.10** (3.767) 12.11*** (3.641) 11.67** (4.240) 13.44** (4.468)
2008 4.405 (3.449) 6.043 (3.572) 6.266 (3.260) 4.72 (3.789) 5.43 (3.892)
2009 3.539 (3.510) 0.0491 (2.963) 0.913 (2.692) -0.7 (3.188) 1.321 (3.266)
2010 16.24*** (3.909) 17.10*** (4.417) 18.15*** (4.340) 17.84*** (5.145) 21.39*** (5.438)
2011 27.12*** (3.815) 24.66*** (4.368) 24.00*** (4.146) 23.07*** (4.878) 26.35*** (5.049)
2012 40.40*** (3.900) 37.58*** (4.502) 37.14*** (4.351) 37.09*** (5.214) 39.61*** (5.443)
2013 32.10*** (4.318) 33.20*** (5.247) 34.10*** (5.469) 33.96*** (6.769) 38.01*** (7.061)
Constant 510.1*** (2.697) 477.8*** (3.312) 476.4*** (2.897) 477.5*** (3.404) 475.4*** (3.571)
Observations 2452 606 526 448 408
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
PEMLE versus PAE
What is the target population? What are the characteristics defining the target population benefit-
ing from this program?
PEMLE : 29,147 primary (grades 1-6) and lower secondary (grades 7-9) schools in which 50 per-
cent or more of the students obtained an “insufficient” level on the 2009 ENLACE exam. The
program divides the 29,147 schools into 3 categories: Category 3: 29,147 schools in which 50
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Table 3.12: Differences and Differences estimation of PAE impact
(All) ±18.97 ±9.48 ±4.74
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
PAE School -50.95*** (3.910) -18.75*** (4.371) -14.88** (5.309) -19.25** (6.058)
2007 14.80** (4.553) 13.21** (4.244) 14.11* (5.476) 11.37 (8.092)
2008 5.447 (4.335) 7.082 (4.168) 6.177 (5.049) 8.786 (6.914)
2009 5.773 (4.422) -1.228 (3.482) -2.274 (4.117) -2.843 (5.112)
2010 17.73*** (4.531) 14.76*** (3.988) 15.87** (5.106) 15.21* (7.314)
2011 28.53*** (4.429) 24.84*** (4.186) 23.18*** (5.206) 25.06*** (7.238)
2012 41.13*** (4.516) 39.13*** (4.810) 38.83*** (5.502) 34.40*** (6.822)
2013 33.30*** (4.641) 31.30*** (5.315) 33.43*** (6.302) 36.18*** (8.626)
PAE 2007 -6.987 (5.594) -7.490 (5.720) -4.792 (7.252) 6.309 (9.247)
PAE 2008 -4.865 (5.333) -5.697 (5.758) -0.324 (6.662) 3.601 (8.267)
PAE 2009 -10.32* (5.191) 0.740 (4.584) 5.300 (5.424) 14.48* (6.140)
PAE 2010 4.131 (6.113) 9.449 (6.397) 15.46 (8.829) 23.46* (11.75)
PAE 2011 4.554 (5.651) 10.24 (5.944) 12.14 (7.549) 14.17 (8.712)
PAE 2012 7.577 (6.215) 7.339 (6.799) 6.781 (7.901) 15.78 (8.839)
PAE 2013 5.665 (6.472) 9.046 (7.378) 8.349 (9.185) 6.866 (10.82)
Constant 508.9*** (3.185) 479.8*** (3.355) 476.6*** (4.054) 474.8*** (5.038)
Observations 2452 964 528 304
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
Table 3.13: RD- 2010 -PAE results by subject- with controls and grade and cluster correction of the SE
Spanish Math Other
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
PAE 41.20** (20.11) 46.51** (21.42) 44.47* (24.17)
Forcing Variable 502.4 (474.3) 1076.3* (478.2) 732.3 (447.3)
FV 2 -0.527 (0.499) -1.134* (0.504) -0.770 (0.471)
PAE ∗ (FV − cuto f f ) 1.600 (6.901) -2.614 (8.415) -1.732 (8.897)
(PAE ∗ (FV − cuto f f ))2 1.380 (0.747) 1.986* (0.856) 1.576 (0.934)
Low Marginality -19.91* (7.673) -24.13** (9.032) -13.64 (10.44)
Medium Marginality 1.158 (5.884) 2.020 (5.692) 2.707 (6.383)
High Marginality 5.567 (10.41) 16.50 (13.30) 34.51* (15.58)
Carrera Magisteria -8.870 (8.933) -13.26 (9.020) -8.172 (8.935)
Student/Teacher 1.785 (0.991) 2.356* (1.075) 1.974 (1.268)
Teachers with HE 47.79** (14.94) 38.73 (19.83) 37.51* (15.39)
Grade 4 -33.04*** (4.519) -18.47** (5.466) 9.290 (5.849)
Grade 5 -43.48*** (5.427) -37.63*** (6.298) 2.790 (5.506)
Grade 6 -17.72** (5.796) -6.466 (6.559) -6.535 (5.935)
Constant -119164.7 (112632.6) -254969.7* (113485.5) -173759.0 (106155.7)
Observations 7304 7333 7356
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
percent of the students obtained an insufficient level in the 2009 ENLACE exam, but not consecu-
tively in the 2007 ENLACE and 2008 ENLACE exams.
Category 2: 9,882 schools in which 50 percent of the students obtained an “insufficient” level in
the ENLACE exams since 2007 until 2009 are not situated in poor areas.
Category 1: 7,395 (of the 9,882 schools in Category 2) in which 50 percent of the students obtained
an “insufficient” level in the ENLACE exam since 2007 until 2009 and are situated in school zones
in which at least three schools fulfill the condition of poor areas. This program is a national pro-
gram.
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Table 3.14: RD- 2011 -PAE results- with controls and cluster correction of the SE
±4.74 ±9.48 ±18.97
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
PAE 101.0** (50.42) 41.05** (21.36) 16.56 (13.10)
Forcing Variable 6656.8 (4071.0) 699.6 (408.6) 90.64 (89.03)
FV 2 -7.054 (4.314) -0.736 (0.430) -0.0937 (0.0928)
PAE ∗ (FV − cuto f f ) -0.267 (33.89) 0.279 (8.070) -2.359 (3.563)
(PAE ∗ (FV − cuto f f ))2 12.85 (6.380) 1.583 (0.800) 0.0131 (0.186)
Low Marginality -52.24 (31.45) -16.84* (7.699) -12.19** (3.717)
Medium Marginality -2.624 (6.694) 5.628 (5.439) -0.702 (3.981)
High Marginality 3.732 (17.87) 22.38 (14.13) 12.51 (13.05)
Carrera Magisteria -24.83 (15.60) -12.66 (11.65) -5.413 (7.962)
Student/Teacher 3.434* (1.591) 1.697 (0.877) 1.050 (0.601)
Teachers with HE 19.25 (27.24) 45.42* (21.80) 35.54** (12.51)
Constant -1570049.1 (960385.2) -165859.3 (97015.2) -21457.1 (21352.6)
Observations 4173 7432 13516
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
Table 3.15: RD- 2010, PAE results- with controls and grade and cluster correction of the SE
±4.74 ±9.48 ±18.97
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
PAE 99.92** (47.67) 44.33** (20.91) 19.42 (13.35)
Forcing Variable 45.57 (30.12) 9.635 (5.163) 3.004 (1.964)
FV 2 -8.603 (5.602) -0.774 (0.442) -0.109 (0.0909)
PAE ∗ (FV − cuto f f ) 13.44 (6.679) 1.650* (0.774) 0.0516 (0.193)
(PAE ∗ (FV − cuto f f ))2 -16.26 (39.09) -0.239 (7.254) -2.230 (3.668)
Low Marginality -40.34 (23.43) -19.45* (8.295) -12.31** (4.299)
Medium Marginality -6.051 (7.188) 1.978 (5.177) -2.138 (3.463)
High Marginality -1.311 (13.69) 19.26 (12.32) 10.88 (12.50)
Carrera Magisteria -7.244 (11.23) -10.24 (8.173) 2.245 (6.001)
Student/Teacher 4.076* (1.714) 2.005 (1.062) 0.709 (0.484)
Teachers with HE 24.02 (18.67) 41.50** (15.00) 24.62* (10.64)
Grade 4 -18.05** (5.804) -14.10** (4.627) -20.02*** (3.781)
Grade 5 -34.70*** (5.547) -25.87*** (4.995) -25.38*** (3.342)
Grade 6 -15.16* (7.006) -10.03 (5.596) -11.34** (3.775)
Constant 348.0*** (59.39) 420.5*** (29.41) 468.0*** (14.39)
Observations 4169 7424 13494
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
Table 3.16: RD- 2011 - Simplest model of PAE results- with controls and grade and cluster correction of the SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 38 ES 33 ES 28 ES
PAE 5.234 (3.201) 6.265 (7.542) -0.0256 (9.231) 4.410 (9.947)
Forcing Variable 0.791∗∗∗ (0.0404) 2.115∗∗ (0.707) 1.486 (0.922) 1.831 (1.711)
PAE ∗ (FV − cuto f f ) 0.0218 (0.134) -2.399∗ (1.157) -2.285 (1.712) -2.229 (2.432)
Low Marginality -5.122 (3.055) -9.991 (5.742) -7.256 (6.302) -5.675 (8.992)
Medium Marginality 0.325 (2.352) -11.20∗ (4.523) -11.87∗ (4.892) -13.24∗ (5.511)
High Marginality -0.452 (4.264) -5.939 (8.685) -0.0573 (10.55) -10.90 (8.982)
Carrera Magisterial 9.984∗∗ (3.349) 16.41∗ (6.498) 16.11∗ (7.203) 7.819 (7.983)
Student/Teacher 0.461∗ (0.218) -0.563 (0.596) -0.898 (0.690) 0.112 (0.628)
Teachers with HE 6.041 (5.505) -6.004 (10.19) -6.086 (10.43) 13.31 (11.71)
4th Grade -6.653∗ (2.598) -2.675 (4.861) -2.994 (5.362) -2.953 (6.233)
5th Grade -9.063∗∗∗ (2.438) -1.673 (4.365) -0.618 (4.746) -3.402 (5.316)
6th Grade -2.534 (2.616) -1.504 (5.743) -0.589 (6.361) -5.868 (6.225)
Constant 114.4∗∗∗ (19.93) -483.8 (332.0) -177.5 (434.3) -365.2 (808.9)
Observations 39832 8871 7807 6330
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.17: RD- 2012 - Simplest model of PAE results- with controls and grade and cluster correction of the SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 38 ES 33 ES 28 ES
PAE 3.925 (3.451) 8.943 (7.040) 7.931 (7.973) 1.045 (9.871)
Forcing Variable 0.862∗∗∗ (0.0402) 1.716∗ (0.691) 1.695 (0.994) 2.922 (1.616)
PAE ∗ (FV − cuto f f ) -0.353∗ (0.153) -2.018 (1.083) -1.845 (1.396) -8.111∗∗ (2.519)
Low Marginality -0.345 (3.208) -1.762 (6.115) -0.920 (6.757) 3.737 (8.859)
Medium Marginality 4.827∗ (2.387) 3.943 (4.414) 3.064 (4.826) -0.589 (5.084)
High Marginality -5.453 (4.287) -18.64∗∗ (6.545) -16.02∗ (7.229) -24.96∗∗ (7.923)
Carrera Magisterial 10.70∗∗ (3.660) 28.82∗∗∗ (6.672) 28.03∗∗∗ (7.130) 22.88∗∗ (8.414)
Student/Teacher 0.442∗ (0.224) 0.146 (0.492) -0.0701 (0.546) 1.129 (0.728)
Teachers with HE 6.986 (5.671) -5.091 (8.890) -6.596 (9.281) -2.011 (11.20)
4th Grade 3.583 (2.545) -3.656 (4.853) -2.515 (5.237) -0.441 (5.971)
5th Grade -3.543 (2.538) -10.35∗ (5.067) -10.81 (5.535) -10.59 (6.062)
6th Grade 2.064 (2.691) -0.0888 (5.337) 0.475 (5.786) -0.142 (6.305)
Constant 84.93∗∗∗ (20.06) -313.1 (324.4) -296.4 (468.6) -904.9 (765.6)
Observations 43429 9771 8583 7000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
PAE: 110 primary schools which obtained lower educational scores based on the ENLACE scores
of the students. This program is specific to the state of Colima.
What is the treatment of the program?
PEMLE: The program offers three specific attention packages (PAE Paquete de Atención Es-
pecı́fica) designed to suit the needs of schools each category. The schools in category 3 receive
PAE 3, the schools in category 2 receive PAEs 2 and 3, and the schools in category 1 receive all of
the PAEs.
PAE: The program consists of three phases. The first phase is a diagnostic phase in which schools
are chosen, prepared to receive the program, and finally introduced to the program. This occurred
during the 2010-2011 school year. The second phase is the strengthening of the program during the
school years between 2011 and 2013. The third phase focuses on consolidating the PAE program
in all 110 schools and seeing improvement in the academic achievements of the students during
the school cycles between 2013 and 2015.
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How long will the program last?
PEMLE: The program was designed between December 2009 and January 2010, gestated between
January 2010 and March 2010, and implemented in schools starting March 2010 to the present day.
PAE: The program began during the 2009-2010 school cycle and will end with the 2015 school
cycle.
How was the target population selected?
PEMLE: The selection of schools was initially organized under the national coordination of the
PEMLE, and was later completed by the education authorities at the state level, who had the privi-
lege of adding those schools they thought needed the help of the program.
PAE: The selected schools were a result of a budget restriction that only allowed for 110 primary
schools to receive the program. These 110 scores where the schools receiving the lowest ENLACE
scores.
What is expected of the program?
PEMLE: The program is expected to help those selected primary and lower secondary schools
emerge.
PAE: Increase the percentage of students by 25% to higher scoring levels in the ENLACE exam.
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Table 3.18: Regression Discontinuity Quantile Regression
76 schools 66 schools 56 schools 310 schools
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
q1 9.4 (3.63)*** 9.50 (3.89)*** 7.17 (4.44) 12.78 (4.93)***
q2 4.7 (3.82) 2.56 (4.00) 4.67 (4.47) 14.01 (5.00)***
q3 2.6 (4.36) 6.77 (4.61) 8.83 (5.16)* 16.13 (5.51)***
q4 6.6 (4.71) 2.12 (5.10) 9.36 (5.65)* 18.37 (6.37)***
q5 2.4 (5.02) 2.42 (5.41) 9.42 (6.07) 19.93 (7.23)***
q6 5.1 (5.30) 5.73 (5.83) 13.69 (6.83)** 15.95 (8.05)**
q7 9.1 (5.72) 12.41 (6.36)** 28.72 (7.12)*** 32.64 (8.07)***
q8 11.8 (5.73)** 18.66 (6.25)*** 32.98 (7.42)*** 41.10 (7.97)***
q9 18.5 (7.39)*** 19.00 (7.66)*** 41.36 (9.88)*** 61.11 (11.00)***
Each model includes controls.
The original set of the evaluation sample (ES) is 38 schools.
All regressions are clustered by schools
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
Table 3.19: Differences across Principals’ indicators, PAE vs Non-PAE
Non-PAE PAE Diff S.E.
How often do you evaluate teacher’s attendance? 3.42 3.79 -0.37 0.02 *
How often do you evaluate teacher’s puntuality? 3.45 3.73 -0.28 0.02 *
How often do you evaluate teacher’s senority? 2.17 1.99 0.19 0.03 *
How often do you evaluate teacher’s support to students? 2.69 3.09 -0.40 0.02 *
Do teachers receive monetary benefits for performance? 0.33 0.29 0.03 0.01 *
How often do teachers miss classes? 0.80 0.67 0.13 0.02 *
How often are teachers evaluate? 0.81 0.84 -0.04 0.02 *
How often do supervisors visit the school? 3.28 3.83 -0.55 0.03 *
How often do you visit the classrooms? 3.91 4.01 -0.10 0.02 *
How often do you evaluate teacher’s performance? 2.34 2.40 -0.06 0.02 *
How often do you evaluate student’s performance? 2.74 2.54 0.20 0.02 *
How often does the school give report cards to parents? 3.00 3.05 -0.05 0.00 *
How often do you discuss how to evaluate learning in meetings? 2.73 2.74 0.01 0.02
How often do you discuss how to improve learning? 2.85 2.82 0.03 0.02
Does the school use enlace to help low performance students? 0.95 0.90 0.03 0.07 *
Source: Principal Questionnaires
*** 99% ** 95% *90%
Table 3.20: Average number of students missing ENLACE evaluation sample
2009 2010 2011
PAE Non-PAE PAE Non-PAE PAE Non-PAE
3th 2 0 5 3 9 7
4th 9 10 1 -1 5 3
5th 2 -4 6 8 2 -2
6th -4 -6 1 -4 5 7
Source: ENLACE.*** 99% ** 95%
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Delaying Formal Schooling
and the Effect of School-Entry Age on
Student Achievement in México.
4.1 Introduction
Early childhood development (ECD) research has received growing attention in recent years due
to the potential benefits for investments during this period. According to a review of ECD pro-
grams conducted by Currie (2001), the evidence demonstrates that ECD programs have short-term,
medium-term and long-term benefits, and in particular, for disadvantaged populations. While the
ECD period involves biological and cognitive processes which interact with chronological and en-
vironmental factors (social, culture, physical, etc.), it is not clear exactly when interventions must
be timed in order to provide the highest returns. On the one hand, chronological age is an important
parameter used to time investments during the ECD period. Cahan and Cohen (1989) mention that
“chronological age actually stands for both biological and psycho-educational development” (p.
1239). On the other hand, the timing of formal schooling—a major cognitive investment—must
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also be carefully evaluated in order to achieve the greatest return on this expensive and complex
socially administered intervention. This is why one of the principal debates in early childhood
development is the age formal education should start.
Nowadays, there is no discussion regarding whether or not children should attend school. The
debate now centers on the best timing for children to begin formal academic instruction. Parents,
schools, governments and society at large must decide when children should begin going to school.
Ideally, in order to promote equality and inclusion, governments should allow children to attend
school without restriction. In reality, however, education systems inevitably attempt to “optimize”
this timing by using more or less arbitrary cut-offs.
Entry-age laws differ from country to country. According to the UNESCO database, in 2013, there
were 25 countries whose primary school start age was five, a total of 137 countries whose entry age
was six, and 41 countries for which it was 7. Even within the same country entry-age practices are
subject to change. Identifying the best age to start formal education can maximize the efficiency
of children’s learning. However, age-setting can also distort a variety of other objectives children,
parents and other school actors value. For example, Stipek (2002) observe that test scores can be
increased virtually for free merely by increasing the minimum age of school admission. Of course,
this policy unfairly postpones schooling for otherwise eligible students.
What, then, is known about the best time to start school? Is it merely a question of whether or
not younger entrants gain more or less from schooling than older entrants? In economics, human
capital theory focuses on how individuals aim to select an optimal cognitive achievement sched-
ule, one which emphasizes high returns on early investments in the life cycle. In addition, human
capital theory assumes that individuals optimize their life earnings so they will have more working
life after they have completed their human capital accumulation (marginal benefit) and will incur
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lower forgone earnings (marginal cost) Berndt (1990). However, there is evidence that “readiness”
is also an important factor in the learning process. Black et al. (2008) mention that “It is possible
that children cannot learn as well in school earlier in their developmental life” (p. 213).
While the long-term effects of early entry are clearly and consistently positive, the short-term ef-
fects of early entry are not so obvious. According to Black et al. (2008), older students perform
better in school. Moreover, students who start earlier out-perform those of the same age but who
delayed their entry into school. To be sure, empirical evidence on this subject is inconclusive, and
many questions regarding the “right” age to begin formal academic instruction remain unanswered
for many reasons. First, the effect of school entry age has been studied by correlating age and
the attainment of academic skills through various counterfactual hypotheses. Second, the research
conducted so far has analyzed different empirical questions or manipulated different variables, un-
dermining the interpretability or generalizability of the studies. Third, while most of the empirical
evidence has used a “cut-off approach” to address the existence of omitted factors, the empirical
designs vary widely. Finally and most importantly, the methodologies used—combined with the
lack of a unified theory—inevitably confuse direct age effects with the indirect effects of age on
learning. For example, Black et al. (2008) argue that “Most of the literature has compared test
scores of children who are in the same grade and so has in fact estimated the combined effects of
school starting age and age (at the test) ” (p. 3).
Yet the debate revolving around school entry age is not just a governmental debate about an insti-
tutional rule. In many countries, parents calculate exactly when they will first enroll their children
in school—a practice called “red-shirting”. Deming and Dynarski (2008) define “red-shirting” as
deliberately delaying entrance into academic instruction as a result of a parent’s or teacher’s de-
cision. Supporters of red-shirting argue this “gift of time” allows children to be more mature and
thus benefit more from their academic instruction. In the U.S., the share of six-year old children
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enrolled in first grade dropped from 96% in 1968 to 84% in 2005. Deming and Dynarski (2008)
estimated that two-thirds of this decline was due to redshirting. Compounding this problem is the
fact that some parents also seek to accelerate their children, enrolling children that are younger
than the legal, minimum entry age.
This chapter examines the impact of delaying the age of entry into school in the case of México.
The analysis avoids some of the problems of the previous literature by considering the impact of
a government reform law that changed age eligibility in the country. In June of 2006, Mexican
education law (Article 65) was revised to change the date governing first grade eligibility. Before
the law, children had to be at least 6 years old by September 1st to enroll in first grade. The reform
moved the cut-off date from September 1st to December 31st thereby allowing younger students
(who were five years old in September but six by the end of December) to enroll in first grade and
lowering average entry ages. Because the younger students entered first grade as a result of an
exogenous policy change (and not because of the decisions of parents), they are unlikely to differ
from the older students except because of the age difference.
Taking opportunity of this natural experiment,, the research in this chapter adopts a a regression
discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of delayed entry into school on student achieve-
ment. This quasi-experimental design, which mimics a randomized experiment, allows to estimate
the parameters relevant for policy analysis. Section 4.2 summarizes the current literature. Section
4.3 presents a theoretical model where age is incorporated into the Education Production Function
(EPF) as an underlying parameter that has an effect on children’s cognitive achievement through
three different channels, 1) maturation (all dimensions), 2) parental investment (in the form of
family inputs) and 3) school inputs. Section 4.4 explains the background and the context delayed
school entry in México. Section4.5 describes the research methodology and identification strategy.
Finally, Section 4.6 discusses the main results.
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4.2 Related Literature
The early studies examining the effect of age delay simply compared student outcomes of students
of different ages in a given grade or students of the same age in different grades (see, for example,
Stipek and Byler (2001), Stipek (2002) and NICHD and Study (2007)). But due to the practice of
redshirting, early school entry may be endogenous and respond to the characteristics of students
and parents. More recent studies have sought to deal with these econometric issues by seeking ex-
ogenous variations in ages of entry into school, whether as a result of changes in entry age policy
within a country, shifts in those policies over time, or through quasi-experimental studies that claim
random assignment of students of different ages to a grade cohort. Moreover, these recent studies
on the short-term effects of delayed formal education is extensive but inconclusive. Black et al.
(2008) argue that there are two main conclusions in the literature: 1) in a same grade, children who
delayed school entrance by a year tend to perform better on in-school tests, and 2) among children
who are the same age, those who entered school earlier (thus have more schooling experience) per-
form better than those who have less school experience. Furthermore, the empirical studies tend to
use only children in the same grade as counterfactuals to estimate the effect of delaying enrollment
by a year. Consequently, for the most part, the evidence tends to suggest that older children do
better in school. There is evidence in the field of economics supporting that “readiness” itself is an
important factor.
One of the first analyses of school start ages using methods that seek to establish causality was
conducted by Datar (2006). In this study, the author estimated the effect of entry age and school
age within a grade. Datar (2006) uses two sources of identification: variation in birthdays and vari-
ation in state kindergarten entrance-age policies. The results show a significant positive effect of
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delaying school by a year of about 5.8 points (0.8 s.d.) over baseline math scores at kindergarten.
The impact of delaying school by a year on test score gains from the baseline to the spring of the
1st grade was 0.5 points (0.08 s.d.). In addition, Datar (2006) compared students at the same age
by using test score trajectories (linear projections of the estimates) indicating that younger entrants
perform better by 5.8 points on the standardized tests at the age of 6. The author concluded that
these results were driven by the extra year of schooling among younger entrants.
Elder and Lubotsky (2009) extended the methodology used by Datar (2006) to pursue a different
interpretation of the age effect. The authors used the same sources of variation as the previous
Datar analysis (the distribution of birth dates through the calendar year and the differences across
states in kindergarten entrance cut-offs) and concluded that upon entering kindergarten, the gap be-
tween the oldest and youngest entrants is explained by an entrance-age effect. Prior to the impact
of schooling on cognitive achievement, the oldest entrants scored 5.28 points (0.53 s.d.) higher
than the youngest entrants. At the end of kindergarten, the effect of entry age was 8.17 points
higher than when the children started kindergarten.
Elder and Lubotsky (2009) finds that the impact of delayed school entry varies by socioeconomic
status. In general, the results show that entrance-age effects rise with socioeconomic quartiles.
Within the richest quartile, the difference on performance (youngest versus oldest) is higher (23.66
points) than the differences within the poorest quartile (10.65 points). The effect of entry age
among the poorest decreased after the end of kindergarten; only a small effect lasted until 5th
grade (4.92 points). Nevertheless, the differences over time remained high within the richest quar-
tile. The authors also mention that the age entry cut-offs and birthdays affected the absolute and
the relative ages in school. In addition, the variation across states in entry cut-off dates allows
variation of relative ages since states with earlier cut-offs, such as September, have an older cohort
than those states with later entrance cut-offs, say in December. The effect on average age in school
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is standardized so as to estimate how the relative age of a child influences student achievement,
expressed as EAis−EAs,−i. The results show that relative age is not a significant factor at the
baseline (Fall 1998), but that later the effect of average age is positive and significant, declining
after the child enters 1st grade. These results show that relative age may influence learning and
other non-academic skills.
Elder and Lubotsky (2009) concludes that “the ratio of the benefit of a year spent out of school
to the within school year increases in average test scores is 0.28 (8.17/29) for reading scores and
0.43 (9.98/23) for math test scores” (p. 752). However, the authors emphasize that the systematic
increase of school entry ages results in an increase on test scores at the beginning of school life
but decreases later, parental investments in pre-schooling are crucial for how the older students do
after they enter kindergarten, and the differences in achievement are more prevalent among rich
people. All of these issues make the authors emphasize that parents’ and teachers’ decisions are
biased by initial differences in skills unrelated to children’s natural abilities.
Most of the recent empirical evidence related to the effects of entry age has been gathered in devel-
oped countries such as the United States, including Moussa (2012), who uses data for New York
City, Cascio (2008) who uses experimental data from project STAR, Dobkin and Ferreira (2010),
using data for Texas and California, and Bedard and Dhuey (2006), who use OECD data, among
others.
One of the exceptions is the research by Shapiro on Chile. McEwan and Shapiro (2008) are the
only researchers to present evidence on the short-term effects of delayed school entrance on cog-
nitive achievement in a developing country using credible exogenous variation. That is, their study
investigated the causal effect of delayed school enrollment on student outcomes in Chile. The
authors concluded that 1) Older students are less likely to be retained in the 1st grade by 2%, 2)
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older students increase test scores by 0.3 to 0.4 s.d. in 4th grade, and 3) older students demonstrate
similar effects in the 8th grade.
The basic framework of this research is an education production function whereby dates of birth
are treated as exogenous variation and a regression discontinuity is used to estimate causal effects.
Moreover, the identification strategy compares outcomes of students who were born in different
age cohorts around the cut-offs. In conclusion, McEwan and Shapiro (2008) argue that “the gen-
eral equilibrium effects of such a policy depend on (uncertain) casual pathways. First, if age-at-test
effects dominate, then such a policy would increase early grade test scores without increasing learn-
ing, simply because students would be older when tested. The policy could even widen inequality
if advantaged students experience greater test score gains while out of school (Stipek, 2002; Elder
and Lubotsky, 2009). Second, if relative-age effects dominate, then moving cut-off dates earlier
would merely redistribute achievement among students without increasing mean test scores. Third,
if absolute-age effects dominate, then raising mean enrollment age would increase mean test scores
by improving students’ readiness for school” (p. 270).
A more complete analysis of the effects of age on cognitive achievement was conducted by Ca-
han and Cohen (1989). The study analyzed all the 4th, 5th, and 6th graders attending Jerusalem’s
Hebrew Language (state-run elementary schools) in 1987. As part of their empirical procedure,
Cahan and Cohen (1989) designed IQ tests to be comparable across grade, and test scores were
standardized using the standard deviation of the 4th grade. First, the authors point out that the rel-
evant counterfactual of the age effect is a comparison between an age effect and a schooling effect.
That is, Cahan and Cohen (1989) realize the tradeoff between delaying school entrance by one year
and benefitting from one more year of school. These authors use a regression discontinuity design
to explore the age and school effects on cognitive achievement. This quasi-experimental design
exploits the exogenous variation in enrollment age at a school as it relates to entry-age laws. This
83
identification strategy assumes the allocation of children to birth dates is random and admission
to school is based solely on chronological age. The authors applied the same twelve tests to three
different cohorts of students in grades 4 to 6 at the end of the school year and separated age and
schooling effects attributed to within-grade and between-grade mean scores differences. Cahan
and Cohen (1989) argue that the net effect of age and schooling on intelligence is a comparison
between chronological age and schooling effects. The authors define age effects as the difference
in mean test scores between individuals chronologically in the same grade and schooling effects
as the difference in mean test scores between individuals differing by one year of schooling yet
born around the same entry-school date. Cahan and Cohen (1989) finds the coefficients of both
age and grade for each of the twelve regressions examined are significant. Of the six verbal tests,
the coefficients of age vary from 0.05 and 0.19 s.d. while the coefficients of schooling vary from
0.23 to 0.50 s.d.
4.3 Simple Theoretical model
This section focuses on how to specify and estimate an educational production function (EPF) that
examines the effect of age on cognitive achievement in a way which recognizes child development
as a cumulative process—a process which itself depends on variety of environmental factors and
inherited endowments. The section presents the rationale underlying the age effect on learning and
extends the structural theoretical model of cognitive achievement developed by Todd and Wolpin
(2003). The model analyzes the factors and processes behind the entry-age effect, time in school,
and school inputs on cognitive development. This model suggests that age has an effect on chil-
dren’s cognitive achievement through three different channels, 1) maturation (all dimensions), 2)
parental investment (in the form of family inputs) and 3) school inputs. Finally, in addition to this
model, there is one major theoretical consideration related to explaining the age-effect on cognitive
achievement. This theoretical discussion emphasizes that age can be partitioned into two periods
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(before and after entry to school) where responses from parents, in the form of resources and other
influences, as well as responses from schools are different between these periods.
Age at Entry and the Educational Production Function
Todd and Wolpin (2003) consider an educational production function (EPF) to analyze the rela-
tionship among learning, family, and school inputs when children attend school. In this model,
cognition is a cumulative process, which starts before children enter school, and is a function of
family inputs (F0,i) and innate ability at that point (µi). According to this model, changes in school
inputs have a total effect which can be divided into direct and indirect effects through changes in
the levels of other inputs (for more details see Todd and Wolpin (2003); p. F8). For example, an
increase in one hour of math class per day changes cognitive achievement through 1) the direct
effect of one more hour of math, and 2) the indirect effect on achievement of changes in family
inputs linked to that child i receiving one more hour of math instruction per day (e.g., parental
supervision of the child’s math homework, more math materials at home, etc.). In this model, cog-
nitive achievement is a function of current and past school and family inputs combined with the
child’s mental abilities (µi determined at conception). Moreover, parental and school inputs are a
function of the decision rules followed by parents and schools.
More formally, Todd and Wolpin (2003) assume that student achievement, as measured by test
scores, is a measure of the cumulative process of knowledge acquisition of the child during time
in school i residing in household j at age a. In addition to family (F) and school-related (S) inputs,
children’s cognitive achievement is assumed to depend on a general reasoning ability, µi, which is
partly determined by biologically-inherited traits. As Wang and Aamodt (2010) argue that “ In-
dividual people’s performance on any cognitive test is moderately predictive of their performance
on any other cognitive test. These broad correlations between different cognitive skills reflect the
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existence of a general reasoning ability ” (p.191).
The specification of the educational production function (EPF) generally uses test scores as depen-
dent variables and adds a measurement error (εija) (for more details see Todd and Wolpin (2003);
p.F15). The EPF is therefore given by:
Ti,j,a = Ta(Fij(a),Sij(a),µi0,εija) (4.1)
Fij(a) is a vector of parental inputs (current and past) at age a and Sij(a) is a vector of school
inputs (current and past) at age a. Equation 4.1 incorporates chronological age in an EPF as a
scale for both biological and psycho-educational developments which impact family and school
inputs. Todd and Wolpin (2003) argue that “ The a subscript on Ta(·) allows the impact of inputs
and of the genetic endowment to depend on the age of the child” (p. F16). This model provides a
framework to understand the role age plays in the child’s cognition.
The Age Effect. Under this model, chronological age has a non-negative relationship with cog-
nitive achievement, δTija
δAge > 0. Three different channels by which age has an impact on test scores
can be analyzed. That is, the total effect of age on cognitive achievement is the sum of a direct-age
effect plus an indirect family-age effect and the schooling-age effect. Without loss of generality,

















The first component of the total effect is the direct effect of age holding constant other factors;
that is, the effects of biological maturity on test scores. This effect can be visualized as a shift of
the production function (T), over time, holding all inputs constant. The second component is the
return to school inputs on achievement due to a child entering one year older. Parental inputs are
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provided since the moment of birth, whereas school inputs are a function on the time in school and
age in the education production function (Todd and Wolpin, 2003).
Decomposing the Age Effect in two periods. While this model may provide a solid background
for the analysis of cognitive achievement in general, it does not distinguish between what the ef-
fect of age on cognition is before and after the child enters school, a crucial issue to separate in an
analysis of changes in school entry age. An extension of this approach follows Black et al. (2008)
which state that the age at which a student takes a test can be divided into the school starting age
and the subsequent years of schooling.
Age = SchoolTime(SA)+EntryAge(EA) (4.3)
If the model assumes that age can be partitioned into these two periods (before and after entry to
school), an EPF including these periods is obtained by incorporating the conceptual distinction in
equation 4.3 into equation 4.2 in the following way:
Ti,j,EA,SA = TEA,SA(Fij(EA),Sij(EA),Fij(SA),Sij(SA),µi0,εija) (4.4)
Fij(EA) is a vector of parental inputs starting at the moment of birth up until the age that a child
starts school, EA, and Sij(EA) is a vector of school inputs at the entry age EA (which is zero before
the start of school).On the other hand, Fij(SA) is a vector of parental inputs supplied after the child
enters school SA, which start at entry age and ends at the time the child takes the achievement test
which is the outcome of the production function being examined, and Sij(SA) is a vector of school
inputs supplied after the child enters school, up to the age at which the child takes the achievement
test (SA). The decomposition into two periods allow learning to be analyzed at two different stages
of development: 1) learning with family inputs only, which happens before entry to school occurs,
and 2) learning in a school environment.
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The total effect of age is divided into an entry-age effect and an age-school effect. From a theoret-
ical perspective, the first two components of the equation are 1) the impact of being older at entry
age on student achievement by being more cognitively mature (which symbolically is represented
by how an increase in entry age, EA, shifts the production function T, and 2) the effect of entry-age
on family inputs since, by entering school a year older the child will have an extra year of parental
inputs. The rest of the equation is the school-age effect which is divided into 1) the age-at-test
effect, which measures the impact on student achievement of the maturity gained by a child by
being in school for a longer period of time, 2) the age-school inputs effect and 3) the family-school
age input effect. Entering a year older may change the decision rule relative to family inputs
and school inputs, thus affecting these components of the EPF. For example, parents may allocate
fewer inputs during the first years of education due to the extra cost of having had the child out
of the school, or teachers may adjust the curriculum during the year due to the child’s performance.
This decomposition defines the total effects of age as the effect of age at the moment of starting
school (entry-age effect) and the effect of age during school. The entry age effect allows hetero-
geneity among test scores before the first day of school. The channels through which this effect
works are the biological maturation of the child and the resources during an extra year out of the
school. For example, children face a decision to enter school when they are eligible albeit less
mature and with fewer parental inputs, or a year later with a higher level of maturity plus an extra
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year of family inputs. The school-age effect is the effect on mental capacity at the moment of the
test plus the effect of parental and school resources on test scores as a response to the delayed
enrollment.
To sum up, this theoretical model emphasizes four different channels though which delaying a year
of schooling affects the cognitive achievement of children using an EPF: 1) parental investments
prior to formal education in the form of prior skills, 2) adjusted family inputs during school time,
3) adjusted school inputs during school time, and 4) direct entry-age and age-at-test effects (age
maturation effects).
4.4 Background and the context delayed school entry in México
4.4.1 Data and Sample
The analysis in this dissertation uses two main sources of data: the National Evaluation of Aca-
demic Achievement in School Centers (ENLACE) and the administrative School Census data
(SCD- 911). These sources of data are produced by the Ministry of Education (ME). México’s
school census and ENLACE tests have far richer information from assessment information for
school, students, and principals.
The National Evaluation of Academic Achievement in School Centers (ENLACE). Since
the school year 2005-2006, the Ministry of Education has administered the National Evaluation of
Academic Achievement in School Centers (ENLACE) nationwide. ENLACE is now administered
annually in April to early June and parents, teachers, principals and other stakeholders know when
the exam will be applied (through a document distributed before the start of the school year). This
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test instrument is objective, standardized and comparable over time, although, it is not compara-
ble across grades (ENLACE technical document, 2010). The ENLACE assessments are in math,
Spanish and another subject that varies from year to year (rotative subject), as well as birthdate
information. ENLACE is still not administered in two Mexican states due to teacher strikes and
the CNTE teachers union. Removing these two states from consideration, ENLACE attains very
good coverage. Table 4.1 depicts the population covered by the exam (which excludes Oaxaca and
Michoacán from the total number of enrolled students by grade).
There are four types of schools from grades 1 to 6 in México: 1) compensatory schools, 2) in-
digenous schools, 3) public-general schools and 4) private schools (see Annex Table 4.17 for more
details). Compensatory schools are those with a multigrade curriculum and enroll very isolated
populations. These schools can decide not to administer ENLACE, resulting in a lack of data for
them.
Table 4.1: ENLACE net coverage without Oaxaca and Michoacán
Third Fourth Fifth Sixth
2006 0.97 1.00 1.02 1.05
2007 0.89 0.90 0.94 0.94
2008 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.97
2009 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91
2010 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.96
2011 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.97
2012 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.91
Source: Author’s calculations using
ENLACE and official numbers from SEP
In the Appendix, Table 4.17 details the number of students evaluated since ENLACE started. The
2012 administration numbered over 13 million students between the 3rd and 9th grades. In fact,
ENLACE requires the coordination of over 100,000 people to supervise the nation-wide assess-
ment. There are a number of methods used to diminish the risk of cheating. First, teachers cannot
administer the exam to their own class and parents cannot supervise their own children. Also,
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the SEP’s Department of Policy Evaluation (the agency in charge of ENLACE before the reforms
of the National Evaluation Institute in 2013) used the K-index and Scrutiny methods to detect
cheating or suspicious answer patterns. Each subject is tested individually, and ENLACE scores
represent the number of correct answers (weighted by the difficulty of the item) on a scale that
ranges from 200 to 800 points, with a standardized mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100.
For comparisons over time, 2006 is used as the base year.
ENLACE was not a high stakes assessment until 2010, but since then it has also been used to
calculate incentives and promotions among teachers and principals. Moreover, selected schools
taking ENLACE are given questionnaires to complete. The questionnaires gather information on
principals, parents and students during the school year.
The School Census data (SCD) -
The School Census Data (SCD) is an annual administrative record prepared by principals at the
beginning and end of each school year. This census is validated by each state’s information de-
partment and by the federal department in charge for integrating all the information. The SCD
includes geographic school information (precise location of each school) and school inputs during
each school year, from infrastructure to teachers’ average education. For purposes of this analysis,
the SCD data set includes measures of the school inputs students receive during their education as
well as data on the distribution of age in each grade, percent of 1st graders who attend kindergarten,
repeaters, etc. These data had fourteen rounds from the school year 1998-1999 to 2011-2012.
Other sources of information -
Data regarding the distribution of birthdates vis-à-vis school cut-off dates are derived from the Na-
tional Health Information System (SINAIS). This data bank contains all the administrative records
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of births from 1984 to 2011. In addition, the socioeconomic background of students is identified
by using a marginality index constructed by The National Council of Population (CONAPO). The
CONAPO marginality index uses a principal components analysis with nine variables to measure
levels of domestic assets, education and family income at the level of individual localities. This
marginality index is a function of 1) the percent of houses without water, sewage, electricity, non-
dirt floors or a refrigerator, 2) the percent of the population without a primary education, and 3)
family income.
4.4.2 The Context of a Natural Experiment: the School Entry-Age Law
This subsection describes the context of the School Entry Age reform undertaken in México 2006
as well as those changes in the education system that occurred parallel to the reform, such as the
kindergarten reform that took place two years earlier. The school entry-age reform had several
implications. First, the reform changed and unified the school-entry age across Mexican states.
Before the 2006 reform, half of the Mexican states used September 1 as their cut-off-date; af-
ter this centralized reform, all states transitioned to December 31. A second implication was the
change of incentives on the parental decision rule. Before the 2006 reform, parents could decide to
engage in accelerated school entry as well as “red-shirting”. After the reform, red-shirting practice
was possible but accelerated school entry disappeared. Finally, the reform had a transition period
during class size increased.
In June of 2006, Mexican education law (Article 65) was revised to change the date governing 1st
grade eligibility: Children had to be at least 6 years old by September 1 to enroll in 1st grade.
This reform moved the cut-off date from September 1 to December 31 thereby allowing younger
students to enroll in 1st grade and lowering average entry ages. Before the revised date became
law, however, there was notable opposition among teachers, researchers and politicians. After all,
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September 1 had been the cut-off date without modification for at least 40 years. In an interview
with the minister for basic education during the discussion and approval of the reform, Lorenzo
Gomez Morin mentioned that the reform was due to parental pressures for children to enter 1st
grade at a younger age.
Table 4.2 depicts the school entry legislation before and after the 2006 reform. The minimum age
to be eligible to start academic school was 6 years at September first before the 2006 reform; now,
eligibility covers those at minimum age of 5.6. The distribution of age has shifted to the left be-
cause this law also implies a lower expected maximum age.
Table 4.2: Changes in School Entry Legislation
Level Cutoff until 2006 Min-Age Max-Age Cutoff after 2006 Min-Age Max-Age
Kindergarten September first 3 4 December 31th 2.6 3.6
First Grade September first 6 7 December 31th 5.6 6.6
Source: Diario Oficial de la Federación, Martes 6 de Junio de 2006
Before the 2006 reform, parents and other school actors adjusted their behavior in accordance with
cut-off dates—in some sense they “gamed” the system. The reform changed the calculus as the
new date dis-incentivized those parents who wanted to accelerate their child’s entry to school. The
minimum school entry age was reduced by 122 days (4 months), redefining what counts as earlier
entry. Moreover, those parents who still engage in redshirting, that is, who delay school entry, will
enroll children when they are older but they will still be relatively younger when compared to the
children involved in redshirting prior to the 2006 reform. Before the reform, children born before
September 1st (say in August and July) would be key targets for parents engaging in redshirting,
but after the reform it would be children born in November and December who would be key tar-
gets. This would be a younger group. But in addition, it is likely that the reform would make the
practice of redshirting more common, at least temporarily: if some parents believe their children
are too young to enter the first grade, then making the entry age lower would raise the likelihood
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that even more parents will believe their children are too young to enter first grade. Of course, as
parents adjust to the idea of younger first-grade students, the practice may diminish.
Table 4.3 illustrates school entry decisions before and after the 2006 reform.
Table 4.3: Parental and school actors reaction to cutoffs
Before the reform After the reform
Parents Delayed Delayed
Accelerated
States Accelerate Consistent with the law





The available evidence is that the Mexican states not only complied with but enforced this new
federal cut-off date. There is no detailed information of each student at the exact age they entered
first grade. But in third grade students take the ENLACE test, which records their age. Students
with an age younger than the appropriate age to be in third grade are classified as early age stu-
dents. Those students who are age-eligible to attend this grade are named appropriate age students.
Finally, those students who are older than the eligible age for third grade are defined as late age
students.
Table 4.4 shows the percentage of these three student groups. Because the reforms were imple-
mented in 2006, the law initially applied to that cohort of children who were (i) born between
September 2, 1999 and December 31, 2000 and then (ii) entered 1st grade in school year 2006-
2007 and then (iii) sat for the ENLACE test in 2009 in the 3rd grade. Earlier cohorts (born in 1997,
1998 and the first two-thirds 1999 generation) were not affected by this reform. Early age students
for the school years before the reform (in this case, they took the ENLACE test before 2009) were
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around 11-12% of the third grade class. Those who delayed enrollment were about 13% of the
third grade class (which also included those who repeated 1st or 2nd grade). Technically, Mexican
law prohibits children from failing or repeating the first three grades, but repetition and temporary
dropouts do happen—at a rate less than 2%.
It can be concluded from this analysis that the law allowed younger students to be enrolled and it
ended the practice of school acceleration. On the other hand, it could be implied from the data that
the practice of redshirting did not end, and so there remained a substantial proportion of students
who were older than the appropriate age after the reforms. In fact the proportion of older students
rose temporarily but then declined, which may be a result of parents adjusting their perception
of the age at which students should enter the first grade (which motivates redshirting) after the
reform. It should also be emphasized that school delay has a variety of reasons. An analysis of
the ENLACE data shows that the over-age population –children who entered the first grade at age
7—have on average lower family income, have less kindergarten experience, more siblings, and
less educated parents when compared with those who enrolled at age six.
Table 4.4: Classification of entrants over time
Early Appropiate Late
2006 0.11 0.79 0.09
2007 0.12 0.74 0.13
2008 0.11 0.75 0.14
2009 0.00 0.87 0.13
2010 0.00 0.70 0.30
2011 0.00 0.76 0.24
2012 0.00 0.82 0.17
2013 0.00 0.86 0.14
Source: Author’s calculations using
ENLACE (2006-212)
The reform had some short-term effects on the school system itself. There was a direct impact
on class size during the first years of the implementation. The first grade entry age modification
allowed more children to enter to first grade for the first time during 2006-2007: those children
95
born from September 1999 to the end of December 1999 were now eligible to enter first grade,
and this implied a larger class size during the 2006-2007 school year. But in addition to the entry
age reform, state education authorities and schools were forced by federal authorities to enforce an
obligatory 3rd grade of preschool reform in 2002, which meant that there would be a greater num-
ber of children enrolled in primary school beginning in the school year 2006-2007, three school
years after this reform was approved. This also bumped upwards the enrollment rates in first grade,
as seen in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: First Grade Absolute Enrollment by school year.Source:Author’s calculation using SEP data
This figure also shows the overall declining enrollment trend in first grade. According to the
SINAIS information, since at least 1997, the Mexican birth rate has declined: in 1997, 2,285,050
Mexicans were born while in 2004 only 2,034,460 were born. This has led to a reduction in enroll-
ment, An appendix shows enrollment rates during this time period. Note finally that state education
authorities, parents, teachers and children all adjusted to the 2006 reform over a period of years.
The effects could not been expected to be restricted just to the year of the reform itself.
Table 4.5 indicates that delayed enrollment is a common practice at all levels of marginality. How-
ever, this practice is more prominent with high and very high marginality. There is no evidence that
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Table 4.5: Marginality and Late age students in third grade
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
2006 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.20
2007 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.20
2008 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.23
2009 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.22
2010 0.30 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.35
2011 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.32
2012 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.26
2013 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.23
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE
there are gender differences in school delay. Gender discrepancies appear only with low marginal-
ity schools (that is well-off localities) where the percentage of male late-age students attending 3rd
grade is 4% greater than female late-age entry. There are substantial differences, however, among
different types of school. For instance, community and indigenous schools have a greater percent-
age of students enrolling at late entry. 1
Figure 4.2 delineates a timeline of enrollment before and after the school entry-age reform of 2006.
In order to enter 1st grade, parents must enroll their children during a national week of registration
every February (though there are exceptions due to migration or special cases which permit reg-
istration just before the start of the school year). But because of the 2006 reform, the 2005-2006
cohort only included those born between September 1, 1998 and September 2, 1999 while the
2006-2007 cohort included a greater number of students. As Figure 4.2 illustrates, the 2006-2007
schools comprised students born between September 1, 1999 and January 1, 2001—a longer pe-
riod of time. By contrast, the 2007-2008 cohort was composed only by those born in 2001.
1As the marginality index measures poverty in smaller geographical units rather than in households, it is only
possible to investigate the relationship between mean poverty scores and the marginality index at state level. The
value of 0.90 obtained for the correlation coefficient reveals that mean poverty score is highly correlated with the
marginality index. As expected, the main reason is that the two indices include common indicators of deprivation.
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Figure 4.2: Timeline of the School Entry Age Reform. Source:Own elaboration
It is important also to recognize that, prior to the 2006 law, each state observed its own age cut-off
date. Table 4.6 depicts the variability of these school entry cut-off dates across states and time.
In 2007, nine states had already implemented a December 31 minimum school-entry age cut-off
(resulting in greater uniformity among different cohorts). Finally, by 2012, all states conformed to
the same nationally mandated cut-off date. Figures 4.14 and 4.15 in the annex illustrate this point.
Table 4.6: State variation in school entry cutoff
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1-Jan 9 7 7 17 28 32 32
1-Sep 14 16 17 10 2 0 0
1-Oct 6 6 4 3 1 0 0
1-Nov 3 3 4 1 0 0 0
Total 32 32 32 31 31 32 32
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE (2006-213)
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4.4.3 Variation in the number of instructional days
According to Article 12 part 2, the federal education ministry mandates a 200-day school year,
establishes the national school calendar (detailing exactly when in late August classes start, when
in early July classes end, school breaks, long vacations and when registration week and evaluation
week occur) and publishes this calendar in its federal newspaper. (Article 51 permits individual
states to adjust these dates to suit local contexts and publish locally specific dates in their state
newspaper.) Table 4.7 depicts these dates between school years 2005-2006 and 2012-2013 2.
At the end of each school year, all students in grades 3 to 9 sit for the ENLACE exam. The column
entitled 1st-ENLACE specifies the number of days since each generation started first grade until
the day of the ENLACE exam in third grade. By the time of their ENLACE exam, the 1998-1999
cohort averaged fewer school days (only 966) compared to other cohorts. Using this cohort as a
basis, an “extras days” variable was defined as the number of school days greater than the 1998-
1999 cohort.
Agüero and Beleche (2013) analyze ENLACE data over the first three years of its application us-
ing instructional days as a source of exogenous variation. These authors estimated the effects of
school year length on student performance, and found that average ENLACE test scores increased
0.04 to 0.07 s.d. per extra 10 days of instruction. In that study, extra days of classes are defined as
those extra days during a specific school year. The authors claim that their results are controlled
for time trends and school time-invariant unobserved characteristics. However, two potential en-
dogenous sources of variation may limit their empirical strategy: (1) variation in state school entry
cut-off dates, which generates differences in the average age of students in any grade across states,
a matter ignored in their paper, and (2) compulsory preschool for those cohorts entering 1st grade
2In February of 2014, SEP and INEE agreed to cancel ENLACE in the school year 2014 but they claimed that
ENLACE will be updated and applied in 2015
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after the 2005-2006 school year, a reform that was noted earlier and which implies that the cohort
with the fewest days of instruction (1998-1999) had more students with third grade of kindergarten
since this generation was the first one to be under compulsory pre-school education.
Table 4.7: Eligible generation, school days and ENLACE test
Generation 1st grade 3rd grade Start 3rd End 3rd 1st-ENLACE ENLACE Extras
Sep1996-Sep1997 8/18/03 2005-2006 8/22/05 7/6/06 1024 6/7/06 58
Sep1997-Sep1998 8/18/04 2006-2007 8/21/06 7/6/07 980 4/25/07 14
Sep1998-Sep1999 8/22/05 2007-2008 8/20/07 7/4/08 966 4/14/08 0
Sep1999-Dec2000 8/21/06 2008-2009 8/18/08 7/3/09 978 4/25/09 12
Jan2001-Dec2001 8/20/07 2009-2010 8/24/09 7/9/10 975 4/21/10 9
Jan2002-Dec2002 8/18/08 2010-2011 8/23/10 7/8/11 1010 5/25/11 44
Jan2003-Dec2003 8/24/09 2011-2012 8/22/11 7/6/12 1018 6/7/12 52
Jan2004-Dec2004 8/23/10 2012-2013 8/20/12 7/5/13 1017 6/5/13 51
Source: Own elaboration using the official school calendar by SEP
Agüero and Beleche (2013) cite two states that (with permission of the federal authorities) did
not follow the official school calendar: Aguascalientes and Sinaloa. Aguascalientes changed the
days of the evaluation week due to a local festival (celebrated since 1828), and in school years
2008-2009 and 2009-2010, Aguascalientes administered ENLACE in a different week (May 20 in
2008-2009 and May 6 in in 2009-2010). In school years 2005-2006, 2006-2007 and 2007-2008,
Sinaloa started classes one week later (due to high temperatures in late August). At the national
level, ENLACE 2009 (for school year 2008-2009) was planned for the last week of April but can-
celed due to an outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus. In response, the Ministry of Education
rescheduled ENLACE in three phases: (1) May 12 to May 14 in Baja California, Baja California
Sur, Coahuila and Veracruz, (2) May 15 to May 18t in Zacatecas, Jalisco, Hidalgo and Chiapas,
and (3) May 18 to May 22 in the rest of the country.
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4.4.4 Data for the analysis
The Ministry of Education identifies all Mexican schools by assigning each a unique number. In
addition, each student is assigned a number. These numbers are used when aggregating and com-
paring data sets.
The data set utilized in this dissertation includes math and Spanish test scores for third grade stu-
dents in the school years 2005-2006 through 2012-2013, by year of birth. The empirical method-
ology analyzes cohorts defined by students’ year of birth, including cohorts entering first grade
before and after the school entry reform law was implemented. More specifically, the data includes
students for the school years starting in 2005 to 2012, which comprises eight student cohorts born
between 1997 and 2004. Unfortunately, the ENLACE data during this period are partially incom-
plete. Exact dates of birth (month/day/year) are known for only 65% (120,0846 students) of the
2006-2007 enrollees. (By comparison, a minimum of 97% of birth dates are known for the other
years.)
There are no data available specifying the exact entry age of 1st graders. However, their ages can
be estimated from information provided when they took the ENLACE test in third grade. Table
4.8 depicts ENLACE rounds for 3rd graders by their birth cohort. The enrollment rate per cohort
before the age-entry reform of 2006 can be divided in two, those who were born between January 1
and September 1 and those who were born between September 2 and December 31. For example,
about 56% of the 1997 birth cohort, those who were born between January 1 and September 1,
attended third grade in the school year 2005-2006 while the rest of this cohort attended third grade
after. The situation changed after the 2006 reform: the 2001 birth cohort attended at a rate of 76%,
while the rest of the cohort attended 3rd grade over the age eligible to them. After that, subsequent
cohorts have increased their enrollment in the year they became eligible to attend school with the
2002 cohort attending the 2011-2012 school year at a rate of 85%.
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Table 4.8: Third grade attendance by year of birth
School year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2005-2006 0.56 0.0013 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006-2007 0.36 0.66 0.0017 0 0 0 0 0
2007-2008 0.06 0.28 0.66 0.0008 0 0 0 0
2008-2009 0.02 0.04 0.28 0.69 0.0007 0 0 0
2009-2010 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.26 0.76 0.0007 0 0
2010-2011 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.85 0.0007 0
2011-2012 0 0.001 0.002 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.89 0.0007
2012-2013 0 0 0.0002 0.002 0.01 0.02 0.11 1.00
Total 1458501 1946236 1981753 2053835 2018067 1992465 1799251 1628048
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE (2006-213)
ENLACE cannot claim to achieve complete coverage of the Mexican education system. Most of
the missing data are clustered in isolated schools, new schools, or states which do not comply with
the evaluation system. Table 4.18 in the Appendix illustrates this latter point: the participation
of Oaxaca and Michoacán in ENLACE is so low that their numbers lose statistical validity. For
these reason, these two states were removed from the data analysis. Similarly, the more isolated
multigrade schools are not well represented in ENLACE.
Table 4.9 provides a picture of schools’ relative socioeconomic status via a marginality index.
There is some variation over time but very little Overall, around 46% of the total population lived
in a very low marginality locales; 21% were concentrated in localities with low marginality; 11%
of the population lived with medium marginality and the rest (22%) lived under conditions of high
or very high marginality.
Table 4.9: Marginality Index by year of birth
Marginality 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 National
Very Low 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.46
Low 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.21
Regular 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
High 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20
Very High 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.2
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE and CONAPO 2010
Table 4.10 provides mean math and Spanish scores by birth cohort. The 1997 birth cohort had the
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lowest mean score in math and Spanish. (Most of this cohort was in the 3rd grade in school year
2005-2006—the base year of the ENLACE scale). The mean scores in math and Spanish have
increased in subsequent years with a 0.88 s.d. increase in math and 0.52 s.d. increase in Spanish
between the 1997 and 2004 birth cohorts. Table 4.10 also shows the “extra days” of schooling in
each cohort. Recall that the variable “extra days” of schooling is the number of instructional days
each cohort had before taking ENLACE.3 The cohorts with more extra school days were the 2003
and 2004 birth cohorts—with 50 days more school prior to the ENLACE test. Finally, the average
years of preschool have increased over these generations due to the reform of kindergarten in 2002.
Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics by year of birth
Year of Birth 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Math 507 515 520 529 533 545 572 595
Spanish 507 517 525 537 546 555 556 559
Extra days 38 10 4.38 12.85 17.78 45.16 52 51
Average years K 2.17 2.19 2.28 2.38 2.38 2.40 2.36 2.38
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE (2006-213)
The data use in this analysis permit the internal validity of the results for the Mexican context for
the population impacted by identification strategies, and also minimize the selection problems.
4.5 Methodology and Empirical Strategy
4.5.1 The identification strategy: the cutoff approach
The identification strategy used in the current analysis is the “cut-off approach” whereby some
children must attend school one whole year later –by accident–than their cohort because of school
start age policy (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Fredriksson and Öckert,
3This number is constructed using the total days of schooling of each student during grades 1, 2 and 3 prior to
taking the ENLACE exam, and is compared to other cohorts with fewer or greater extra days of instruction by the time
of the ENLACE test: Cohorts with more days of instructions have extras days of schooling.
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2005; Datar, 2006; Dickert-Conlin and Elder, 2010; McEwan and Shapiro, 2008; Cahan and Co-
hen, 1989; Cahan and Davis, 1987; Bjorklund, 2011; Black et al., 2008; Deming and Dynarski,
2008; Barnsley and Thompson, 1988). This identification strategy compares the outcomes of stu-
dents who were born just before the cut-off to those born just after the cut-off (with the assumption
that birth dates near such cut-offs are random). This strategy allows us to observe schooling out-
comes and how these outcomes are affected by entry-age cut-off dates.
The cutoff approach in Economics uses as counterfactual individuals in the same grade who differ
in age due to the entry law (two different birth cohorts). This cut-off strategy is used in the analysis
in this dissertation. Maintaining the grade constant, the strategy compares the older students who
delayed enrollment due to the law with the younger students, with a focus on those who were born
around the entry-date of formal education. The only difference is one year in age. However, there
are two potential groups that comply with this strategy. Table 4.11 illustrates these two groups.
Maintaining the same birth cohort and grade constant, the first strategy compares the older stu-
dents who delayed enrollment due to the law with the younger students from a previous school
year. For example, it compares the outcomes in third grade of students who were born in the same
cohort but because they were slightly younger or older they ended up entering first grade with
one year of difference (which also means they reach third grade in different school years). The
second strategy is to also maintain the grade constant, but compare the older students who delayed
enrollment due to the law with the younger students in the same school year, with the two groups
belonging to two different birth cohorts. For example, one can compare the outcomes of the older,
school-delayed students in third grade with those of the younger students in that same grade (who
entered on-time) in a given school year.
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Table 4.11: Same Grade, counterfactual groups
Intra-Age Inter-Age
Oldest School year t +1, Birth Cohort bc School year t, Birth Cohort bc+1
Youngest School year t, Birth Cohort bc School year t , Birth Cohort bc
4.5.2 Validity of the Randomness of the Date of Birth
The literature on this topic uses the “cut-off approach” as an exogenous source of variation, and
tends to justify its utility by either assuming (or arguing, see below) the randomness of birthdays
before and after a cut-off date. But since parents are typically of aware of the entry age law for
starting 1st grade, parents may attempt to control the day the child would be born. This may
make dates of birth non-random. However, McCrary (2008) argue that this type of manipulation
would not necessarily invalidate the identification strategy. After all, some parents tend to want
their child to start school as early as possible (even if younger than the other students) while other
parents might want their child to be among the older students in the class. The overall result may
not bias birth dates in any given direction, whether younger or older
Nevertheless, such non-random manipulation could be at play, and would threaten the validity of
the “cut-off approach”. In fact, Bound et al. (1995) share evidence of small differences in health
across seasons of birth in the United States—health differences between winter- and summer-born
children. According to this literature, parents manipulate the timing of a birth (with the aid of
medical technology) so as to maximize benefits and minimize costs for their family. Birth timing
vis-à-vis school entry cut-off dates is then, at least theoretically, an avenue for parents to maximize
benefits and minimize costs for their family Dickert-Conlin and Elder (2010). Upon inspection,
however, Dickert-Conlin and Elder (2010) show there is no parental manipulation of birth tim-
ing—including those births under obstetric procedures—in the United States during the period
1999-2004. The authors conclude that parental manipulation with an eye toward school cut-off
dates is not significant.
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In order to identify potential birth timing discontinuities relative to school cut-off dates in México,
the density of births from 1998 to 2007 were analyzed. While many factors affect the timing of
a planned birth, those parents who aim to have a child start school at a relatively young age will
plan for a birth just before the cut-off date and those who want their child to be relatively older
will plan for a birth just after the cut-off day. So, if there are disproportionately more births just
before or after a cut-off date—a “birth bubble” surrounding a cut-off date—this is evidence that
parents are manipulating birth dates. And while a McCrary test may not work if manipulation is
not monotonic, parents who the due(birth) date is close to the cutoff and want to delay school will
not act in response of cutoff dates; however, parents who the due(birth) date is close to the cutoff
who want their child start at eligible age will try to make sure that the birth is before the cut-off
(strategy manipulation).
Figure 4.3: Histogram of the number of individuals by date of birth. Source:Author’s calculation using
SINAIS data
Analyzing Mexican birth certificate records from 1998 to 2008 in México, the continuity of birth
density around the cut-off date and the randomness of covariates at the cut-off date were tested.
Figure 4.3 presents several histograms of birth dates from 1998 to 2007 and does provide some
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evidence of a greater density of births on both sides of the cut-off date relative to other calendar
dates—with birthdays just prior to the enrollment cut-off often out-numbering birthdays just after
the cut-off. All this suggests that parental manipulation of birth timing around cut-off dates is ap-
parently real, and can invalidate assumptions regarding the random distribution of birth dates.
Figure 4.4 highlights the proportion of births for each day in August and September 2007 relative
to the annual per day average from 1998 to 2007. Each bar shows the number of births that oc-
curred in one day as a percentage of the average number of births during that year. The vertical
line in each graph represents the cut-off day. The births before the cut-off out-number those after
the cut-off—further evidence that birth timing manipulation seems to favor pre-cut-off dates rather
than post-cut-off dates.
Figure 4.4: Proportion of Births Relative to the year average. Source:Author’s calculation using SINAIS
data
Closer inspection of the data, however, reveals more subtle patterns. The first three years (1998,
1999 and 2000) indicate a large discontinuity at the school cut-off day of (September 1, the 244th
day)—all of which were weekdays (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday, respectively). In 2001, the
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cut-off day fell on a Saturday resulting in 29% more births than on an average day in 2001. Further-
more, in 2002 when September 1 fell on Sunday, the number of births increased only 8% relative
to the annual per day average while the days after the cut-off accrued about 10% more births than
the average that year. In 2003, a higher discontinuity is found before the cut-off than after the
cut-off, and in 2004 and 2005, discontinuities appear again after the cut-off. By 2006 and 2007,
discontinuities centered around a September 1 cut-off date are no longer visible; only the cyclical
decrease of births on Sundays is apparent.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the average years of schooling of the mother by day of birth.
Figure 4.5: Density in Covariate - Mother’s schooling. Source:Author’s calculation using SINAIS data
These graphs depict inconsistent discontinuities at the September 1 cut-off between 1998 and 2007.
The first discontinuity occurs between the last day of August and September 1. This gap varies
from about 0.25% more births for the years 1998 to 2001 but decreases after this period. The
second discontinuity occurs between the September 1 cut-off and September 2. This gap measures
below 0.25% and is not stable over time. For example, the average schooling of mothers bearing
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children in 1998 was 7.6 years, but mothers who gave birth on Monday, August 31, 1998 had 8.1
years of schooling, and those who had a child on Tuesday, September 1 averaged 7.85 years of
education while the average schooling for mothers bearing children on Wednesday, September 2
was 7.65 years—a distribution which peaks before the cut-off date and then consistently drops off.
In this way, the data substantiate some sorting around cut-off dates (and by implication, deliberate
manipulation of birth timing), but, overall, the data is not strongly consistent and appears to be
subject to day-by-day effects. For example, the average schooling in 2003 was 8.2 years, but those
mothers who gave birth on Monday, August 31 had 8.2 years of schooling and those who gave birth
on Tuesday, September 1 had 8.3 years of education, and mothers who gave birth on Wednesday,
September 2 had 8.25 years of schooling—a relatively flat distribution.
Figure 4.6: Average Mother’s Years of Schooling in the Neighborhood of September 1 in México.
Source:Author’s calculation using SINAIS data
Table 4.12 also shows how the timing of births in México is not random across days—results
similar to those reported by Dicker-Colin et al. (2010) in the United States. Dicker-Colin et al.
(2010) argue that an even distribution amounts to about 14.3% for each day, yet Sunday births are
disproportionately less frequent (and actually becoming less and less frequent during this period).
Data relating birth dates to cut-off dates must be interpreted in light of this statistical bias against
Sunday birth dates. For example, in 1998, the biggest difference was between Sunday and Monday
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by 1.83 percent points; in 2007, the biggest gap was between Sunday and Friday by 3.49 percent
points. For Sundays, the proportion of births respect with other days of the week was by 1.34
percent points during 1998-2007. The major differences are between Sunday-Monday and Friday-
Saturday that suggests that there is a manipulation during these days, but not as much than in these
differences in the USA.
Table 4.12: Share of all births by day of week and year, 1998-2007
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday N
1998 12.92 14.75 14.72 14.51 14.63 14.57 13.91 2,442,276
1999 12.74 14.78 14.68 14.69 14.44 14.93 13.75 2,445,579
2000 12.75 14.66 14.65 14.64 14.55 14.79 13.96 2,509,538
2001 12.37 14.89 14.67 14.7 14.69 14.84 13.83 2,422,265
2002 12.29 14.69 15.01 14.63 14.69 14.97 13.71 2,392,850
2003 12.18 14.85 14.83 14.92 14.53 14.99 13.7 2,323,980
2004 12.04 14.8 14.89 14.77 14.81 15.13 13.57 2,274,897
2005 11.89 14.78 15.02 14.76 14.82 14.98 13.75 2,214,112
2006 11.96 14.63 15.03 14.86 14.84 15.15 13.54 2,134,437
2007 11.66 14.74 14.88 15.02 14.92 15.15 13.63 2,081,248
Source: Author’s calculations using SINAIS-SSA data
Overall, the statistical evidence does not support a conclusion of specific parental manipulation of
birth timing geared toward cut-off dates. The cut-off strategy is therefore not invalidated. More-
over, on an anecdotal basis, pediatricians in México do not report any systematic manipulation
of birth dates near cut-off dates by parents or doctors. As Lee and Lemieux (2009) concludes,
“Parents do have some influence regarding when their children are born, but with only imprecise
control over the exact date” (p. 347).
4.5.3 Empirical Education Production Function
This section describes the empirical model used to estimate the impact of the 2006 entry-age
reform on math achievement. As discussed in the theoretical section, the education production
function (EPF) model assumes that age has a direct impact on test scores through a maturity effect,
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and also an indirect effect on achievement through parental and school inputs (Todd and Wolpin,
2003). The current analysis deploys two different sources of variation to identify the relationship
between age and student outcomes in an empirical EPF. First, dates of birth allow comparisons
among achievement between those who were born around the minimum-enrollment age. This cut-
off strategy allows two treatment groups and one control group. The first pair of treatment-control
groups are those who were born around the minimum-enrollment age and attend third grade at the
same time but differ in birth cohort. The second pair of treatment-control groups are those who
were born around the minimum-enrollment age in the same year and attend third grade at two dif-
ferent points in time. In this second pair, the education production function estimates the impact of
the timing of treatment on learning outcomes in the 3rd grade between those who start younger and
those who delay enrollment and start older. The analysis allows comparisons of children born in
different years but who entered school at the same time as well as students born into the same birth
cohort but enrolled in school at different times. The second identification strategy is the school
entry reform of 2006 which superimposes a “natural experiment” on the age composition in third
grade. Given the new cut-off date, the empirical education production function will benefit from
the exogeneity of the age impacts of the reform and provide more reliable estimates on this basis.
Based on these two identification strategies, a regression discontinuity (RD) design is used to es-
timate the causal effect of age on learning achievement. This quasi-experimental design, which
mimics a randomized experiment, allows to estimate the parameters relevant for policy analysis.
The RD design estimates the total effect of age on achievement which includes both the direct
and indirect effects of the intervention and which is the local average treatment effect on student
achievement (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). That is, estimating the age effect includes those factors that
changed after the combination of age-eligibility and the decision to enter to first grade. This effect
aggregates the impact of factors that are conditional on age, as well as, the effects of age directly.
Indeed, Lee and Lemieux (2009) argue that the interpretation of the parameter estimated through
regression discontinuity designs with discontinuities in age is a combined effect of all factors that
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switch on at the threshold.
More specifically, the empirical approach uses a fuzzy regression discontinuity model to estimate
the impact of age on math test scores. Even under the September 1st federal cut-off, the entrance
age for enrollment was not always followed by parents—or states. Parents in México actually had
three options: enroll earlier than permitted, later than necessary or on time. The estimation of an
age effect is then potentially distorted due to both underage and overage children. And this dis-
tortion is not random: Underage children are typically brighter while overage children typically
perform worse (Cahan and Cohen, 1989). In particular, cut-offs create incentives for delays and
acceleration of school entry. As a result, Cahan and Cohen (1989) argue that “the relative fre-
quency of grade misplacement is likely to be related to month of birth, being particularly high near
the cut-off point. Cook and Campbell (1979) discuss this possibility as a fuzzy cutting point” (p.
1242).
Fuzzy RD design, required by the heterogeneity of parental decisions regarding accelerated age and
delayed entry, uses a Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimation strategy, which is the method
adopted in this dissertation. TSLS estimates will be used so that the source of identification is the
variation in the age-at-test that results solely from differences in birth dates. This TSLS model
identifies local average treatment effects (LATE) among children whose actual age is affected by
their predicted age.
Another issue to deal with is the fact that some Mexican states were following the 2006 entry law
cut-off even before the law was adopted. That is, different states had different cut-offs before the
reform. Because of this, the estimation below includes state fixed effects to compare birth cohorts




Using dates of birth for cohorts from 1998 to 2004, a variable DB is defined as the number of
days relative to January 1. For example, for a child born on January 1, 1998, DB is equal to
x = 0. For an individual born on December 31, 1998, DB is equal to x+ 364. For an individual
born on January 1, 1999, DB is equal to x+ 365. School entry cut-offs have two direct effects
on learning: the composition of each classroom and the heterogeneous responses parents, school
actors and students have to educational inputs. Children born around cut-off dates attend school
in two “artificial” school cohorts: one composed by the same birth cohort and the other composed
of two different cohorts. When the cut-off occurs on December 31, all the students belong to the
same birth cohort—and the oldest is 364 days older than the youngest. When a cut-off date occurs
somewhere during the calendar year, the comparison between the oldest and youngest is equal to
a comparison between those who delayed a year of school and those born at day x. Due to the cut-
off date, those who enter school at the minimum entrance age belong to a younger birth cohort x+1.
Four thresholds per birth cohort were defined: September 1, October 1, November 1 and December
1—and one more between birth cohorts, January 1. The total number of dummies D j = 1(DB ≥
DB) where DB j refers to each specific school entry cut-off. Moreover, any potential bias due to
the presence of underage and overage children is identified.
Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimation strategy consists of two stages. That is, the empirical
EPF, which incorporates imperfect-compliance, is a system of equations where the first stage is a
function of each of the dummies defined by the cut-off dates.
First Stage.
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ˆAi,bc = β0 +D jβ ′+ f (DB j)+νi (4.6)
where Â is the predicted age at test of a child i of birth cohort bc. D is a dummy that D j = 1(DB≥
DB), f (DB) is a piecewise quadratic polynomial.















j D j(DB−DB j)k (4.7)
γk=coefficients on polynomial terms
Second Stage.
A second equation is used to estimate the causal effect of a one-year increase in enrollment age
on math scores. β1 is the local weighted average treatment effects (LATE) of students with birth
dates near September 1st and who are induced to delay enrollment. It can be interpreted as an
“intent-to-treat” effect.
Ti,t,bc = β0 +β1Âi + f (DB j)+β2Xi,t + εi,t (4.8)
where Â is the predicted age at test of child i, D is a dummy that D j = 1(DB ≥ DB, f (DB)) is a
piecewise quadratic polynomial, Xi,t represents a vector of past and current school characteristics
and child characteristics and Ti,t= Test scores of children i of age t in third grade.
The causal effect of delaying one year of formal schooling on achievement is β1 which includes
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the direct and indirect effects of age on the EPF discussed in the theoretical section. The covari-
ates of the analysis include gender, type of school, marginality index, pupil-teacher ratio of the
student‘s classroom, and percent of teachers with university or more at the school. Standard Errors
are clustered at the school level. The empirical strategy also evaluates the impact the 2006 reform.
The first set of specifications is the system of TSLS equations used to estimate the local average
treatment effect of age on achievement at each cut-off date across three periods, defined as before
the reform (2006-2008), during the reform (2009-2011) and after the reform (2012-2013).
The issue of states adopting different cut-off dates was mentioned earlier and is incorporated into
the model with state fixed effects. One of the implications of having states with older school chil-
dren than others –at least before the 2006 federal reform unified such cut-offs– is that average test
scores at the state level may be influenced by those age differences, providing misleading cross-
state comparisons. In this regard, it is more appropriate to compare performance within states or
between states that have the same cut-off date.
Also, the estimation includes standard errors clustered at the school level. As Alvarez et al. (2007)
mention, “It is expected that the scores among students in the same school will be correlated. The
reason is that students enrolled in the same school are usually more similar to one another in be-
havior and characteristics than students enrolled in different schools. In other words, one would
expect that student performance for given school factors would increase in order for those school
variables to increase or improve, but one might also expect the variation on average school per-
formance to increase as school factors increase or improve” (p. 5). Another issue that the current
analysis investigates relates to the exogenous effects of school entry reform on the distribution of
ages. That is, the 2006 reform affected the average age of the classroom and it therefore altered
the individual students’s relative age in comparison with his or her peers. As Elder and Lubotsky
(2009) argues, the delay of school enrollment has an effect on the average age composition of the
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classroom, and it affects children’s peers, a factor that influences student achievement. Economet-
rically, age peer effects should be included, and the EPF should include the average entry age of the
class EA to estimate the age peer effect. Equation 4.9 defines the second stage in this case:
Tiyb = α +β1A+β2Ā+ f (DB j)+β2Xi,t + εi (4.9)
This is equivalent to the following model, with β1 = α1 +α2 and β2 =−α2 (For more details see





+ f (DB j)+β2Xi,t + εi (4.10)
4.6 Results
Variation in enrollment age related to changes in age-entry law arises because an exogenous event
causes some children to enter school younger than others. The empirical relationship between age-
entry laws, the 2006 age reform and 3rd grade ages found in this dissertation suggests that school
entry policies had an effect on school outcomes. These are the results.
4.6.1 Graphical Analysis
First Stage
Figure 4.7 depicts the relationship between average age at test and date of birth. The average age
at test was calculated taking into account dates of birth and the day the test was taken. The graph
shows the expected value of age on a particular day of the year. Reviewing the conditional ex-
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pectation of age at test, there is a negative relationship between age at test and date of birth for
those born between January 1997 and September 1, 1997. For those born after September 1, 1997,
there is an increase in age at test until the end of the year. In addition, there are discontinuities
in October and November 1997 due to the fact that some states used these months as their cut-off
date. A similar pattern is obtained for those born in 1998, 1999 and 2000. The figure also shows
that those who were born between 2001 and 2004 had a lower age at test than previous generations.
The solid line plots fitted values from the piecewise spline.
Figure 4.7: Average Entry Age by date of birth. Source:Author’s calculation using ENLACE
Second Stage
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate the reduced-form discontinuity analysis for 3rd grade math and Span-
ish student achievement, respectively. The math graph shows a negative relationship between math
scores and dates of birth before September 1, 1997. Subsequently, there is a substantial nonlinear
increase until January 1, 1998. From January 1 and September 1, 1998, the negative linear rela-
tionship reappears, and thereafter, the nonlinear relationship between date of birth and math scores
resurfaces. After that, the gaps after September 1 decrease. For the birth cohorts who started
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1st grade after the reform, there is no discontinuity centered around September 1, and the figure
displays a fitted quadratic relationship between math scores and dates of birth after September 1.
In fact, the shape of the fitted relationship is very different to the left of September 1 than to the
right for each of the cohorts before the 2006 reform. Moreover, after the reform, the relationship
between age at test and math achievement is negative across calendar days for each birth cohort.
Finally, the discontinuities are centered around January 1.
Figure 4.8: Average Math performance by date of birth. Source:Author’s calculation using ENLACE
Figure 4.9 illustrates the relationship between Spanish test scores and dates of birth. A pattern
similar to the math graph obtains although Spanish did not increase as much as math for the later
birth cohorts.
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Figure 4.9: Average Spanish performance by date of birth. Source:Author’s calculation using ENLACE
4.6.2 Results Reform
Table 4.13 shows the results from the education production function (equation 4.8) for each set of
cutoffs. Employing six (intra birth cohort-age effect) estimates (six sets of cutoffs) of the causal
effect by birth cohort and subgroups, these estimates are interpreted as local average treatment
effects for those born near cut-off dates and who delayed their enrollment. For those students
of varying ages across the cut-off who were born in 1998-1999 and therefore enrolled before the
school entry reform, the age effect is significant and about 50 points in ENLACE (0.5 s.d.) includ-
ing controls which give more precision to the estimator. This effect does not change across gender
or using various specifications. Following the results of Elder and Lubotsky (2009), differences
in age are more pronounced for students coming from families with greater socioeconomic back-
ground. In addition, private schools have a greater age effect than public schools by 0.09 s.d. For
this cohort, those who delayed enrollment and attended school in the following year performed in
the standardized test half of a standard deviation greater than those who attended school younger
and entered school in a previous school year. The great magnitude of this coefficient is important;
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attending a school year in 2008-2009 instead of the school year 2007-2008 (a year older) increased
math achievement by 50 points in ENLACE. It is worth to recall that this effect includes the direct
effect of age (age at the test and entry age) plus those indirect effects of age in parental and school
inputs since they entered the first grade.
Table 4.13: The Effect of Age on Math Achievement over time, intra-age
Without controls Controls Female Male Public Private Quadratic
1998-1999 Age 49.2*** 49.5*** 49.3*** 49.8*** 49.5*** 58.5*** 47.9***
S.E. 3.041 2.988 3.999 4.381 3.046 9.233 4.017
¯Age 8.1*** 8.1*** 9.1*** 8.3*** 1.2*** 7.0 10.2***
S.E. 2.443 2.376 3.138 3.468 2.397 7.993 3.396
Obs 1283291 1258635 616758 641877 1103420 110432 1258635
1999-2000 Age 59.17*** 59.34*** 56.21*** 62.46*** 61.23*** 59.36*** 59.72***
S.E. 1.27 1.27 1.63 1.80 1.30 4.48 1.35
¯Age -0.04 -0.12 3.98*** -2.84*** -7.51*** 10.25*** -0.97
S.E. 1.16 1.17 1.50 1.65 1.20 4.04 1.53
Obs 1344999 1321202 649344 671858 1152306 115281 1321202
2000-2001 Age 54.30*** 54.78*** 57.75*** 51.59*** 55.35*** 49.43*** 53.93***
S.E. 1.37 1.38 1.80 1.89 1.42 4.37 1.52
¯Age 5.30*** 5.05*** 4.14*** 7.51*** -2.22** 18.17*** 6.97***
S.E. 1.24 1.25 1.64 1.72 1.29 3.87 1.64
Obs 1372479 1351028 665159 685869 1178072 119313 1351028
2001-2002 Age 61.12*** 61.20*** 60.58*** 61.76*** 63.24*** 54.23*** 60.24***
S.E. 1.17 1.17 1.52 1.63 1.21 4.13 1.45
¯Age -0.04 0.38 2.37 -0.10 -6.79*** 12.66*** 1.37
S.E. 1.23 1.24 1.63 1.72 1.28 4.02 1.72
Obs 1350181 1329981 655828 674153 1159620 117918 1329981
2002-2003 Age 80.35*** 80.56*** 82.07*** 78.96*** 80.98*** 75.15*** 82.75***
S.E. 1.09 1.09 1.44 1.55 1.13 4.21 1.59
¯Age -20.06*** -18.91*** -19.38*** -17.05*** -23.00*** -7.04 -19.59***
S.E. 1.29 1.31 1.73 1.84 1.35 4.58 1.92
Obs 1307446 1287827 638087 649740 1123997 116771 1287827
2003-2004 Age 79.97*** 79.93*** 81.36*** 78.36*** 80.03*** 80.72*** 79.88***
S.E. 1.09 1.09 1.44 1.55 1.14 3.93 1.59
¯Age -21.56*** -20.58*** -21.15*** -18.60*** -23.67*** -11.57*** -0.18 ***
S.E. 1.31 1.34 1.78 1.87 1.39 4.50 0.02
Obs 1191252 1174592 584278 590314 1023703 113540 1174592
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE (2006-213)
SE are clustered at the school level.
For the 1999 and 2000 cohorts, the first generation that started school under the 2006 reform, the
age effect is 59 points in ENLACE (0.59 s.d.). That is, the 2006 reform had a short-run effect on
student achievement. There are several channels that these cohorts were impacted by the reform,
120
1)an increase in class size, 2) a relative increase of younger students , and 3) uniformity among
states, who started their transition to one, federal cutoff. The reforms affected males more than
females, and students in public schools more than those in private schools. For the 2000 and 2001
cohorts, the age effect was again significant and of a considerable magnitude. After these cohorts
(for older generations), the age effect increased. For those born around the cutoffs date in 2001-
2002, the age effect is 0.61 s.d.; whereas for those 2002-2003, the age effect is 0.8 s.d. Finally, for
the latest cohorts, 2003 and 2004, the age effect is 0.8 s.d. which is 0.03 s.d. higher for females
than for boys. Generally speaking, the inclusion of covariates does not affect the stability of the
parameters estimated nor the nonlinear form of the EPF.
Looking at the impact of peer effects: the coefficient on average age varies significantly over time,
being negative for cohorts entering first grade before the 2006 reform and becoming highly pos-
itive and significant for later cohorts. For the 1998-99 cohort, for example, (which is before the
reform)the coefficient of average age is 8 points of ENLACE (0.08 s.d.); recalling Elder and Lubot-
sky (2009), the coefficient of the average age has an implicit negative sign (according with equation
4.10, β2 =−α2); that is, students who delayed enrollment (due to the cutoff and the date of birth)
had a negative effect to be older with respect to the average age in class 4. But for the 2002-2003
cohort, the average age of the class for those who delayed enrollment has a positive and significant
impact on math achievement. This suggests that, over time, the incentives for delayed enrollment
may have risen as a result of the 2006 law: with younger average ages, students who delay their
entry into school would be entering even younger peers and the lower average age would have a
strong positive effect on the tests scores of the older, age-delayed students. This effect is stronger
for students in public schools, relative to private schools.
The analysis in this dissertation also finds that the 2006 reform reduced the variance of the age
4 Elder and Lubotsky (2009) mention “note that a positive effect of the school average entrance age corresponds to
a negative effect of a child’s age relative to the school average” p. 668
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distribution in the ENLACE population. Figure 4.10 illustrates this point.
Figure 4.10: Density of the Average Age at the Test by School Year. Source:Author’s calculation using
ENLACE
Table 4.14 shows the estimates for those who attend the same school year and grade but differ on
the year of birth. For those who attend third grade in 2012, the age effect is positive and equal to
0.52 s.d. or approximately 52 points in the equation with controls. There is a slight difference in
the coefficient on the basis of gender, with a difference of 1.5 points between females and males.
In addition, there is also variation on the basis of the type of school, with the inter-age effect for
students in public schools equal to 0.52 s.d., whereas for students in private schools it is 0.60 s.d.
The estimates presented in this Table show that the coefficient of the average classroom grade on
student achievement is positive. This means that a child who delays enrollment, and whose class-
room peers would be younger, would face a negative impact of about seven points on math student
achievement through the peer effect. This impact of the age of peers on student achievement is
stronger among private school students.
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Table 4.14: The Effect of Age at the test on Math Achievement inter-age, school year 2011/2012
and 2012/2013
Without controls Controls Female Male Public Private
2012 Age 50.57 51.48 52.92 49.93 51.82 59.98
S.E. 1.05 1.04 1.42 1.53 1.07 3.77
Average Age 7.85 7.31 8.12 8.23 3.06 7.17
S.E. 1.08 1.13 1.49 1.61 1.16 3.93
Observations 1912301 1883412 925047 958365 1638672 179140
2103 Age 52.32 52.85 53.52 52.05 53.05 63.27
S.E. 1.01 1.01 1.36 1.48 1.05 3.77
Average Age 8.89 7.57 8.64 8.36 3.97 7.77
S.E. 1.05 1.10 1.45 1.56 1.13 3.85
Observations 1863887 1836546 900461 936085 1595513 171850
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE (2006-213)
SE are clustered at the school level.
Table 4.20 (this later in the annex) shows the estimates for those in the same grade and the same
birth cohort but different school year. In contrast, Table 4.15 shows the estimates for those in the
same grade and the same school year but different birth cohort. The comparison here involves the
test scores of the older, school-delayed students in third grade with those of the younger students
in the same grade (who entered on time) in the given school year. The (inter)-age effect is very
similar to the (intra)-age effect (see table 4.11 for these definitions). However, before the reform
the inter-age effect was larger than the intra-age effect, after the reform and transition, it is the op-
posite story. This difference may be associated with the fact that more recent generations taking the
ENLACE tests have increased achievement tremendously, thus postponing enrollment may imply
better “education” in the subsequent school year. However, this may also be the result from other
opportunistic behaviors of school actors (e.g. cheating), which may be rising over time. Table
4.15 depicts that the age effect is 64 points in ENLACE for those who were born around Septem-
ber 1, 1998. This effect decreased after the implementation of the reform; for example those who
attend third grade in 2012 and were affected by the cutoff, the age effect was 55 points of ENLACE.
In conclusion, regardless of the sample, the school year or birth cohort, the age effect estimated in
this dissertation is equal to about a half standard deviation, suggesting that age has a significant,
positive impact on student achievement. While the age effect for those in the same birth cohort has
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Table 4.15: The Effect of Age on Math Achievement over time, inter-cohort
Coeff S.E. Obs
Sep 1 1998 62.04 0.95 656591
Sep 1 1999 60.20 1.22 535545
Jan 1 2001 64.20 0.44 550049
Jan 1 2002 57.13 0.33 879971
Jan 1 2003 52.11 0.32 1222939
Jan 1 2004 54.96 0.33 1191252
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE
SE are clustered at the school level.
increased over time and in particular after the 2006 reform, the age effect has decreased over time
for those who attend the same school year. This result suggest that the age effect may be capturing
other factors that have positively affected the education production function in more recent school
years.
4.6.3 Threats to validity
Regression discontinuity designs have several limitations and present potential threats to quasi-
experimental studies. In order to test the validity of the regression discontinuity design, the current
study first determines whether the distribution is continuous at September 1, tests for discontinu-
ities in covariates not related to the treatment at the cut-off, and then tests for discontinuities at
non-discontinuity points. (Recall how Bound and Jaeger (2000) found some evidence of small dif-
ferences in health across seasons of birth—differences, for example, between winter- and summer-
born children.)
Furthermore, state cut-off dates may be endogenous and respond to decisions regarding school
inputs and correlated with the average characteristics of children in a state. While major school in-
puts are developed or delivered by the federal Ministry of Education (e.g., curriculum, text books,
school calendar, etc.) and federal education funds are formulated with the same unit cost for every-
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one, states can add more resources, and states with younger average cohorts may provide more or
less school resources. After the 2006 reform, all states finally adhered to the same cut-off date—a
fact reflected in Figures 4.15 and 4.14 in the Annex.
Histogram tests can also reveal manipulation of assignment variables. If the distribution of data
at a cut-off point is continuous, the data implies that no manipulation of the assignment variable
occurred. By contrast, if, for example, parents were successful at “scheduling” birth dates relative
to a specific cut-off date, the distribution of births would tend to stack around that cut-off date.
Figure 4.11 presented a histogram of Mexican birth dates whereby September 1 births do indeed
out-number September 2 births—evidence that parents successfully engaged in some sort of birth
date manipulation vis-à-vis a cut-off date.
Figure 4.11: Histogram of the number of Individuals by date of Birth. Source:Author’s calculation using
ENLACE
Stacking alone, however, does not necessarily violate assumptions required for regression disconti-
nuity. As Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) emphasize, “ The violation of the regression discontinu-
ity assumption arises from the interaction of the stacking and the endogenous sorting of households
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”. To test if the quasi-experimental assignment is random at a cut-off, the continuous density of the
data points was tested. Table 4.16 showed the results of a McCrary test—a measurement detecting
changes in the density distribution of an assignment variable. The results of the McCrary test indi-
cated the assignment variable was subject to non-random manipulation. In particular, the McCrary
test showed an estimated discontinuity of -0.13 or -13% more observations on the left side of the
1998 cut-off, with a standard error of .004. Moreover, January 1 produced more discontinuities
across all cut-offs with a maximum of 27% more births after a cut-off and a minimum of 5 percent.
With results like these, the null hypothesis of continuity can be rejected.
The McCrary (2008) test on the assignment variable (Day of birth) results in an estimated discon-
tinuity of −.0117, with a standard error of .005. Therefore, the null hypothesis of continuity is not
rejected.
Table 4.16: McCrary density test
Cutoff Discontinuity estimate (log difference in height) S.E.
1998 1-Sep -0.13 (.004)
1-Oct 0.02 (.004)
1-Nov 0.06 (.004)




















2004 1-Jan 0.19 (.004)
Source: Author’s calculations.
Finally, in order to assess the plausibility of the identification strategy, the analysis tested disconti-
nuities at September 1 via factors which are orthogonal to 1st grade entry ages. If, for example, stu-
dent characteristics vary sharply near September 1, the identification strategy itself is undermined.
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Looking at some possible discontinuities, Figure 4.12 illustrated the mean values of schooling of
the mother by date of birth. The relationship between education and day of birth is flat over 365
days.
Figure 4.12: Average Mothers’ Schooling by day of birth in 2008
4.7 Conclusion
This research has analyzed the impact of age on student achievement in México. In order to more
accurately evaluate the effects of age on achievement, the study exploited two different identifica-
tion strategies: exogenous variation in education vis-à-vis dates of birth and the school entry age
reform law of 2006. In 2006, a new school entry age law was passed in México which reduced
the minimum age to enter academic schooling by four months. This reform had two observable
effects: It lowered both the average entry age of 1st grade students and the relative homogeneity of
the school-entry ages among 1st grade students. Before the 2006 reform, most Mexican states used
September 1 as their cut-off-date; after the reform, states transitioned to December 31. Due to the
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2006 law, some children were allowed to begin school earlier than was permitted in prior years.
To estimate the potential effects of these variables on math scores, a fuzzy regression discontinuity
was used to track the causal effect of delayed school enrollment on student outcomes whereby the
source of identification was age at test variation.
The results indicate that older students generally scored higher than younger students. In addition,
the reform impacted this result, with the gap between those regulated by the new cut-off dates and
those regulated by the old cut-off date(s) equal to 0.30 s.d. (comparing the 1998-1999 cohort with
2002-2003 cohort). This result suggests that the age effects on schooling outcomes is stronger for
the more recent generations when compared to cohorts in school previous to the reform. While
there is an increased age effect after the reform, one possibility is that school inputs were not ad-
justed to younger students (e.g. curriculum, etc), even when these new generations were more
prepared before first grade (compulsory kindergarten). Because math scores have increased by
0.95 s.d. since the first administration of ENLACE in 2006, this result suggests that, at a mini-
mum, moving the cut-off date by four months to December 31 did not have an adverse effect on
mean math test scores.
Because entry-age dates affect class composition, peers effects have changed due to the 2006 re-
form. Students in the 1998-1999 cohort (who entered school prior to the reform) who delayed
school and attended a class composed, on average, being the older students, scored lower (negative
effect) by 0.08 s.d. By contrast, the same effect after the 2006 reform was estimated to be positive
at 0.22 s.d.
Although age appears to have a strong effect on student achievement throughout the various anal-
yses in this dissertation, there is a difference in results obtained from the intra-age cohort analysis
versus the inter-age cohort analysis. The intra-age analysis compares the outcomes in third grade
128
of students who were born in the same cohort but because they were slightly younger or older they
ended up entering first grade with one year of difference. The inter-age analysis also maintains
the grade constant, but compares the older students who delayed enrollment due to the law with
the younger students in the same school year, with the two groups belonging to two different birth
cohorts. In this case, the comparison was between the outcomes of the older, school-delayed stu-
dents in third grade with those of the younger students in that same grade (who entered on-time)
in a given school year.
First, the intra-age effect of delaying 1st grade by a year on math scores was an increase of 0.5
s.d. For the generations prior to the reform attending 3rd grade, the inter-age effect of delaying 1st
grade by a year on math scores was an increase of 0.62 s.d. That is, the intra-age counterfactual
provided estimates of age on math achievement which were higher than the inter-age counterfac-
tual. On the other hand, after the school reform of 2006 (looking at the 2003-2004 age cohort),
the results obtained from the intra-age strategy imply that delaying 1st grade by a year on math
scores yielded an increase of 0.8 s.d., while the inter-age estimation strategy implied that the effect
of delaying 1st grade by a year on math scores was an increase of 0.53 s.d. In other words, the
intra-age counterfactual produced estimates of age on math achievement that were stronger than
the inter-age strategy.
Underlying the results of this research is the fact that there has been a large increase in test scores
over time in México. The impact of age on schooling, specially the changes over time in the rate of
return to age in terms of student achievement, may be connected to this trend. This requires further
research as it involves analyzing the changes in resources and choices made by schools, teachers
and parents over time, which may be impacting test scores (including the pre-schooling and other
reforms implemented by the government as well as the possibility of increased cheating or teach-
ing to the test, among many other factors). Indeed, there are many limitations to the age-effect
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analysis carried out in this dissertation. First, the estimated age effect aggregates several effects
which are dependent upon age and includes not just the impact of maturation –which makes older
students do better in test scores—but also any greater investments made by parents in their children
during the extra time connected to the delay of entry into first grade. Second, since test scores are
not comparable across grades, it is not possible to estimate the schooling effect (as described in
the chapter’s theory section). Third, there is some evidence of birth manipulation among parents.
Though this manipulation may not invalidate the identification strategy (especially if before the
reform, the percentage of students who had accelerated school entry equaled the percentage of
students who had delayed enrollment), it can cause an underestimation of the age effect. Fourth,
the kindergarten reform that occurred in parallel to the 2006 age-entry reform may be one of the
reasons math scores increased over time. However, the age effect cannot be disentangled from this
effect across birth cohorts. Finally, a 2010 teachers incentive program may have induced strategic
behaviors among teachers and principals (e.g., systematic cheating or teaching to the test) which
can distort the estimation of the intra-age effect.
Though the current research focused on the effect that delayed enrollment may have on student
achievement, there are other issues to consider. One important issue relates to age dispersion.
What is the optimal mix of student ages in a classroom? This issue deserves its own research
agenda.
Policy recommendations. Before the entry-age reform of 2006, some states systematically al-
lowed younger children to enroll in 1st grade, and thus, had lower average ages in their classrooms.
Several published analyses did not account for these state-by-state differences, yet we know that
states with older students score, on average, 8 points higher in ENLACE exams respect to lower
average age classes. These results demonstrate that systematic de jure or de facto rules which
influence classroom composition may lead to differences in average test scores across Mexican
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states. Moreover, this result also suggests that comparing schools which have more discretion in
the selection of students (e.g., private schools) with those that don’t (e.g., public schools)must be
carefully considered in terms of their impact on the average age of students and its connection
to relative student achievement. Nevertheless, because national enrollment reform generally in-
creased classroom homogeneity throughout México, comparisons among Mexican states are more
accurate than before the reform.
Another issue to consider is that Mexican authorities have recently begun to enforce a “no-failing”
policy for the first three grades of school. While several critics have raised concerns, the fact that
the estimated age effect is above 0.5 s.d. demonstrates that younger children are at a disadvantage
relative to those who delay school entry even if both groups have increased their performance over
time. Because failing is actually correlated with entry age during the first three grades of school,
this “no-failing” policy promotes these younger students to an upper grade, but does not address
the disadvantages of younger students.
México has addressed many problems related to educational access, especially since the 2006 re-
form. Two complications, though, have arisen from these successes: greater human capital hetero-
geneity and greater age heterogeneity among all the children entering the 1st grade (due to overage
enrollment). Whereas compulsory kindergarten can help to mitigate the first problem, a nationally
uniform entry-age policy would have presumably resulted in more homogenous classrooms. So
while underage enrollment is no longer much of an issue, overage children are a problem related to
socioeconomic status, migration (temporal and permanent) patterns and access. The intra-cohort
peer effects estimated in this dissertation suggest that that children should transit the school system
with children of the same age.
The results of this dissertation regarding school entry-age reform also illustrates that administra-
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tive and legislative decisions have an impact on classroom compositions (both in increased age
diversity and increased size) which in turn affect teaching and learning outcomes.
In conclusion, what, then, is known about the best time to start school? Is it merely a question
whether or not younger entrants gain more or less from schooling than older entrants? The impact
of age on student achievement estimated in this dissertation is positive and significant (regardless
the sample, the school year or birth cohort, the effect of school delay is half a standard deviation or
above). This result, which is the outcome of the greater maturity as well as greater parental inputs
obtained by being one year older when you enter school, suggests that it is better to be the head
of the mouse than the tail of the lion in México. But this result claim for better classroom compo-
sition or organization, and does not support red shirting. However, it should also be emphasized
that when a sizable portion of the student population delays enrollment, there are consequences
on both students and the school system that are not measured by the impact of age on individual
student outcomes examined in this dissertation. An examination of these impacts should be the
task of future research.
4.7.1 Tables
Table 4.17: ENLACE - census-based assessment - Official numbers
Third Fourth Fifth Sixth 7th 8th 9th Total
2006 1,840,417 1,892,833 1,909,516 1,863,489 — — 1,371,202 8,877,457
2007 1,984,594 1,955,348 2,038,536 1,984,347 — — 1,526,867 9,489,692
2008 2,009,201 2,042,002 2,030,916 2,026,575 — — 1,614,281 9,722,975
2009 2,081,460 1,946,074 1,908,484 1,874,055 1,732,862 1,682,712 1,582,315 12,807,962
2010 2,224,353 2,140,003 1,977,389 1,981,983 1,820,767 1,747,413 1,642,129 13,534,037
2011 2,264,175 2,231,429 2,135,273 2,000,214 1,849,676 1,729,023 1,636,471 13,846,261
2012 1,979,766 2,099,700 2,055,989 2,006,188 1,801,856 1,702,920 1,575,028 13,221,447
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE
Official numbers from SEP.
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Table 4.18: Birth cohorts and ENLACE cohorts
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total Births 2,285,050 2,296,222 2,350,401 2,411,271 2,285,777 2,185,073 2,097,139 2,034,460
Michoacán 102,642 102,231 103,937 105,982 99,135 91,367 85,321 80,840
Oaxaca 84,701 84,856 86,377 88,259 83,814 78,642 74,670 71,772
Aguascalientes 24,010 24,414 25,199 26,033 25,324 24,343 23,714 23,297
Colima 11,422 11,534 11,835 12,173 11,637 11,008 10,567 10,264
No Oax & Micho 2,097,707 2,109,135 2,160,087 2,217,030 2,102,828 2,015,064 1,937,148 1,881,848
ENLACE 1458501 1946236 1981753 2053835 2018067 1992465 1799251 1628048
Oaxaca 14,526 38,707 44,970 5,632 27 41 98 714
Michoacán 20,369 36,965 5,146 30,272 33,178 35,513 17,194 20,862
Colima 10,654 11,110 11,130 11,678 11,210 11,428 10,908 8,245
Aguascalientes 23,028 23,688 24,073 25,268 25,040 25,109 24,026 20,739
Total 63.8% 84.8% 84.3% 85.2% 88.3% 91.2% 85.8% 80.0%
No Oax & Micho 67.9% 88.7% 89.4% 91.0% 94.4% 97.1% 92.0% 85.4%
Oaxaca 17.1% 45.6% 52.1% 6.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1.0%
Michoacán 19.8% 36.2% 5.0% 28.6% 33.5% 38% 20.2% 25.8%
Aguascalientes 95.9% 97.0% 95.5% 97.1% 98.9% 103.1% 101.3% 89.0%
Colima 93.3% 96.3% 94.0% 95.9% 96.3% 103.8% 103.2% 80.3%
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE
Figure 4.13: Enrollment by Entrants category in First Grade. Source:Author’s calculation using 911 data
Table 4.19: Marginality and Late age students in third grade
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
2006 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.20 0.02
2007 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.03
2008 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.02
2009 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.01
2010 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.27 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.18 0.28 0.05
2011 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.16 0.25 0.05
2012 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.05
2013 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.04
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE
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Table 4.20: The Effect of Age on Math Achievement over time
No controls Controls Female Male Public Private Quadratic
1998-1999 Coeff 58.5 58.9 59.9 59.4 50.7 66.5 58.4
S.E. 0.839 0.889 1.193 1.214 0.906 2.187 1.184
Obs 1283291 1258635 616758 641877 1103420 110432 1258635
1999-2000 Coeff 59.1 59.2 59.6 59.9 54.8 69.3 59.1
S.E. 0.731 0.763 1.005 1.048 0.805 2.072 0.879
Obs 1344999 1321202 649344 671858 1152306 115281 1321202
2000-2001 Coeff 59.20 59.36 61.48 58.46 53.36 66.91 58.82
S.E. 0.722 0.761 1.010 1.041 0.795 2.130 0.917
Obs 1372479 1351028 665159 685869 1178072 119313 1351028
2001-2002 Coeff 61.09 61.49 62.35 61.68 58.17 65.56 61.10
S.E. 0.645 0.674 0.885 0.928 0.700 2.123 0.871
Obs 1350181 1329981 655828 674153 1159620 117918 1329981
2002-2003 Coeff 65.47 66.87 68.26 66.37 64.55 69.25 68.53
S.E. 0.552 0.587 0.761 0.786 0.613 1.864 0.802
Obs 1307446 1287827 638087 649740 1123997 116771 1287827
2003-2004 Coeff 64.76 65.88 67.15 65.42 64.10 71.78 66.60
S.E. 0.567 0.608 0.816 0.837 0.643 1.862 0.884
Obs 1191252 1174592 584278 590314 1023703 113540 1174592
Source: Author’s calculations using ENLACE
SE are clustered at the school level.
Figure 4.14: First state, Aguascalientes. Source:Author’s calculation using ENLACE
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Figure 4.15: First state, D.F. Source:Author’s calculation using ENLACE
Simple Theoretical model
The Entry−Age Effect. A further theoretical perspective on the entry-age effect (as defined
here) was contributed by Elder and Lubotsky (2009). These authors discussed how the relation-
ships between family inputs and test scores change as a response to changes in entry-age. Elder
and Lubotsky (2009) argue that the accumulation of knowledge prior to the start of kindergarten
explains the gap between the oldest and youngest entrants and within each group of rich and poor
students. Datar (2006) argues that activities prior to school may affect the impact of age on test
scores when a child is in school. Following the previous notation, the theoretical model of Elder
and Lubotsky (2009) is:
Tia = Ta(Ti,EA,Fage,θi,SA(S,EA)) (4.11)
Ti,EA is the cognitive achievement of an individual previous to school (human capital in the theoret-
ical model of Elder and Lubotsky (2009)). θSA(S,EA) is the contribution of a year S of schooling
to the human capital of a child who entered school at age EA. According to this model, an indi-
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vidual who starts school at EA = t has an evidently lower cognitive starting point than the same
individual starting school a year older (EA = t+1). In fact, the accumulated parental inputs will
be higher for the older individual than for the younger one. On the first day of kindergarten, a











Elder and Lubotsky (2009) claim that differences in test scores at the moment children begin school
are explained by the effect of a year of parental resources through differences in age. Consequently,
and extra year of parental inputs creates heterogeneity among new entrants of different ages. Note,
however, that following Equation 4.12, these authors do not explain the complete entry-age effect
(which includes direct and indirect effects). That is, Elder and Lubotsky (2009) contributed to
the discussion by focusing on the effect of entry-age on family inputs, but did not incorporate the
entry-age direct effect on test scores (the ceteris paribus effect). Finally, the authors argue that stu-
dent achievement among the richest new entrants will be higher than among the poorest entrants
due to the capability of rich families to provide higher parental investments during that extra year.
The School−Age Effect. Furthermore, while the entry-age effect is clearly defined by two
components, age and family inputs, the total school-age effect is not clearly defined due to the
perfectly collinear relationship between current age and accumulated schooling among on-track
children(Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Fredriksson and Öckert, 2005;
Datar, 2006). That is, while children are in school, an extra year out of formal school affects
not only their cognitive achievement on tests through mental capacity (age) but also affects their
accumulated experience in the form of parental and school inputs. Moreover, this model can be
extended by adding two types of school inputs in order to understand the effect of school age on the
cognitive achievement model. Assuming there are two types of inputs, a fixed school input is the
136
school-grade in which the student is eligible to enroll, and the adaptive school input includes the
resources devoted to the student during that school year. For example, school grades typically have
defined curriculum standards whereas there are no rules determine hours of tutoring by grade. In
this approach, the school-age effect can be divided using these two school inputs. The total effect































The first component is the age-at-test effect on cognitive achievement. The second component
is the effect of family inputs on cognitive achievement conditional to attending a lower grade
(G=grade). The third component is the effect of a lower grade on achievement due to delayed
enrollment by one year. This effect is negative due to students losing one year of schooling. The
following component is the effect of family inputs on test scores as a result of changes in the adap-
tive school inputs of a child one year older. The last component is the effect of the adaptive school
inputs on cognitive achievement as a consequence of delayed enrollment. In this extension, delayed
enrollment automatically results in attending a lower grade than if they had entered the previous
year. Starting a year older is a balance between the cognitive return of an extra year before school
and the cognitive return of another year of schooling. Consequently, the school-age effect has three
defined effects, 1) the age-test effect, 2) the age-grade-effect, and 3) the age-adaptive school input
effect, where the last two can be considered the schooling effect.
The Age−Grade Effect. In the literature on the short-term effects of age, a debate emerges
regarding counterfactuals, related to delayed enrollment. For example, Datar (2006) mentions that
“ When examining short-term outcomes such as test scores in school, one key issue relates to the
point at which these children should be compared, i.e., in the same grade or at the same age ”
(p.45). Individuals face a tradeoff between age and schooling, entering one-year-older means post-
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poning academic instruction by one year and spending a year of activities out of school. While
there are two direct effects of age on cognitive achievement relative to entry-school age, the EPF
adjusts family and school inputs accordingly. In other words, whereas most of the research on this
topic seeks to disentangle the direct effects of age (entry-age and age-at-test-effects), the model
used by Todd and Wolpin (2003) uses non-ceteris paribus mechanisms by which age impacts cog-
nitive achievement.
Theoretically, the age-grade effect is similar to a years-of-schooling effect. Suppose one could
compare the effect of schooling of an individual i in a year of schooling (S) with the same individ-
ual in a year of schooling (S−1) at the same age. (These types of counterfactuals are obviously
not possible, and are considered a fundamental problem regarding causal inference). For illustra-
tion, the treatment effect for this hypothetical individual is the difference in outcomes due to the
effect of the fixed school input (the grade). This effect can be called ”the treatment of the treated


























Equation 4.13 is equal to the age-grade component in Equation 4.15. Moreover, a similar approach
was developed by Cahan and Cohen (1989). This study discussed the age-at-test effect and the
schooling effect of entering a year older relative to academic instruction. That is, the absolute
effect of an additional year of schooling on achievement can be estimated by holding age constant
(given age is the only factor of admission in school). This effect can be estimated as a “ treatment
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on the treated.” These authors argue that “ the difference between any two adjacent grade levels in
mean achievement can be viewed as the sum of the effects of two factors: one year of schooling and
an average of one year in chronological age. In order to isolate the independent effect of one year
of schooling, one has to partial out the independent effect of one-year difference in chronological
age” (p. 3). In other words, the effect of schooling on cognitive achievement is driven by:
Table 4.21: Net Enrollment-Age Effect of Being Older, Shown by the model by Cahan and Cohen
(1989)
Age-effect Schooling-effect
Treatment Age t, grade x Age t, grade x
Control Age t−1, grade x Age t, grade x+1
The authors define the age effect as the differences in the mean test scores between individuals
with one year differences in chronological age in the same grade and the schooling effect as the
difference in mean test scores between individuals of one year of schooling difference born around
the entry-school day between two consecutive grades. Maintaining the grade constant, this strategy
compares the oldest students who delayed enrollment age due to the law with the youngest students
who were born around the entry-date of formal education. The only difference is one year in age.
Maintaining the age constant, the strategy compares the oldest students who delayed enrollment
age due to the law with the youngest students who are in the next grade. The same achievement
test is needed to compare individuals of the same age but in different grades (Cahan and Cohen,
1989). In this theoretical model, the school effect exists as the total age-grade effect that is part of
the total school-age effect.
4.7.2 Extension of Todd and Wolpin (2003)
Consider a simple cognitive achievement model in which the education production function is a
cumulative process where each level of achievement is prerequisite for subsequent learning. This
cognitive production function follows partially Elder and Lubotsky (2009) model and it can be con-
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sidered an extension of the cognitive production function developed by Todd and Wolpin (2003).
The importance of this extension is to define a structure of the EPF that allows the estimation of
the age effect. First, it defines that intelligence of a child has two components, innate intelligence
at the moment of birth and a malleable mental capacity which is function of age. Second, it defines
that investment in cognition have different returns due to the mental capacity. That is, at different
ages, the cognitive return is nonnegative to any investments. Third, based on the theoretical model
discussed previously, there are two define periods that may incentive different responses by parents
and schools actos. At the moment to start academic school, students with the same mental capacity
start with different levels of human capital due to prior differentiate investments. At this moment,
also, students with different mental capacity start with different accumulation of human capital due
to mental capacity and parental responses. Moreover, from the supply side, government regulates
the rules and requirements to start formal education. As government regulates the school entry
age, any cutoff have implications on minimum age, average age and age dispersion which is trans-
lated into levels of mental capacity across children starting first grade. That is, these cutoffs have
implications on how equal is the starting point to new entrants. Finally, taking these considerations
into account, a causal model is developed to understand the components of the age effect in third
grade; these parameters are the accumulated effect delayed one year of formal schooling in third
grade.
Proposition 1 - Cognitive endowments - . A person’s initial cognitive endowments are the sum
of innate intelligence (I) plus mental capacity which is malleable and a function of age.
The optimal cognitive achievement schedule is based on the cognitive endowments, and how the
developmental stages respond to the external inputs which are function of age. Wang and Aamodt
(2010) argue that “ Genes provide the blueprints for your child’s individuality, but the plans are
certain to be modified during construction depending on local conditions-not only parent’s actions,
but also your child’s culture, neighborhood, teachers, and peers” (p. xxi). Assume that chrono-
logical age is reliable measure of the various stages of biological, physical, emotional and social
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development which allows to identify what an individual should learn at that any developmental
stage; for example, education systems base their admissions in individuals’ age.
CognitiveEndowmenti = G(Intelligencei,Agei) (4.16)
where Age ε [0,+∞)
Therefore, the cognitive achievement is a function of age from birth to the time optimal schooling
is completed. According with Berninger and Richards (2002), “Thanks to the biological develop-
ment during the first year of life, the child learns from what the genetic program says to acquire,
from the stimuli from parents and from external experiences” (p. ). That is, in the first year of life,
the cognitive achievement is function of innate intelligence (I), household inputs-and external in-
puts (factors endogenous to the parents’ optimization problem). While it is clear parents optimize
resources as a function of their children’s age, parents do not possess perfect information regarding
the cognitive achievement on their child. Moreover, according with Todd and Wolpin (2003), “The
effect of the capacity endowment while allowed to vary with age does not depend on current or
past inputs” (F.23).
Proposition 2 - Innate ability constant overtime
Though the innate ability contribution to cognition is constant over time, parents adjust their op-
timal inputs to cognitive development to reflect the “observed” cognition of their child. In this
model, innate ability influences represent a small proportion of cognition over time.
Proposition 3 - Cognitive returns to scale
A key assumption in this model is that people selects their optimal cognitive achievement schedules
to maximize high returns through early investments (Berndt, 1990). In the educational production
function, there are three define periods of mental capacity; the first period starts at the moment of
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birth to the age of three. The second period is around the age of 3 until around the age of 6. Finally,
the third period begins at the age of 6 and ends when compulsory schooling ends. That is, there
are different types of returns to cognition. So while resources can be invested at any time, mental
capacity maturation induces different returns to differently timed investments.
Before the age of 3, cognitive achievement is represented as a function of previous cognitive
achievement, current household inputs and current external inputs. That is, learning is the result
of internal developmental trajectories and interactions with the world (though similar production
functions aggregate this prior accumulation as innate ability).
Moreover, around this age, children have reached a development stage that allows for greater and
greater learning. For example Bjorklund (2011) claim, “ At the age of 3 or 4, children’s brains are in
the midst of hooking up their intuitive understanding of quantity with an explicit, later-developing
sense of abstract numbers” (p. 208). Also, in some countries, at the age of 3, individuals are
eligible to start kindergarten. Therefore, the cognitive achievement of a child at age t = 3 is an
accumulation process which is a function of the achievement in previous years, current household
inputs and potentially, extra-household experiences like kindergarten. Assuming that Kindergarten
is intended to the stimulation in development skills, parents enrollment decision is primarily based
on the cognitive return to kindergarten which in this model is assumed to be positive.
Whereas the empirical evidence in economics does not distinguish between school experiences
before academic instruction (kindergarten) and formal academic instruction, developmental theory
clearly distinguishes between these two periods. In particular, the decision to enter kindergarten is
based upon different factors than the decision to enroll in the 1st grade of formal academic instruc-
tion. For instance, kindergarten entry-age may be related to early development skills while enroll
1st grade enrollment may be related to literacy development.
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Proposition 4 - Cognitive Heterogeneity starting formal education
Cognitive achievement is heterogenous across individuals of the same age before academic in-
struction. The informal learning experiences which result from family resources and kindergarten
engender individuals with different patterns of achievement long before staring formal education.
Berninger and Richards (2002) mention that “considerable research on child development during
the preschool years has shown that developmental trajectories in the following domains show vari-
ability across individuals of the same age and within the same individual: gross motor, fine motor,
receptive language for understanding speech, expressive language for communicating, cognition
and thinking, social-emotional, executive functions, and attention. The intra-individual develop-
mental variation should not be surprising given the different brain systems are involved in each
domain” (p. 299).
Prior to formal education, the main differences across children of the same chronological age are
due to previous accumulation and contemporaneous parental and external resources as well as any
kindergarten experiences. It is assumed here that children’s mental capacity for abstract thinking
is orthogonal to the development of children’s social development. In other words, a child at age
6 can be capable of more abstract thinking necessary for formal school but still be slower with
respect to social developmental stages or vice versa. In this respect, it is assumed that kinder-
garten is designed for an specific developmental stages as gross motor, expressive language for
communicating, social emotional, executive functions or attention, while the academic education
is designed for higher developmental stages like cognition and abstract thinking. Preschool can
signalize that children have matured their first specific developmental stages and they are ready
for more complex social context named school. Bedard and Dhuey (2006) state that “ One should
expect weak relative age effects in countries where formal curriculum based education begins later
because initial age differences will be less important. ” (p.4).
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Proposition 5 - Parental decision rule
Parents will also decide to enroll children in academic instruction based on age eligibility. One
way of representing this decision process for child i is the effect of one year of schooling at the age
of t in comparison with a non-academic schooling at the age of t. However, the expected return
of schooling depends on the school the child will attend. It is assumed, having the choice, parents
will select a school which maximizes expected cognitive achievement.
Generally speaking, eligibility for enrollment to any kind of schooling is based upon the belief
the child is ready, either by age or developmental maturity, to maximize cognitive achievement.
Suppose when a child is eligible to enroll first grade (age based admission), parents choose child’s
optimal timing to enter to school based on the considerations that involve opportunity costs (in-
cluding options), the cognitive achievement of the child, and the preferences of parents towards
education given their resources. That is, parents make these decisions by taking into account the
benefits and costs of starting formal education at age t. The parental decision is a function of the
expected return of schooling (conditioned by school inputs) at age t. In addition, parents may see
kindergarten as an exit certificate signifying the child is ready for formal schooling.
Proposition 6 - Cognitive Heterogeneity, School Eligibility and intra age variation
Eligibility to start formal education aggregates children who are all born within a 365-day period.
This policy increases the variability of cognitive achievement levels among 1st graders as mental
capacity will vary due to age ceteris paribus family resources and the developmental stages. Imag-
ine two children—one born January 1 and one born December 31 in the same calendar year. Both
would belong to the same chronological age group for purposes of enrollment eligibility, but are
likely at different stages of biological, emotional, social or mental development. Nevertheless, par-
ents typically do not know the cognitive achievement of child i at age t, and thus not know if their
child is ready to start formal instruction in math and other skills. But still parents must still decide
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when to start the formal education of their child given the entry-age law imposed by authorities
and the relative age of their child compared to peers.
Proposition 7 - Maturity cutoff
From the supply side, government regulates the rules and requirements to start formal education.
However, it is still not clear, the direction of such regulation to make starting point equal and fair
to all new entrants. In reality, however, education systems inevitably attempt to “optimize” this
timing by using more or less arbitrary cut-offs. That is, “institutional knowledge” determines the
minimum mental capacity necessary to benefit from schooling as well as the minimum level of
social, motor and physical maturity to interact in the more demanding academic and social context
of formal education. As government regulates the school entry age, any cutoff have implications
on minimum age, average age and age dispersion which is translated into levels of mental capacity
across children starting first grade. That is, these cutoffs have implications on how equal is the
starting point to new entrants.
Proposition 8 - Educational Trajectories - Parental decision rule and Institutional rules
Educational trajectories are a function of mental capacity, but also depend upon parental decisions
and resources as well as institutional factors. In addition, school authorities and teachers may
react to parental decisions and this may impact the cognitive production of children through school
inputs. The interaction of parental and institutional forces affects children’s cognitive achievement
trajectories.
A Causal Model In order to understand the causal effect of schooling and age, analyses extend to
a model developed by Todd and Wolpin (2003). Taking into account these propositions and the re-
lationships among age, schooling and test scores, the regression framework is based on differences
between those equal in expectation that differ in school entry age. Imagine a child who was born
the first day of the calendar year and starts an education accumulation process since the first mo-
ment of life. This model expresses the theoretical arguments behind cognitive achievement during
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early childhood and during school. In this first approach, it is assumed that unobservable factors
do not impact the cognitive achievement. In terms of notation, age is equal to a full year.
Following the specification by Todd and Wolpin (2003), the model (including test scores as depen-
dent variables and measurement of error) (εija) is given by:
Ti,j,a = Ta(Fij(a),Sij(a),µi0,εija) (4.17)
Fij(a) is a vector of parental inputs (current and past) at age a and Sij(a) is a vector of school
inputs (current and past) at age a (For more details, see Todd and Wolpin (2003) model). This
model provides a framework to understand the role age plays in the children’s cognition.
A child born the first day of the calendar year starts the accumulation process at the moment of
life, A = 0, where innate ability accounts for initial cognitive achievement (Proposition 1 and 2).
The equation is :
Ti,0 = µi0 + εi ja (4.18)
Moreover, cognitive achievement prior to formal education is the sum of innate abilities, the returns
on family resources (βia) at different ages and the efficiency of those mental abilities(γia) prior to
academic instruction (Kindergarten can be included in this equation, as reflected in Propositions 3,
4, 6 and 7). Equation 4.19 shows the parameters of the EPF prior formal schooling:
















A′+ εi ja (4.19)
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In this production function, family resources have different returns βiA which depend upon the age
of the child. In addition, age has a direct effect on cognition functioning: γit > γit−1 where this
return is increasing γit > γit−1. According with Todd and Wolpin (2003), “inputs effects differ both
by age at which the input is applied and by the distance in time from the achievement measure” (p.
F23).
Parental Decision Rule
Nevertheless, parents have two options for their children: to enroll at age 6 or 7 (Proposition 5).
These options may affect children’s cognitive learning schedules as well as their educational tra-
jectories.
Option 1 - Parents decide the child will enroll at the age of 6. The cognitive production function
after a year in school is:
Ti,6 = µi0 +βit ′F(A)+βi6S1Fi6 + τ1S1(A6)+ γit
′A+ εi ja (4.20)
After a year in school, the production function accumulates the return for one year of schooling τ1
and the returns of parental resources βi6S1 conditional that the child is in school.
Under this condition, the contrafactual of going to school at the age of six will be the difference






Fi6 + τ1S1(A6)+ εi ja (4.21)
Equation 4.21 shows the difference on cognition at the end of the child’s age of 6 between to enter
to school or not. This equation is the difference between the family inputs with a child in the school
and not in the school at the age of six and the school return to that year with a mental capacity of a
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6 -year-old child. This difference is composed of the different returns to family resources with the




and the return to a year of schooling ( τ1). This
last component is the schooling effect.
Option 2 - If parents decide the children enters academic instruction at the age of 7, the cognitive
production function after a year in school will be:
Ti,7 = µi0 +βit ′F(A)+βi7S1Fi7 + γit
′A+ τ1S1(A7)+ εi ja (4.22)
Equation 4.22 specifies the production function of this child entering school at the age of 7. In
this production function, only family resources at the age of 7 are affected by the child attending
school. While previous inputs were not affected by this condition, entering an older age gives the
child one more year of family resources unconditional to school as well as greater mental capacities
reflected not only on developmental maturity but also in the returns to schooling.
How does cognitive production change relative to with these two options? The effect of earlier
enrollment is a tradeoff between mental efficiency versus more schooling (all things equal). The
decision to enter one year younger to academic instruction can be analyzed following this indi-
vidual in these two educational trajectories. The differences in schooling can be analyzed as the
intensity of the treatment maintaining mental capacity constant. For example, Equations 4.23 and
4.24 depict the cognitive function at age 8 for both options.
Starting younger—option 1—gives an additional return to one more year of schooling τ3A8 , which
represents a fixed school input with higher cognitive achievement than a previous grade τ3 > τ2.
Under this option, parental resources are relative to enrollment at age 6 βi6S1,βi7S2,βi8S3 .
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Starting one year older—option 2—provides higher returns to schooling due to the higher mental
efficiency and an extra year of parental resources without taking into account school inputs.



























In this way, two different educational trajectories are possible (Proposition 8). However, the esti-
mation of the impact of younger versus older enrollment depends upon estimating of the impact
of schooling on cognitive production functions with different returns due to differences in mental
capacity. That is, estimating the causal effect of school is not clear due to the efficiency of the
brain early in formal schooling. Ceteris paribus the mental capacity, the causal effect of schooling
on cognitive achievement is the differences between those who enter older and those who enter
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younger.
Due to the fundamental problem of causal inference, the empirical strategy cannot be estimated for
child i. Thus, the empirical strategy is to consider the average treatment on the treated effect. The
estimation of the treatment on the treated effect is summarized in Equation 4.25:









S(A)′+ τ1S3(A8)+ εisa (4.25)
The differences in the education production function between these two options is equal to the dif-
ferences in the returns to parental investment conditional on attending school at age 6 βiS1,6−βi,6,
plus the differences in returns to parental inputs at the same age but different grades βiS2,7 −
βiS1,7,βiS3,8−βiS2,8. In addition to the differences in returns to schooling within grade with dif-
ferent mental efficiencies τiS1,6− τiS1,7,τiS2,7− τiS2,8, plus the return to 3rd grade relative to age
8 (τ1S3). In this setting, The return to education assumes non-negative relation with age, thus in
principle this difference τiS1,6− τiS1,7,τiS2,7− τiS2,8 should be negative.
The Age Effect in third grade -
Empirical evidence evaluates another counterfactual so as to understand the effect of age and
schooling for a child with these two options. That is, it supposed that test score differences by
age within a grade reflect an age-at-test effect. Another assumption is required to estimate the
causal effect in this case. Within grade, the oldest and youngest below to two different chrono-
logical cohorts. Here, it is assumed these cohorts are equal in expectation. Equation 4.26 depicts
the difference of test scores between those who are in the same grade but start one year apart. The
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difference comprises the return to family resources with the older child out of school βi,6 plus the
differences in returns to family resources conditional on each grade attended plus the returns to
schooling to each grade and the effect of age at test. The differences in returns to education to each
grade are expected to be positive due to age differences.












According to Elder and Lubotsky (2009), the estimation of these effects should include not only the
age at test but also the entry age and the time in school: “The test score differences by age within a
grade reflect both the effect of kindergarten entrance age on scores and the effect of current age on
test scores. It’s not generally possible to separate these effects since entrance age, current age, and
accumulated schooling are perfect collinear among track children” (p. 647). In fact, Black et al.
(2008) argue that “ Most of the literature has compared test scores of children who are in the same
grade and so has in fact estimated the combined effects of school starting age and age (at the test)
” (p. 3). According with equation 4.26, the comparison between the oldest and youngest (even in
an experimental procedure) may overestimate the age-at-test effect (in the previous equation is γ9)
if there is no information on past and current decision rules by parents and schools. That is, this
equation shows the accumulated effect of age on learning in third grade which includes the direct
age-at-test effect, and indirect effects conditional on age since formal schooling started.
From this theoretical perspective, the practice of “red-shirting” mentioned earlier influences not
only direct entry-age and age-at-test effects, but also influences family and school inputs during
the extra year out of school. While this debate centers on how individuals can benefit most from
school and personal experiences, the issues are enriched by incorporating all the effects of a policy
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not just the effect of mental capacity. Under equation 4.26 redefines this concept into a combined
cluster of factors conditional on one year of delayed formal schooling. Yet discussion of “red-
shirting” is more common in the United States since other countries have different practices of
eligibility and admission. For example in Israel, Lavy et al. (2012) points out, “ The Ministry
protocol specifies that the kindergarten psychologist and teachers are in charge of identifying those
children who are not ready for entry to 1st grade and who would rather spend an extra year in
kindergarten” (p. 3).
This theoretical discussion also needs to be extended, however, to incorporate the effect of delaying
school entrance on other school inputs which also impact learning. In particular, researchers have
studied, without a theoretical framework, the effect of relative age as a result of delayed school en-
trance practices or as a result of changes in the cut-off age. The principal argument is that changes
in school-entry age change the relative age in the classroom, which is defined as the differences in
age between individuals who perform an activity in a group (Barnsley and Thompson, 1988). This
occurs when a child’s delayed enrollment increases the child’s absolute age and modifies the rela-
tive age of the group (Black et al., 2008; McEwan and Shapiro, 2008). Lavy et al. (2012) argue that
peer effects are important school inputs that affect student performance in school, and therefore
changes in relative age may impact peer learning. Some authors claim that the effect of relative age
on student performance may favor the oldest students (Deming and Dynarski, 2008). For example,
Bedard and Dhuey (2006) argue that “ Relative age differences at the start of formal schooling may
therefore be long-lasting if relatively older students are better positioned to accumulate more skills
in the early grades because their maturity advantage increases the likelihood that they are selected
for more advanced curriculum groups or because they progress through a common curriculum at
a faster rate”. In this way, relative age may change individual opportunities for the youngest and
oldest children (Barnsley and Thompson, 1988).
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Pursuing the effects of relative age further, Elder and Lubotsky (2009) agree that “ There are sev-
eral reasons why the average age of a class may influence student outcomes. First, an older class
may have fewer disruptions or allow a teacher to focus on more advanced material. Second, the
achievement or behavior of older students may have a positive spillover effect on younger students.
Alternatively, a child’s own age may matter only through its effect on the child’s location in the
classroom age distribution” (p. 651).
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Chapter 5
The Educational Disadvantages of the
Indigenous Population of México and its
consequences
5.1 Introduction
Es mas facil uniformar y emparejar,
que integrar armonicamente. El
ideal es un México integro
Sáenz (1939)
In México, indigenous peoples are—and have been—the most disadvantaged population since the
times of the Spanish conquest. (Ramirez, 2006). According to Sáenz (1939), being indigenous in
México is not only a racial or biological classification; being indigenous is a social condition. The
persistent poverty that the indigenous population faces is one of the most critical challenges con-
fronting economic development in México. Despite significant improvements in the educational
coverage and average educational attainment over the past several decades, considerable differ-
ences remain between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. First, illiteracy and drop-out
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rates continue to be substantially higher among indigenous families. Second, among indigenous
families, children are less prepared to start formal education. Third, educational opportunities
(i.e., access, learning environments, outcomes, and transitions to subsequent educational levels),
are fewer. Finally, even when educationally successful, indigenous peoples do not receive the same
monetary returns to their investments in education as do non-indigenous peoples.
This chapter analyzes educational inequities between indigenous and on-indigenous populations
and their socioeconomic consequences. Section 5.2 describes the data. Education inequities are
discussed at length in Section 5.3. Additionally, Section 5.4 analyzes poverty and income dis-
parities in México while Section ?? reviews how these economic conditions relate to educational
contexts. Section 5.5 details the monetary returns accrued through investments in education. Fi-
nally, Section 5.6 concludes with policy suggestions for improving the educational condition of
the indigenous population of México.
5.2 Data and Demographics
For most of the rest of the 20th century the only criterion used by the government to identify
indigenous people was language. The single focus on the linguistic capability of the population
as an indicator of ethnicity, however, has a number of limitations. It was not until 1997 that a
National Employment Survey used self-perception, in addition to language, as a means to identify
indigenous people. And it was not until 2000 that self-perception was reintroduced as an indicator
of ethnicity to the National Population Census. Since 2008, the National Income and Consumption
Survey identifies Indigenous population by the linguistic capability of the population and self-
identification.
Ethnic identity is a complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to language alone. In the case
155
of Mexico, however, language spoken is perhaps the most reliable and objective proxy for eth-
nicity. In addition, it is the only indicator of ethnicity that allows us to analyze historic trends.
In the present analysis, all the speakers of an indigenous language 5 year of age or older were
counted as indigenous. In addition, all individuals that are part of a household where the house-
hold head or his/her spouse speak an indigenous language were also counted as indigenous. The
self-identification criterion was not used because it does not allow for inter-temporal comparisons.
The indigenous population of Mexico is predominantly rural (communities with fewer than 15,000
inhabitants). In terms of geographical distribution, the indigenous population is primarily concen-
trated in the southern region of the country.
The current analysis relies on data from the National Income and Consumption Survey (Encuesta
Nacional Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, ENIGH) which, for the first time in 2008 and then
2010 identified indigenous populations by two criteria: the linguistic capability of the population
and self-identification. The ENIGH survey is carried out biannually and collects information on
household income (including property rentals and public transfers), education and employment at
the national level in both urban and rural areas. Following the poverty measure methodology de-
veloped by CONEVAL, the survey provides detailed household expenditures for education, which
improves over the data available in previous studies, which includes instead general education ex-
penditures on education.
An indigenous variable was constructed from the survey by using a technique which combines
the indigenous variable in the survey and household membership. This contrasts with previous
studies which did not have access to data with a variable that could be used to identify an indige-
nous person and, instead, relied on geographical considerations, identifying people who reside in
“indigenous municipalities”—where at least 30% of the population speak an indigenous language.
Previous ENIGHs (1989-2006) indeed lacked a variable identifying indigenous people, but through
matching methods researchers were able to impute the likelihood that an individual or family was
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indigenous by their geographical location. This matching method has a natural bias since it fo-
cuses on the characteristics of indigenous individuals who live in municipalities with high density
of indigenous populations. The data set used in this chapter, however, includes individuals who
live in all types of municipalities, including municipalities which do not have a huge percentage
of indigenous people. The analysis below is performed using the indigenous criterion asked in
ENIGH 2008 and 2010.
In addition to more accurately representing indigenous populations, the ENIGH 2010 data tracked
multiple sources of income. Total current income was defined as the sum of two components:
monetary and non-monetary. Monetary income includes wages, income from self-employed or
entrepreneurial activities, income from cooperative societies, businesses, and firms, rent of non-
domicile properties or assets, and transfers. Non-monetary income includes production for own,
in-kind payments, and the estimated value of renting a domicile home. In order to properly express
the value of income and expenditures (for non-monetary income), deflation rates for income and
expenditures were independently specified. Moreover, for the purpose of this study, indigenous
communities were analyzed because they are more similar in both characteristics (infrastructure,
schools, production, etc.) and in outcomes than non-indigenous communities. Other data is drawn
from the indigenous criterion surveyed in ENIGH 2008 and 2010. The main sources of educational
data were from the Mexican Ministry of Education, which collects a range of information, from
assessment data to household characteristics along with national, state and type of school modality
representativeness.
In addition to the data obtained from ENIGH 2008 and 2010, this chapter uses educational data
from the Mexican Ministry of Education, which collects a range of information, from assessment
data to household characteristics along with national, state and type of school modality. In order
to track their data, the Ministry of Education issues each school a number which, in turn, allows
researchers to identify schools across different data sets. In addition, each student is associated with
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a single unique code. This dual-code system allows data from many diverse sets to be aggregated
and analyzed.
The present study also uses information from fourteen rounds of the School Census Data (SCD).
The SCD specifies the geographic location of schools, the distributions of age in each grade, the
percentage of 1st graders who attended kindergarten, and general information regarding teachers
and school facilities.
As for data on student characteristics, including student achievement, this study relies on the data
provided by ENLACE (Evaluación Nacional de Logro Académico en Centros Escolares). The
ENLACE test is a census-based assessment which examines student performance in mathematics
and Spanish. In connection to ENLACE, selected schools were given two questionnaires—one for
principals and one for students—to complete. All in all, the ENLACE tests and the ENLACE sur-
veys provide a comprehensive data base covering students from the 3rd to the 9th grade, including
student and parental characteristics.
5.2.1 Indigenous population
In México, indigenous populations have two main geographic characteristics: most indigenous
households live in concentrated areas and they tend to reside as well in rural communities. Of the
entire indigenous population, only 28% live in urban areas. As Ramirez (2006) argues, “The high
concentration of indigenous populations in rural areas is even more marked for the monolingual
indigenous population” (p. 152).
The majority of indigenous people in México live in rural areas in the south of the country. By
way of comparison, while more than 50% of the indigenous population lived in rural communities
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with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants in 2010 only 25% of the overall Mexican population lived in
such small communities. This percentage increases to a full 70% when the community numbers
15,000—almost double the comparable national average of only 39%. These indigenous areas
are principally located in Chiapas (32%), Yucatan (51%), Oaxaca (43%), Quintana Roo (35%),
Campeche (24%) and Tabasco (5%) (see Table 5.22 in Annex).
The composition and characteristics of the indigenous household differs from the rest of the pop-
ulation. The indigenous household has more family members and, on average, more children (see
annex 5.27). In fact, 19 percent of non-indigenous households were managed by a female head
of the household, while only 14 percent in indigenous communities (above 70 percent indigenous
inhabitants).
In addition, Table 5.1 details how age distributions differ between indigenous and non-indigenous
households. For instance, in 2000, 60% of the Mexican population was below the age of 30 (with
no difference between indigenous and non-indigenous households). However, by 2010, only 54%
of the non-indigenous population was still below age 30; the figure for indigenous communities
remained at 60%. By the same token, the plurality of the indigenous population is aged between 4
and 15 years while 15 to 29 year olds constitute the plurality of the non-indigenous population. In
this way, indigenous households have more members and they are younger on average.
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Table 5.1: Age Distribution of Population by Municipality
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
1 2 1 2
Younger than 5 10 10.7 10.6 10.1 8.76 8.9 11.03 8.89
5 to 14 23 26.2 27.6 23.4 19.77 21.08 24.51 20.09
15 to 29 27.2 24.7 21.4 26.9 25.88 27.13 24.9 25.88
30 to 44 19.6 20.4 17.3 19.6 20.77 20.86 17.08 20.57
45 to 59 12.2 9.6 12.4 12.1 14.69 12.86 12.41 14.48
Older than 59 7.9 8.4 10.7 8 10.13 9.18 10.07 10.09
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010.
Non-Indigenous refers to 0% to 30% of indigenous in the municipality
Indigenous 1 refers to 30% to 70% of indigenous in the municipality
Indigenous 2 refers to 70% to 100% of indigenous in the municipality
5.3 Education inequities
5.3.1 Human capital endowments
Indigenous populations have faced, and continue to face, significant socioeconomic disadvantages
(Lunde et al., 2007). Indigenous children are born into poorer environments, live poorer lives and
have poorer children.
Language
The issue of language is an essential one to consider in examining the indigenous population. The
data show that the proportion of monolingual indigenous people in México has decreased at an
even faster rate than the proportion of indigenous language speakers in the population as a whole.
As Table 5.2 shows, in 1930, over half of the indigenous language speakers did not speak Span-
ish. In 2010, by contrast, only 15% of indigenous language speakers could not speak Spanish.
This trend towards bilingualism reflects the integration efforts of post-revolutionary governments,
among which bilingual education has played an important role.
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Table 5.2: Proportion of Monolingual and Bilingual indigenous people, 1930-2000
Year Indigenous Population* Monolingual % Bilingual %
1930 2,250,943 52.7 47.3
1940 2,490,909 49.7 50.3
1950 2,447,609 32.5 67.5
1960 3,030,254 36.5 63.5
1970 3,111,415 27.6 72.4
1980 5,181,038 22.7 71.4
1990 5,282,347 15.8 80.2
1995 5,483,555 14.7 84.8
2000 6,044,547 16.9 81
2010 6,695,228 14.6
Source:INEGI 2012.
The monolingual population is increasing with age; the oldest generation constitutes the highest
proportion of the monolingual populations (for more information see table in the annex).
Literacy
One of the most important skills in any society is the ability to speak—and read—the official lan-
guage. Unfortunately, these critical skills are negatively correlated with ethnicity, age and gender:
indigenous peoples are less likely to speak and read in Spanish than non-indigenous; while a sig-
nificant proportion of older people do not read and write, and women have higher illiteracy rates.
These factors can be combined to generate sharp inequities: the majority of older indigenous peo-
ple are illiterate; and, on average, indigenous males are much more literate than females.
In 2000, the illiteracy rate among the elderly living in non-indigenous municipalities (with less
than 30% of indigenous inhabitants) was 30.2%. The comparable rate within indigenous munici-
palities was 69.3%. By 2010, this illiteracy among the elderly in indigenous communities doubled.
(for within gender data, see Tables 5.23 and 5.24 in Annex ).
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Table 5.3: Literacy by Municipality
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
1 2 1 2
5 to 14 78.9 76.3 70 78.4 83.43 81.3 79.09 83.04
15 to 29 95.9 94 80.9 95.4 98.35 96.43 93.48 98
30 to 44 92.6 86 63.5 91.3 96.14 90.71 79.36 95.13
45 to 59 86.4 71.4 56.5 84.7 92.93 82.96 65.27 91.23
Older than 59 69.8 53.4 30.7 67.1 80.13 61.25 41.85 77.27
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010.
Non-Indigenous refers to 0% to 30% of indigenous in the municipality
Indigenous 1 refers to 30% to 70% of indigenous in the municipality
Indigenous 2 refers to 70% to 100% of indigenous in the municipality
Schooling
In the decade 2000-2010, Mexican schooling has expanded. In 2000, the average years of school-
ing was 8.2 years; in 2010 it reached 9.2 years. Patrinos and Metzger (2004) argue that there has
been substantial progress in raising the enrollment rates of both indigenous and non-indigenous
populations, especially in basic education. In fact, municipalities with the highest concentrations of
indigenous populations increased their schooling levels by 2.9 years. By contrast, non-indigenous
communities increased their schooling only one year. This narrowing of the schooling gap by 1.8
years, significant as it is, did not eliminate the 1.9 years of schooling difference that still exists
between these groups.
Table 5.4: Average Years of Schooling by type of Municipality
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
0% to 30% 30% to 100% 0% to 30% 30% to 100%
Ave. Years Schooling 8.31 4.55 8.18 9.33 7.4 9.15
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010.
Furthermore, between 2000 and 2010, the number of individuals aged 15 and above attending
school in México increased by 2%. In non-indigenous communities, this figure increased by only
1.8%, but in communities with the highest concentration of indigenous people, school enrollment
for this age group jumped by 5.1%. Again, while encouraging, this narrowing still leaves a 3%
gap. At this rate, ten more years would be needed to redress the imbalance.
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Table 5.5: Age Distribution of Population by Municipality
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
Population aged 15 and over 1 2 1 2
Still in school (%) 10.8 8.3 4.6 10.4 12.6 12.3 9.7 12.4
If not still in school, highest educational achievement
No Education 25 36.7 59.4 26.8 17.7 27.1 39.9 19.2
Incomplete Primary 6.2 7.6 9.7 6.4 4.5 5.5 7.6 4.7
Complete Primary 25.6 20.7 19.8 25.1 22.1 18.7 21.1 21.9
Complete Lower Secondary 25.4 23.1 6.9 24.6 27.9 25.2 19.7 27.4
Complete Upper Secondary 7.2 5.7 1.5 6.9 16.1 15.4 7.9 15.6
Complete University 10.2 6 2.7 9.7 10.6 7.4 3.6 10.1
Graduated school 0.6 0.3 0 0.5 1.2 0.7 0.2 1.1
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010.
Non-Indigenous refers to 0% to 30% of indigenous in the municipality
Indigenous 1 refers to 30% to 70% of indigenous in the municipality
Indigenous 2 refers to 70% to 100% of indigenous in the municipality
Table 5.5 illustrates human capital endowments for municipalities with different concentrations
of indigenous speakers. Municipalities with the lowest concentration of indigenous people have
higher human capital endowments. In 2000, 18% of the wealthiest population completed high
school or higher education, in contrast to a mere 4.2% among municipalities with a population of
70% or more of indigenous people. Within the latter communities, about 60% of the population
lacks schooling, and another 10% have less than a grade 6 education. By 2010, however, human
capital assets increased at all levels of education across Mexican society: 2% more completed pri-
mary school, 13% more completed 9th grade, 6.5% more completed 12th grade, and 0.9% more
completed university. Yet, educational disparities persist between indigenous and non-indigenous
communities. The former have 22.2% more inhabitants without any education and lower levels of
education.
Gender also plays a role. Among males, educational differences between indigenous and non-
indigenous have decreased over time (see Tables 5.25 and 5.26 in Annex). But for females, these
differences have actually increased. Indigenous females have the lowest levels of academic in-
struction and are consistently among the most disadvantaged groups in the country. However, in
absolute levels, the greatest advancements between 2000 to 2010 were made among this group.
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Using the ENIGH 2010 and SDC definitions of indigenous, Figure 5.1 displays educational diver-
sity by age, gender and ethnicity: Overall, males and females are about equal, older generations
are less educated than younger generations, and those in their twenties have the highest levels
of education. Yet, even among the youngest generations, the gap between indigenous and non-
indigenous, though closing, remains significant.
Figure 5.1: Average Years of Schooling by Year of Birth. Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH
Using ENIGH 2010 data, Table 5.6 shows the distribution of years of schooling among males and
females aged 15 and older for both ethnic groups. For age 15 and older, schooling is negatively
correlated with age, being female or indigenous. Combining these three factors of inequality, the
most disadvantaged individuals are the oldest indigenous females, aged 60 or older, with only 1.2
years of schooling—a gap of 9.1 years of formal education relative to non-indigenous women aged
15 to 30. Differences by ethnicity decrease for the youngest cohorts. The difference between fe-
male indigenous and non-indigenous populations aged 15 to 30 is only 1.9 years of schooling.
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Table 5.6: Average schooling by Ethnicity and Age
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
Male Female Male Female
60 and older 5.5 4.6 2.3 1.2 4.7
45 to < 60 8.8 7.7 5.1 3.5 7.9
30 to < 45 9.7 9.4 6.9 5.8 9.2
15 to < 30 9.9 10.3 8.4 8.4 10
4 to < 15 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.4 3.6
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010.
Indigenous defined as living in households where one or more
members speak an indigenous language or who identified themselves as
indigenous.
Finally, measured by the Gini coefficient, educational inequality increases with ethnicity (see Table
5.7). That is, the dispersion with respect to the mean years of schooling for indigenous populations
is greater than for non-indigenous. In addition, the education endowment has greater dispersion
for people aged 45 and older. Educational disparities have decreased among the younger cohorts.
Table 5.7: Educational Inequality, Gini Index
Gini Index
Age Indigenous Non-Indigenous All
Younger than 5 0.22 0.03 0.05
5 to 14 0.36 0.36 0.36
15 to 29 0.19 0.17 0.18
30 to 44 0.29 0.23 0.24
45 to 59 0.38 0.3 0.31
Older than 59 0.4 0.37 0.38
All 0.34 0.31 0.32
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010.
Indigenous defined as living in households where one or more
members speak an indigenous language or who identified themselves as
indigenous.
In conclusion, there is ample evidence for great disparities in human capital across ethnicity, gen-
der, age and location in México. Indigenous people, however, are the most disadvantaged group in
México.
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5.4 Economic initial conditions of Indigenous people: The poor-
est population in México
Most indigenous people live in small rural communities, often located in remote areas with limited
access to economic markets (Lunde et al., 2007). For these communities, the main source of
income is related to agricultural work.
For consistency and comparison, this study examines the incidence of poverty among munici-
palities of different indigenous concentrations using two national poverty criteria developed by
(CONEVAL, 2014), one for extreme poverty and one for moderate poverty. The extreme poverty
line is set at the per capita household income necessary to acquire basic consumption goods. The
moderate poverty line is set at an income level necessary to cover basic education, health, housing,
clothing and public transportation as well as the basic food consumption.
Table 5.8: Evolution of Poverty, 1992-2002. Head Count Index (P0)
Population 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Extreme Poor
Indigenous 70.8 69.2 83.7 65.1 85.4 68.5 68.1 51.5 55.1 51.9
Non-indigenous 18.7 17.9 33.3 29.3 20.8 14.9 14 10.5 16 16.9
Rural 35.5 36.6 52.2 51.9 42.1 34.5 27.6 24.5 31.8 29.3
Urban 13.4 9.7 26.2 21.1 12.5 11.4 11 7.5 10.6 12.6
Total 22.4 21 36.9 33.7 24.1 20.3 17.3 13.7 18.2 18.8
Poor
Indigenous 90 89.6 96.5 83.1 95.3 89.7 88.6 79.4 80.6 78.9
Non-Indigenous 49.1 52.8 67.2 60.3 50.6 46.7 44.4 39.3 45.3 49.6
Rural 64.8 71.9 80.6 74.7 69 67.3 56.9 54.7 60.8 60.8
Urban 43.8 43.2 61.4 55.4 43.5 42 41 35.6 39.7 45.5
Total 52.4 55.3 69.3 63.3 53.5 51.7 47 42.5 47.3 51.3
Patrinos and Garcı́a-Moreno (2012)
Indigenous: more than 70% indigenous
Non-Indigenous: less than 10% indigenous
Table 5.8 presents Mexican poverty trends between 1992 and 2010. During this period, the ex-
treme poverty rate declined by 3.6% while moderate poverty declined by 1.1%. In rural areas,
extreme poverty decreased by 6.2%. By contrast, extreme poverty in urban areas declined only
0.8% and moderate poverty actually increased by1.7%. As for indigenous populations, extreme
poverty among indigenous people decreased by 19% and moderate poverty by about 11% during
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this 18-year period. This reduction has not been enough, however, to bring the economic condition
of this population to match that of the general population. All in all, these numbers confirm the
findings of (Ramirez, 2006) who combined ENIGH and SCD data from 2002 to estimate poverty
at the municipal level. The author found that the extreme poverty rate in indigenous municipalities
was 68.5% and the moderate poverty rate is 89.7%.
Note, however, that according to Patrinos et al. (2012), “It is possible that the peak in indigenous
poverty observed in 2000 is partly related to a significantly lower representation of indigenous mu-
nicipalities in the sample of the 2000 ENIGH. While 17.2% of the municipalities sampled in the
2002 ENIGH had indigenous concentrations above 40% and 9.8% had indigenous concentrations
above 70%, only 6.4% of the municipalities sampled in 2000 had indigenous concentrations above
40% and only 3.6% had indigenous concentrations above 70%” (p. 8).
Table 5.9 shows that 2008 and 2010 poverty rates, compared on the basis of ethnicity and mono-
lingualism. Consistently, 94% of the monolingual population lives in poverty, while only 80% of
the bilingual population does. Language, like location and ethnicity has also become an indicator
of poverty.
Table 5.9: Poverty Distribution by ethnicity (%)
2008 2010
Indigenous Non-Indigenous Indigenous Non-Indigenous
Monolingual Bilingual All Monolingual Bilingual All
Not Poor 6% 20% 19% 49% 6% 19% 18% 45%
Poor 94% 80% 81% 51% 94% 81% 82% 55%
Extreme Poor 80% 53% 56% 19% 82% 53% 55% 20%
Overall Population 8% 92% 8% 92% 13% 87% 7% 93%
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2008 and 2010.
Indigenous defined as living in households where one or more
members speak an indigenous language or who identified themselves as
indigenous.
In general, education is an indicator of poverty. Table 5.10 depicts levels of education by economic
status and ethnic group. Indigenous populations which lack academic instruction have a poverty
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rate of 83% while comparable non-skilled, non-indigenous populations are poor at a rate of 63%.
Of course, at higher levels of education, the percentage of people living in poverty declines for
both ethnic groups.
Table 5.10: Poverty Incidence by Education Level
Indigenous Non-Indigenous
Poor Extreme Poor Poor Extreme Poor
No Education 0.83 0.45 0.63 0.19
Incomplete Primary 0.78 0.43 0.61 0.17
Complete Primary 0.75 0.32 0.49 0.09
Complete Lower Secondary 0.66 0.19 0.4 0.04
Complete Upper Secondary 0.49 0.11 0.25 0.02
Complete University 0.19 0.02 0.09 0
Graduate school 0.06 0 0.02 0
Source: Authors calculations using: ENIGH-MCS 2010.
Interpret as, ”For a given education level,
what is the percent indigenous or non-indigenous
people who will be poor?” Headcount
In order to determine the impact of increased education in reducing poverty, holding other things
constant, a logistic regression using human capital, household assets and demographics as factors
was carried out. The impact of increased schooling in reducing poverty is specified by introducing
dummy variables for various levels of schooling into the equation. These levels are: incomplete
and complete primary education, complete lower secondary education (9th grade), complete up-
per secondary (12th grade), complete university, and graduate education. The objective was to
determine the importance of these levels of education as determinants of poverty. Indigenous pop-
ulations are identified also by a dummy variable, so that the impact of being in this population on
poverty, holding other things constant, can be examined.
Tables 5.28 and 5.29 show how age, level of education, the number of working-age residents in the
household, the age of the household head, and the prevalence of non-agricultural work decrease
the probability of being poor—both in the 18-year-old and older sample as well as in the household
head sample.
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The analysis shows that the variables with the greatest negative marginal impact on poverty for
both samples are the highest levels of education: complete upper secondary, complete university
and graduate school. These levels of education have a very significant impact in reducing the prob-
ability of being poor. The results indicate that attending primary school decreases the probability
of being moderately poor by 4% relative to not attending school at all (holding other factors con-
stant at their mean levels). Similarly, completing primary education decreases the probability of
being moderately poor by 3% relative to not completing primary school. Similar trends govern
other levels of education: completing 9th grade decreases the probability of being moderately poor
by 3% relative to only completing 6th grade; completing upper middle education decreases the
probability of being moderately poor by 4% relative to only completing lower secondary educa-
tion. Post-secondary higher education decreases the probability of being moderately poor by yet
another 3% relative to only finishing high school.
Living in a rural area and working in the agriculture sector are also associated with poverty.
Salaried agricultural workers are 20% more likely to be moderately poor relative to salaried work-
ers in other sectors of the economy (holding other things constant). Even agricultural owners have
elevated rates of poverty. They are 13% more likely to be moderately poor relative to other busi-
ness owners. The worst case, however, are non-salaried agriculture workers: They are a full 25%
behind their non-agricultural peers.
The presence of children in the household also increases the probability of being poor. From an
economic perspective, every additional young person below age 16 years the probability of being
poor by 7%. This dynamic is particularly significant given the average Mexican household has 3
children under age 15—and the average indigenous household has 3.7 children below the age of
15. Finally, the possession of physical assets has always been a form of social protection, partic-
ularly for the poor. The indigenous population between 2000 and 2010 has registered significant
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progress in these areas, even when great differences continue to exist in access to services and in
the physical conditions of homes.
According to the results in Table 5.29 living in an indigenous household increases the probability
of being moderately poor by 11%. Note that this effect holds constant other factors, including
schooling, and therefore either represents the direct impact of discrimination and prejudice on
indigenous populations or the influence of factors omitted in the analysis. Nonetheless, what is
important to recognize is that, following our earlier results in this Section, increased education
can serve as a major force in reducing this poverty gap facing indigenous groups. The following
sections examine in greater detail the issue of schooling and the labor market returns to education.
5.4.1 Educational opportunities
As commented in previous sections, in the last decade, indigenous people have increased their
formal schooling, but significant educational discrepancies remain between indigenous and the
non-indigenous communities. Moreover, indigenous students face substantial challenges in terms
of the quality of their schooling (INEE, 2004). This section describes the educational opportuni-
ties available to indigenous communities in terms of access, learning environments, outcomes, and
advances to higher levels of education. The data reveals that their educational “ladder of success”
is steeper and longer as well more fractured and splintered.
Access
In México, considerable progress has been made in terms of increasing access to basic education.
In the introduction, some of the educational indicators for México were presented. Some addi-
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tional indicators are presented here, with a special focus on indigenous populations. In 2010, 96%
of the population aged 6 to 12 attended school while just 20 years earlier, the figure was 86%.
Similarly, the number of 13- to 15-year-olds who attended school increased 17% while enrollment
among older students aged 16 to 19 increased by 14% and 6% for those aged 20 to 24.
Table 5.11: Population who attend school by age cohort
1990 2000 2005 2010
6 to 12 years old 89 94 96 96
13 to 15 years old 69 77 83 86
16 to 19 years old 37 41 48 51
20 to 24 years old 16 18 21 22
Source: INEGI
In México, each educational level represents a challenge in terms of terminal efficiency. Table
5.12 depicts the drop-out rates by level of education and school year. In the last ten years, drop-out
rates for the first six grades have decreased by 1.1%. Moreover, in grades 7 to 9, drop-out rates
fell by 2.7% and high school drop-out rates decreased by 1% though still remaining above 15%.
Even technical education which traditionally has the highest drop-out rate, experienced a decrease
of 1.6% during the period 2000 to 2010.
Table 5.12: Drop out rate by education level and school term
School term Primary Secondary Technician High School
2000/2001 1.9 8.3 24.8 16.5
2001/2002 1.6 7.3 25.4 15.8
2002/2003 1.7 7.4 25.3 16.4
2003/2004 1.8 7.4 24.7 16.8
2004/2005 1.4 7.4 26 16.1
2005/2006 1.3 7.7 23.9 15.7
2006/2007 1.5 7.4 24.6 15.5
2007/2008 1.1 7.1 24.5 15.5
2008/2009 1.1 6.8 23.2 15
2009/2010 0.9 6.2 21.2 15.6
2010/2011 0.8 5.6 20.9 13.8
Source: INEGI
While drop-out rates track those students who terminate their education at a certain level, transition
rates track students as they graduate from one level and move to the next. Between 2000 and 2010,
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the number of students who finished the 6th grade but did not enroll in the 7th grade decreased
from 8.2% to 3.5%. In 2000, 81% of 9th year graduates enrolled in the 10th grade while in 2010,
this figure increased to 87%. These data demonstrate how progress has been achieved in the transi-
tion from primary to lower secondary education, but indicate vulnerabilities in the transition from
lower secondary to upper secondary.
Table 5.13: Transition rates -Percent of students who finish the previous level and enter to the next
grade













Table 5.14 presents the results of a multivariate analysis of the determinants of school participa-
tion for children/youth aged 7 to 14. The exercise carries out an econometric analysis where the
dependent variable is equal to one if the youth was enrolled in school and zero otherwise (a lin-
ear probability model). The explanatory variables included: (1) socioeconomic background of the
youth, proxied by family income (MX pesos), parental education (mother’s schooling), number
of rooms in the housing unit where the child/youth resides, presence of running water and of a
kitchen in the housing unit, (2) characteristics of the child/youth, including age, gender, number of
siblings and residence in a location of high indigenous density.
The results of the analysis for 2000, indicate that the probability of being enrolled in school in-
creases with parental education, household assets (number of rooms, water and kitchen), family
income—and simply being male. On the other hand, the probability of school participation de-
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creased with age, and with the number of siblings. By 2010, however, some of these factors were
inverted. For example, the probability of enrollment increased with age, number of siblings and
being female. These changes may reflect shifts in the costs and benefits of education for different
groups as well as cultural changes. The increasing probability of employment among girls in, for
instance, is a tendency observed in many other countries, and the results presented here reflect this
worldwide shift as applied to México.
In terms of the indigenous population, the results for 2000 show that if the child/youth resided in
an area of high concentration of indigenous people, it had higher enrollment rates, holding other
things equal. In 2010, the coefficient of location in a concentrated indigenous location is negative,
but very small in magnitude. These results suggest that, after holding family income and other
socioeconomic and student characteristics constant, being located in a concentrated indigenous
location has no negative impact on enrollment. The implication here is that, in terms of school
enrollment, the shortfall in the enrollment of indigenous children in school may be closely linked
to the lower socioeconomic status of these populations. This assumes –as is assumed here and
most of the literature does—that indigenous populations are more likely to reside in areas where
indigenous populations are concentrated.
Given the result obtained earlier, where indigenous status appears to be positively correlated with
increased poverty, even after holding constant other variables, the implication here may be that
prejudice and discrimination may not be as strong in schooling as it appears to be in income and
the labor market. But such an implication would require much more detailed analysis than the
exploratory work in this chapter.
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Table 5.14: Determinants of Schooling Participation, Entire Youth Subsample
2000 2010
Coef. S.E. Mean MFX Coef. S.E. Mean MFX
Age -0.15 0.000 *** 10.46 -0.011 0.2 0.000 *** 10.5 0.009
Male 0.1 0.001 *** 0.52 0.007 -0.03 0.001 *** 0.5 -0.001
Indigenous 0.01 0.000 *** 10.57 0.001 -0.002 0.000 *** 12.5 0.000
Mother’s Schooling 0.1 0.000 *** 5.77 0.007 -0.09 0.000 *** 7 -0.004
No. Siblings -0.07 0.000 *** 3.33 -0.005 0.1 0.000 *** 2.9 0.004
Rooms 0.12 0.001 *** 2 0.009 -0.08 0 *** 3.8 -0.004
Running water 0.24 0.001 *** 0.86 0.021 -0.1 0.002 *** 0.9 -0.005
Kitchen 0.04 0.002 *** 0.88 0.003 0.05 0.002 *** 0.9 0.002
Family Income 0 0.000 *** 1980 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 2029 0.000
Constant 2.58 0.003 *** -3.46 0.004 ***
R-square 0.1587 0.1848
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENIGH 2000 and 2010.
Ages 7 to 14.
*** 99% **95% * 90%
Indigenous Municipality is a continuous variable from 0 to 1
Learning environment
Before 2004, basic education covered only the 1st grade to the 9th grade. After the Mexican
education law was reformed in November 2002, kindergarten was introduced as a compulsory
element of basic education.
Table 5.15 shows the population of 1st graders who attended at least one year of kindergarten. In
1998, only 21% of 1st graders attending a community school went to kindergarten. By 2008, this
figure had increased by 10 percentage points. Community schools are designed for rural, isolated
communities with fewer than 100 inhabitants, and most of these communities have a very high pro-
portion of indigenous people. Indeed, most indigenous schoolchildren attend either compensatory
or indigenous schools. So, the increased proportion of community school first grade entrants with
kindergarten is likely to apply to indigenous populations as well. But although it shows progress,
note that the overall percentage is very small: less than one third of children in community schools
entered first grade having being in a kindergarten, compared with 88% in the general public school
population. The remaining gap is huge.
Additional information on the participation of indigenous children in kindergarten is given by the
data for schools that are catalogued explicitly as indigenous schools. In 1998, 56% of indigenous
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1st graders had attended a kindergarten. But by 2010, access to kindergarten for this population
increased by 16 percentage points. So, these data again show progress in the enrollment of indige-
nous children in Kindergarten. At the same time, significant disparities remain between indigenous
schools and the general public school population. The 72% figure for the percentage of new en-
trants into indigenous schools who have had Kindergarten in 2008, is much lower than the 88% for
general schools.
These disparities create different starting points which in turn lead to different learning outcomes
later in the children’s school life.
Table 5.15: Percent of first enterers to basic education with some kindergarten
Type of school
Community General Indigenous
1998 0.21 0.73 0.56
1999 0.15 0.74 0.59
2000 0.17 0.74 0.6
2001 0.19 0.76 0.59
2002 0.2 0.77 0.6
2003 0.3 0.81 0.63
2004 0.28 0.83 0.65
2005 0.3 0.85 0.69
2006 0.35 0.88 0.71
2007 0.36 0.88 0.72
2008 0.31 0.88 0.72
Source: School Census – México, 1998-2008
Age-grade distortion Previous chapters in this dissertation have discussed the issue of school
delay, overage and their consequences. A substantial amount of literature shows that the most
productive time to learn is relatively early in the life cycle and that school systems that have sub-
stantial portions of the student population with school delay may be impacting negatively on its
students. Indeed, the literature on the long-term effects on education, achievement, fertility and
even infant mortality rates underwritten by standardized entry policies speak to the importance of
uniform school entry rules McCrary and Royer (2011); Dobkin and Ferreira (2010); Black et al.
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(2008); Angrist and Pischke (2008). Age diversity can impact learning negatively in the classroom
as age heterogeneity can present many pedagogical challenges to teachers.
Table 5.16 shows how compensatory and indigenous schools have more students beginning school
at non-standard ages. While some progress in community and indigenous schools has occurred
between 1998 and 2008, the gap between indigenous students and students in private and general
public schools remains, symptomatic of systemic inequities.
Table 5.16: Percent of First graders by school type
First graders six years and below
Compensatory Indigenous General
1998 0.54 0.74 0.9
1999 0.57 0.76 0.91
2000 0.47 0.78 0.91
2001 0.57 0.79 0.92
2002 0.59 0.79 0.92
2003 0.64 0.82 0.93
2004 0.69 0.84 0.93
2005 0.7 0.86 0.94
2006 0.61 0.85 0.94
2007 0.61 0.85 0.94
2008 0.72 0.86 0.94
Source: School Census – México, 1998-2008
Table 5.17 presents age distortion within classrooms, using ENIGH data on the indigenous pop-
ulation. Whereas approximately 29% of non-indigenous 1st graders are older than the rest of the
students in class, 40% of indigenous students are older than their classmates.
As an equity policy in the public education system, indigenous schools have a bilingual curricu-
lum. However, a recent and on-going qualitative and quantitative study of intercultural bilingual
education in México reveals that the actual degree of bilingual education—even in indigenous
schools—is low and varies widely from one school to another (Yonker Vales, 2004). Moreover,
Ramirez (2006) argues that there are many practical obstacles to bilingual education in terms of
textbooks, subjects and the 62 indigenous languages and many dialects present in México.
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Table 5.17: Age-grade Distortion by Sub-groups
Indigenous Non-indigenous All
1st grade 0.44 0.29 0.31
2nd grade 0.46 0.35 0.36
3rd grade 0.52 0.38 0.39
4th grade 0.5 0.38 0.39
5th grade 0.43 0.33 0.34
6th grade 0.46 0.33 0.34
Source: ENIGH-MCS 2010
Defined as percent of students who are more than one year behind
the age that is appropriate for their grade. Appropriate ages:
1st grade (6 years old); 2nd grade (7 years old); 3rd grade (8 years old), etc
In conclusion, the discussion so far shows that although equity of access to basic education in
México on the basis of ethnicity may not be an acute concern, inequities prior to formal school-
ing, gaps in transition rates between grades and drop-out percentages continue to disproportionally
burden indigenous populations. Issues related to age-heterogeneity and bilingual education serve
to further compound these factors.
Outcomes
In the first six grades of formal education, national test scores indicate comparatively poor per-
formance among children in indigenous and compensatory schools. Figure 5.2 illustrates some of
these disparities among 6th graders in México. The data shows math tests scores by school type,
as obtained from ENLACE. The observed disparities between community and indigenous schools,
which serve moist of the indigenous population, and general schools remain over time and in other
grades.
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Figure 5.2: Sixth grade math scores by school type in the National achievement test (ENLACE)
Test scores have generally risen over time in México and this applies as well to indigenous stu-
dents. Over a period of five school years, 3rd graders in indigenous schools improved by 0.57 s.d.,
with the greatest increase occurring among 3rd graders. By contrast, 3rd graders in compensatory
schools increased only 0.19 s.d. Private and general public schools were in the middle, increasing
by 0.37 s.d. and 0.47 s.d., respectively. In this way, the gap between indigenous schools and pri-
vate and general public schools was reduced by 0.16 s.d. to 0.20 s.d. over five years. By the same
token, 4th graders in indigenous schools improved by 0.49 s.d., comparable or greater to the 0.49
s.d. increase in private schools, and the 0.40 increase in general schools. A similar pattern occurs
among 5th and 6th graders.
All in all, indigenous school math scores increased more than compensatory school math scores
during this period. Nevertheless, as the data clearly shows, consistent disparities remain. As for




An important national assessment is mandated for a sample of Mexican students at age 15. Stu-
dents sit for the international standardized PISA exam covering math, science and reading. In this
evaluation, the indigenous population of México amounts to only 2.6% of test-takers. Like other
assessment measures, Table 5.18 illustrates the comparatively low achievement among indigenous
students. In PISA 2009, the average math score for indigenous students was below the minimum
achievement level (Level 1). In fact, the learning gap between indigenous and non-indigenous
Mexican students was 0.8 s.d.—the same amount México scored below the average of all OECD
countries. These test score gaps cross all academic skills. In particular, indigenous students at
age 15 years are one full standard deviation behind the rest of the population in reading. Yet these
indigenous students who sit for the PISA exam at age 15 are among the best: They have persevered
through at least seven years of formal education while others have dropped out.
The wider gap in test scores at age 15 suggests that the inequality in learning outcomes on the basis
of ethnicity increases after the end of basic education.
Table 5.18: México: Inequities in PISA achievement for the enrolled population
Average Score
Math Spanish Science
Total 419 425 416
Girls 412 438 413
Boys 425 413 419
Wealthiest 50% 444 453 442
Poorest 50% 396 400 393
Spanish speakers 422 429 419
Indigenous 342 327 338
Source: PISA 2009
These learning inequalities cross all academic skills. In particular, indigenous students at age 15
years are one full standard deviation behind the rest of the population in reading. Yet these in-
digenous students who sit for the PISA exam at age 15 are among the best: They have persevered
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through at least seven years of formal education while others have dropped out. Better results
might be expected on this basis alone, but De Hoyos et al. (2012) argue that the determinants of
cognitive learning for indigenous high school students in México have a significant but regrettably
negative correlation with math learning. This coefficient is a negative 0.5 s.d. for indigenous stu-
dents while their non-indigenous peers have less negative—and even positive—coefficients.
5.5 The use of education in the labor markets: Returns to school-
ing investments
Differences in earnings are known to exist between indigenous and non-indigenous populations.
As noted earlier, the existing empirical studies on the determinants of wages on the basis of eth-
nicity in México cannot identify indigenous individuals explicitly, so they have looked at income
or earnings differences between indigenous and non-indigenous municipalities, where indigenous
municipalities are defined as municipalities where 30 % or more of the population is indigenous.
This is the criterion used in Table 5.19. This Table shows the mean monthly earnings by munici-
pality. In 2000, individuals living in non-indigenous municipalities earned three times more than
those living in indigenous municipalities. Following what appears to be the “recession pattern”. In
2010, this gap fell to just greater than two times.
Table 5.19: Mean Earnings by Municipality
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous Non-Indigenous Indigenous
All 3601 1935 1136 3553 9163 7580 4119 8844
Male 3912 2201 1486 3853 9436 7894 4232 9115
Female 2952 1516 1080 2925 8912 7285 4019 8596
Source: ENIGH 2000 and 2010
Universe: all employed individuals. Earnings in last month
The 2010 data makes possible the identification of indigenous populations on the basis of language.
This chapter makes use of the availability of these data to compute in more detail earnings gaps
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on the basis of ethnicity. On this basis, Table 5.19 shows average monthly income across age cat-
egories for indigenous and non-indigenous groups. In 2010, the indigenous population aged 20 to
29 earned more than the rest of the indigenous population, but still 41% less than non-indigenous
earners of the same age. The Table also reveals another interesting fact: While non-indigenous
earners actually earned less in 2010 than 2008, indigenous income remained almost constant—an
indication that indigenous incomes were more resilient than their non-indigenous counterpart dur-
ing the recent recession, an observation worthy of further research.
The present study uses the recent data identifying indigenous people to compute earnings differ-
ences on the basis of education. As expected, wage earnings are positively correlated with school-
ing. In 2008, non-indigenous university graduates earn four times more than non-indigenous work-
ers without any education. By comparison, indigenous university graduates earn between four and
five times their uneducated peers. Two years later, in 2010, non-indigenous university graduates
earn between three and four times more than non-indigenous workers lacking similar education
while indigenous university graduates earn five times their uneducated peers.
So while there are clear returns on educational investments for both indigenous and non-indigenous
workers, the payoffs are not equal. At all levels of education, indigenous people earn less than
non-indigenous. For example, in 2008, the wage gap for indigenous versus non-indigenous with
a university degree was 39%; in 2010, this gap decreased to 19% (likely, though, because non-
indigenous incomes fell rather than indigenous incomes rising). Even within the same sector,
indigenous workers make less than their non-indigenous peers (though, again, the 8% 2008-2010
reduction in the difference probably reflects non-indigenous setbacks rather than indigenous gains).
A few studies have estimated the returns to schooling by ethnicity in México. Most have used data
based upon indigenous municipalities (as determined by the 30% rule defined above) due to a lack
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of direct indigenous data (see Panagides 1994, Ramirez 2006). By contrast, Panagides (1994) esti-
mated an earnings function using a household survey completed by individuals from two different
indigenous areas (high versus low concentrations). In his analysis, Panagides attributed earnings
differences to labor market discrimination as well as human capital differences. In 1989, the re-
turns to schooling were lower for indigenous municipalities but they were close to each other for
the two groups: high concentration municipalities had an 8.7% rate of return to a year of schooling
while low concentration municipalities exhibited a 9.3% rate of return. However, updating the
data, Ramirez (2006) found that the rates of return to education for these two populations had di-
verged even more over time. By 2002, returns to schooling in non-indigenous areas had increased
but remained constant in indigenous areas. Like Panagides, Ramirez concluded that discrimination
plays an important factor in these disparities.
Table 5.20 summarizes estimates obtained from Mincerian earnings functions carried out sepa-
rately for indigenous and non-indigenous municipalities. During the last ten years, the rate of
return to education among indigenous municipalities has increased 1% while it decreased by 3%
for non-indigenous municipalities. For indigenous workers, the recent increase on returns may be
somewhat surprising. Still, this increase is arguably consistent with human capital theory. Since the
rate of return analysis does not include quality of schooling, the rising coefficients on education for
indigenous municipalities may be reflecting the rewards to the greater quality of schooling
Table 5.20 summaries Mincerian earnings functions by indigenous municipalities. The estimated
rates of return are higher than what might be expected—given the expansion of schooling in re-
cent years, a source of potential dilution. During the last ten years, the rate of return on education
among indigenous individuals has increased 1% while it decreased by 3% for indigenous individ-
uals (perhaps because the average years of schooling among non-indigenous has, itself, increased
by one full year). For indigenous workers, the recent increase on returns is somewhat surprising
given the rapid expansion of schooling years for this population. Still, this increase is arguably
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consistent with human capital theory. Recall that indigenous schools improved the most over time,
by more than 0.5 s.d. in test scores. If markets are supposed to reward improvements like this,
then it makes sense that returns on education would reflect this dynamic—small but comforting
evidence that human capital theory is applicable in the real world with real data. The fact that
returns for non-indigenous municipalities decreased by 3% in the same period 2000-2010 must be
left for another day of analysis.
Table 5.20: Returns to Schooling by Municipality
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
(0% to 30%) (30% to 100%) (0% to 30%) (30% to 100%)
Returns to Schooling 13% 14% 13% 10% 15% 10%
Ave. Years Schooling 8.3 4.6 8.2 9.3 7.4 9.2
Source: ENIGH 2000 and 2010
The analysis in this dissertation uses the Oaxaca-Blinder technique, which is used in labor eco-
nomics to decompose earnings gaps between different groups in society and to estimate the role of
discrimination in explaining those gaps. More specifically, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is
used to specify the relative role of different factors explaining the earnings gap between minority
groups and the majority group in the country. In the present case, it is used to examine the de-
terminants of the earnings gap between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. The method
decomposes the gap into two parts: one part that represents variations in individual endowments of
productive attributes or characteristics, and a second part that reflects the impact of differences in
rates of return to those characteristics, which is often associated with the effects of discrimination.
This decomposition assumes that in the absence of discrimination the estimated effects of individ-
uals’ endowments on the labor market are identical for each group. In addition, it assumes that
discrimination is revealed by differences in the estimated coefficients of the earnings equations.
Table 5.21 shows the coefficients of the Oaxaca-Blinder estimation.
But even with economic vagaries which sometimes impact non-indigenous populations worse than
indigenous populations, and despite decades-long educational advances, indigenous peoples will
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continue to lag behind non-indigenous counterparts so long as their schooling is not equal and
discrimination in the workplace may exist.
Table 5.21: Decomposition of Ethnic Earnings Differential, Indigenous Municipality
2000 2010
Percent of the differential due to differences in
Endowments Wage structure Endowments Wage structure
All pop 62.2 37.8 77 23
Men 65.6 34.4 71.3 28.7
Women 66.2 33.8 84.7 15.3
Source: ENIGH 2000 and 2010
5.6 Conclusions
Me declaro a favor del pluralismo
cultural, integrado por el concepto
de una Patria grande y ligado por
un sistema economico justo, a la
vez que eficaz
Sáenz (1939)
This chapter has documented the wide inequalities that exist between indigenous and non-indigenous
populations in education, in poverty and in the labor market. Although some progress has been
achieved in some indicators, huge inequities remain.
Consider poverty: the percentage of families in extreme poverty residing in municipalities where
indigenous populations are concentrated dropped from 70.8% to 51.9% between 1992 and 2010,
while the equivalent change for non-indigenous municipalities was from 18.7% to 16.9%. So, al-
though progress has been made, the gap in poverty rates between indigenous and non-indigenous
populations remains huge.
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In terms of educational attainment, municipalities with the highest concentrations of indigenous
populations increased their schooling levels by 2.9 years between 2000 and 2010. By contrast,
non-indigenous communities increased their schooling only one year. But this narrowing of the
schooling gap by 1.8 years did not eliminate the average schooling difference that still exists be-
tween these groups, which remains at approximately two years.
In terms of participation in Kindergarten, the percentage of students who are overage, and the av-
erage student achievement as measured by a variety of tests, indigenous children lag substantially
below non-indigenous children. The analysis in this paper suggests that these differences in edu-
cation quantity and quality partly explain the income and poverty gaps computed in this chapter.
Rates of return to education estimated as part of this research are high for both indigenous and
non-indigenous groups.
The inequities documented in this chapter require policy actions. From a humanist point of view,
humans deserve a complete life which includes not only biological development—freedom from
deprivation– but also psychological development—freedom to reason, choose and act (Kaushik
and Lòpez-Calva, 2011). This is why Sen (1999) argues that governments should not seek to
equalize resources. Governments should aim to equalize human capabilities. That is, what people
are able to be and to do. In this way, schooling represents a social-wide investment in human capi-
tal. And while schooling entails a variety of opportunity costs in the form of forgone earnings and
expenses (tuition, books, uniforms, etc.), the rates of return—including the indigenous population
of México—indicates such investments are indeed worthwhile.
The goal, then, of México’s education system should be to provide learners equal opportunities to
fulfill themselves. There are four commonly used criteria to inform decision-making regarding re-
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source mobilization and allocation: adequacy, equity, equality and efficiency (Benson 1995, Cohn
and Geske 1990). Given the state of indigenous education in México, specific policies must be
designed and implemented to increase bilingual education, school choice for indigenous students,
and greater integration between indigenous and non-indigenous communities to reduce inequali-
ties and accelerate economic development. There is no doubt that progress in these areas has been
realized since the Mexican revolution, but the relative disparities between indigenous and non-
indigenous communities remain stubbornly persistent.
Today, México needs to be an integrated country to reduce inequalities and boost economic devel-
opment. Education is a necessary tool of this integration by supplying more equal initial conditions
and by providing skill acquisition in a cultural diverse learning environment. Indigenous children,
in particular, those in age to attend school, are not guilty of their poor learning performance. It is
a failure of society and its educational system.
5.6.1 Tables and Figures
186
Table 5.22: E Population Distribution by State in México
percent of ethnic group in given state Non-indigenous Indigenous
Aguascalientes 0.99 0.01
Baja California 0.96 0.04




















Quintana Roo 0.65 0.35










Table 5.23: Male Educational Achievement by Municipios
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
Population aged 15 and over 1 2 1 2
Still in school (%) 11.3 8 7 11 13.2 12.9 10.7 13
If not still in school, highest educational achievement
No Education 23.6 34.3 54.6 25.2 16.3 23.3 35.8 17.6
Incomplete Primary 5.7 8.6 10.8 6.1 4.4 4.6 8.2 4.6
Complete Primary 25.2 19.6 22.2 24.8 22.3 19.3 22.8 22.2
Complete Lower Secondary 24.8 22.5 7.2 24.1 28.7 28.6 21.6 28.3
Complete Upper Secondary 7.2 8 1.9 7 15.3 15.6 7.7 14.9
Complete University 12.6 6.5 3.3 12 11.6 7.7 3.6 11
Graduated school 0.9 0.5 0 0.9 1.5 0.9 0.3 1.4
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010. Non-Indigenous refers to 0% to 30% of indigenous in the municipality, Indigenous 1
refers to 30% to 70% of indigenous in the municipality, Indigenous 2 refers to 70% to 100% of indigenous in the municipality
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Table 5.24: Female Educational Achievement by Municipios
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
Population aged 15 and over 1 2 1 2
Still in school (%) 10.3 8.6 2.3 10 12.05 11.74 8.74
If not still in school, highest educational achievement
No Education 26.3 39 63.8 28.2 18.9 30.6 43.5 20.7
Incomplete Primary 6.6 6.6 8.8 6.6 4.7 6.3 7.1 4.9
Complete Primary 25.9 21.7 17.6 25.4 21.8 18.2 19.7 21.6
Complete Lower Secondary 25.8 23.7 6.5 25.1 27.3 22.1 18 26.6
Complete Upper Secondary 7.2 3.5 1.2 6.8 16.8 15.2 8.1 16.3
Complete University 8 5.5 2.2 7.7 9.7 7.1 3.6 9.2
Graduated school 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.8
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010. Non-Indigenous refers to 0% to 30% of indigenous in the municipality, Indigenous 1
refers to 30% to 70% of indigenous in the municipality, Indigenous 2 refers to 70% to 100% of indigenous in the municipality
Table 5.25: Male Literacy by Municipality
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
Age 1 2 1 2
5 to 14 77.9 71.8 68.1 77.2 83.05 82.44 78.21 82.69
15 to 29 97 93.2 83.3 96.5 97.88 97.68 94.09 97.67
30 to 44 92.6 90.4 71.3 91.8 96.42 93.88 83.87 95.75
45 to 59 88.4 80.9 61.4 87.2 94.7 89.66 76.1 93.61
Older than 59 73.7 64 35.1 71.3 83.79 71.88 57.11 81.78
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010. Non-Indigenous refers to 0% to 30% of indigenous in the municipality, Indigenous 1
refers to 30% to 70% of indigenous in the municipality, Indigenous 2 refers to 70% to 100% of indigenous in the municipality
Table 5.26: Female Literacy by Municipality
2000 2010
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
Age 1 2 1 2
5 to 14 79.8 80.8 71.9 79.6 83.85 80.12 80.04 83.42
15 to 29 94.9 94.7 78.6 94.5 98.81 95.2 92.91 98.33
30 to 44 92.5 81.6 56.2 90.8 95.9 87.92 75.69 94.59
45 to 59 84.5 62.1 51.8 82.4 91.36 76.58 55.58 89.12
Older than 59 66.4 42.7 26.4 63.4 77.02 52.17 27.68 73.41
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010. Non-Indigenous refers to 0% to 30% of indigenous in the municipality, Indigenous 1
refers to 30% to 70% of indigenous in the municipality, Indigenous 2 refers to 70% to 100% of indigenous in the municipality
Table 5.27: Sample Demographics of Population by Municipios
Non-Indigenous Indigenous All Non-Indigenous Indigenous All
(0% to 30%) (30% to 70%) (70% to 100%) (0% to 30%) (30% to 70%) (70% to 100%)
Male (%) 48.0 49.4 50.7 48.1 48.7 48.9 48.8 48.8
Average Age 27.2 26.1 27.4 27.1 29.9 28.6 27.6 29.7
Urban (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.6 46.0 10.9 62.6
Married (%)–aged 15 and over only 50.6 52.2 57.5 50.9 43.8 46.2 44.5 44
Percent of Total Sample 91.4 5.3 3.4 100 90.1 4.3 5.6 100
Households 9099 596 394 10089 22232 2703 2720 27655
Sample Observations 37992 2595 1921 42508 85,241 10,219 12,321 107,781
Weigthed Population 90,036,953 5,203,960 3,321,237 98,562,150 101,594,973 4,891,777 6,252,949 112,739,699
Source:Author’s calculation using ENIGH 2000 and 2010.
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Table 5.28: Determinants of Poverty, Individuals
Independent Variable Coefficient Mean Marginal Effect
Age -0.01 *** 37.76 0
Age Squared 0 *** 1632.51 0
residents 0 to 15 years 0.16 *** 1.81 0.06
residents 16 to 35 years -0.04 *** 2.1 -0.02
residents 36 to 65 years -0.05 *** 1.77 -0.02
residents 66 years and older 0.05 *** 0.31 0.02
Incomplete Primary -0.09 *** 0.04 -0.04
Complete Primary -0.32 *** 0.21 -0.13
Complete Lower Secondary -0.6 *** 0.29 -0.23
Complete Upper Secondary -1 *** 0.19 -0.35
Complete University -1.66 *** 0.12 -0.46
Graduated school -2.22 *** 0.02 -0.5
Worker without salary 0.24 *** 0.14 0.1
Worker salary -0.03 *** 0.67 -0.01
Agricultural owner 0.34 *** 0.01 0.13
Agricultural worker without salary 0.69 *** 0.06 0.25
Agricultural worker salary 0.54 *** 0.08 0.2
Indigenous Household 0.32 *** 0.1 0.12
Year 0.15 *** 0.5 0.06
Constant 0.09 ***
State Dummies Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.37
Pseudo R-square 0.22
N 186,644
Logit regression; dependent variable takes on values of 0 and 1 (dummy variable) indicating whether person is poor
Source: ENIGH-MCS 2008 and 2010
Table 5.29: Determinants of Poverty, Households
Coefficient Mean Marginal Effect
Age 0 *** 43.23 0
Age Squared 0 *** 2007.27 0
residents 0 to 15 years 0.18 *** 1.8 0.07
residents 16 to 35 years -0.06 *** 1.81 -0.02
residents 36 to 65 years -0.06 *** 1.58 -0.02
residents 66 years and older 0.02 *** 0.19 0.01
Incomplete Primary -0.1 *** 0.05 -0.04
Complete Primary -0.31 *** 0.22 -0.11
Complete Lower Secondary -0.61 *** 0.26 -0.21
Complete Upper Secondary -1.06 *** 0.16 -0.31
Complete University -1.73 *** 0.12 -0.4
Graduated school -2.18 *** 0.02 -0.37
Worker without salary 0.31 *** 0.16 0.12
Worker salary -0.03 *** 0.62 -0.01
Agricultural owner 0.32 *** 0.02 0.12
Agricultural worker without salary 0.71 *** 0.09 0.27
Agricultural worker salary 0.49 *** 0.08 0.19
Indigenous Household 0.29 *** 0.1 0.11
Year 0.14 *** 0.5 0.05
Constant 0.14 ***
State Dummies Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.38
Pseudo R-square 0.22
N 109,452
Logit regression; dependent variable takes on values of 0 and 1 (dummy variable) indicating whether person is poor




The Mexican people have made some important advancements in education. These are reflected in
rising enrollment rates and growing educational attainment. But these successes remain tainted by
wide gaps in access to education on the basis of income and ethnicity, and by substantial challenges
in the quality o education provided by the school system.
This dissertation has presented empirical evidence and analysis of three key issues in the Mexican
education system: 1) school accountability, which was examined by studying in detail the PAE
program, a targeted intervention program pursued by the state of Colima in 2009 to identify and
address the problems of low-performing schools, 2) age delay, which is a major phenomenon in
the school system of México, and the effects of a national reform introduced in 2006-2007 that
reduced the first grade entry age across all Mexican states, and 3) the educational disadvantages
of indigenous peoples in México and their consequences, which are analyzed through the use of
recent data allowing individual identification of this population.
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Accountability Reforms and the PAE. In chapter 3, the dissertation conducted an evaluation
of the Programa de Atención Especı́fica para la Mejora del Logro Educativo (PAE), a targeted
state-sponsored intervention program designed to provide low-performing schools with remedial
resources in Colima, México. The research analyzed the effect of this compensatory program on
the standardized test scores of 108 participating schools having the lowest learning outcomes in
2009, comparing them with a control group of non-participating schools.
By exploiting PAE’s eligibility rules, a regression discontinuity method was used to estimate the
impact on subsequent learning outcomes. Schools that participated in the program and a valid com-
parison group were followed for three years in order to compare their performance. The fact that
the program was halted after only one year meant that the only realized interventions were those
related to the program’s preparation, which revolved around notifying schools as low-performing,
identifying a school’s main academic problems and devising a development plan to address those
challenges. Thus, the program’s effects in the short-run were confined to the impact of these in-
formational and analytical activities, and –later—to any pedagogical programs implement by the
schools on their own as a consequence of the information and analysis provided by PAE.
The results of this “natural experiment” confirm that the PAE program had a positive impact on
average test scores in poorly performing Colima schools. Despite the fact that the program was
ended after one year and therefore mostly provided information and a dissection of the educational
problems faced by students in the PAE program, after only one year, test scores in PAE schools
increased by 0.28 standard deviations vis-à-vis non-PAE schools and in fact, after three years, dif-
ferences between the two groups of schools were no longer significant.
The results presented in this chapter indicate that full and wide dissemination of information de-
tailing school quality is critically important for improving student achievement. When students,
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teachers and parents in a school know that their tests scores are low, and this triggers a process
of self-evaluation and analysis, the process itself may lead to an improvement in learning out-
comes. There may also be a motivational impact connected to the ranking of a school relative to
others, linked to the “naming and shaming” social pressure that arises from being labeled a low-
performing school. And, over time, these impacts can generate changes at the school level, with
teachers reforming their pedagogy to improve the achievement of their lowest-performing students.
According to the results of the research in this chapter, it is not so much the inputs made available
by an intervention program, but the signaling value of the program, the associated diagnosis and
networking opportunities with other school officials and advisers which result in school improve-
ments. Moreover, unlike the high-stakes consequences for schools in the United States, or the
sacking of officials in England, or the lead with your feet school choice in the Netherlands, the
policy (or at least de facto events) in Colima bore no punitive actions against school actors.
So while the PAE program in Colima was surprisingly and frustratingly short-lived, it’s prema-
ture termination serves to highlight a largely unrecognized phenomenon: acknowledgment is, in
some ways, virtually tantamount to improvement. After all, if you really understand the prob-
lem, effective solutions come much easier. If you don’t understand the problem, no amount of
“problem-solving” can be expected to work. This is why future research must focus on document-
ing how school administrators, teachers, parents and students interpret, internalize and react to
indications that their school is underperforming.
Age Delay and the Effects of Reforms in School Entry Age: Is it Better to be the Head of
the Mouse or the Tail of the Lion?. Chapter 4 of this dissertation explored the impact of school
delay on student outcomes. The study employed two identification strategies. It used an exogenous
variation in the age at which students enter school to examine the effect on ENLACE test scores. In
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addition, the research was able to incorporate into the analysis the presence of a reform in México
which allowed younger children to enter school, a policy shift that exogenously changed the age
composition of the classroom in the country
Prior to the 2006-2007 school year, the cut-off day for school entry in México had been Septem-
ber 1st. Since then, however, pupils aged 6 by as late as December 31 could start public school.
Data related to this cut-off transition were reviewed and analyzed using a regression discontinuity
method so as to estimate the causal effect of delayed school enrollment on math and Spanish test
scores of students in third grade. A two-stage least square (TSLS) estimator was used wherein the
source of identification is the variation in first grade entry ages which resulted solely from differ-
ences in dates of birth.
The results for various student cohorts and for various time periods indicate that older students
scored higher than younger students. The reform impacted the discrepancy between those regu-
lated by the new cut-off dates and those regulated by the old cut-off date(s) by 0.30 s.d. (comparing
the 1998-1999 cohort which entered school before the reform with the 2002-2003 cohort, which
entered afterwards).
The results also suggest age effects on education outcomes that are stronger for recent generations
than for generations entering first grade prior to the reform. Underlying this result is the fact that
there has been a large increase in test scores over time in México. The impact of age on schooling,
specially the changes over time in the rate of return to age in terms of student achievement, may
be connected to this trend. This requires further research as it involves analyzing the changes in
resources and choices made by schools, teachers and parents over time, which may be impacting
test scores (including pre-schooling and other reforms implemented by the government as well as
the possibility of increased cheating or teaching to the test, among many other factors).
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Because entry-age dates affect class composition, peer effects have changed for those schools af-
fected by the 2006 change in the age of entry into school. Considering the impact of the average
age of peers, students in the cohort 1998-1999 prior to the reform, who delayed school and at-
tended a class composed, on average, of older students, scored lower by 0.08 standard deviations
By contrast, the same effect after the 2006 reform was estimated to be greater, at 0.22 standard
deviations
At a policy level, the research in this study suggests that schools or states with older students will
tend to have higher tests scores. In the analysis, students enrolled in the same grade but one year
older have test scores, on average, 8 points higher in ENLACE exams respect to lower average age
classes. These results demonstrate that systematic de jure or de facto rules which influence class-
room composition may lead to differences in average test scores. And schools that vary in average
student age may have different measured student achievement just because of the age differences.
Such an issue should considering when comparing the results of tests across schools or states for
accountability purposes, if indeed there is age variation. For research purposes, it is an issue that
should also be considered in assessing private-public differences in student achievement: private
schools that have the discretion to choose older student –and exercise this discretion—may again
have higher average test scores just because of this effect.
In conclusion, the impact of age on student achievement estimated in this dissertation is positive
and significant (regardless the sample, the school year or birth cohort, the effect of school delay is
half a standard deviation or above). This result, which is the outcome of the greater maturity as
well as greater parental inputs obtained by being one year older when you enter school, suggests
that it is indeed better to be the head of the mouse than the tail of the lion. However, it should also
be emphasized that when a sizable portion of the student population delays enrollment, there are
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consequences on both students and the school system that are not measured by the impact of age
on individual student outcomes examined in this dissertation. An examination of these impacts
should be the task of future research.
At a policy level, while underage enrollment is no longer much of issue in México, overage chil-
dren remains a big a problem. Part of the problem may be connected to redshirting but it is also
related to socioeconomic status, and migration patterns (temporal and permanent). The fact that
intra-cohort peer effects are positive for those who delayed enrollment—or close to zero for those
in the same school year in public school—may suggest that children who postpone enrollment for
more than one year (overage students) should transit with children of the same age, regardless of
the grade and so called “catch-up” programs. While some non-systematic state programs exist to
address overage children, overage is an issue that deserves closer public policy attention.
The Education Status of Indigenous Populations and their Socioeconomic Consequences.
Chapter 5 presented the results of a detailed study of the educational outcomes of indigenous
populations and the socioeconomic impact of schooling. The chapter utilized data from Encuesta
Nacional Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, ENIGH) which, for the first time in 2008 and then
2010 identified indigenous populations.
The research in this chapter documented the wide gaps in socioeconomic status of indigenous and
non-indigenous populations. For instance, although the percentage of families in extreme poverty
residing in municipalities where indigenous populations are concentrated dropped between 1992
and 2010, , the gap in poverty rates between the municipalities where indigenous people concen-
trate and others remains huge, with extreme poverty in the former equal to 51.9% in 2010 and in
the latter 16.9%.
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The impact of increased education in reducing the poverty gap on the basis of ethnicity is substan-
tial. Rates of return to education in México, estimated on the basis of Mincerian empirical earnings
function carried out in this dissertation, tend to be high in México, ranging around 10%, including
those applying to indigenous populations.
Unfortunately, despite some progress in reducing educational enrollment gaps, the study showed
that the gaps in educational outcomes between indigenous and non-indigenous populations remain
wide, whether in terms of overall educational attainment, participation in Kindergarten, the per-
centage of students who are overage, and the average student achievement as measured by a variety
of tests. For instance, the results of the PISA tests for Mexican 15 year old students carried out in
2009 shows that the average math score for indigenous students was below the minimum achieve-
ment level (Level 1). In fact, the learning gap between indigenous and non-indigenous Mexican
students was 0.8 standard deviations—the same amount México scored below the average of all
OECD countries. These test score gaps occur across all the various tests in PISA, including math,
reading and science. In particular, indigenous students at age 15 years are one full standard devia-
tion behind the rest of the population in reading.
The inequities documented in this chapter require policy actions. Given that the language issue is a
significant one for indigenous population, the reform of bilingual education programs –in terms of
providing greater resources, more qualified personnel and improved pedagogical methods—may
prove to be essential. Raising pre-schooling enrollment rates among indigenous populations is
another area that should be emphasized, as any gaps at this level tend to generate a growing gap
in student outcomes later in the school system. A focus of resources and policy attention on rural
areas, where large portions of the indigenous populations live, needs to be considered. At all levels,
whether because of delayed enrollment and overage, the poor conditions at home faced by students,
the shortages of teachers and school personnel and other school inputs, etc., México’s future edu-
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cational policies need to re-focus their attention on the problems faced by its minority ethic groups.
Concluding remarks. Today, México must intensify efforts to reduce educational disadvantages
and inequalities. Among some Mexican states, inequities in schooling may be having a rebound.
This dissertation has provided research and empirical evidence in favor of a wide variety of policy
measures, as stated in the earlier discussion in the present chapter. Overall, there is a clear need for
greater coordination, information and support to local school actors by state and federal authorities.
The present study used theoretical and empirical analysis based in the field of economics of ed-
ucation to pragmatically evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of some aspects of the Mexican
education system, including some key reforms. Though not claiming to be definitive, the data and
subsequent analysis present a picture of education in México, one open to further discussion, re-
flection and, it is hoped, action.
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